THOMAS ALLAN CARTER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A defendant is entitled to counsel at sentencing, and a prior waiver for trial does not automatically waive counsel for sentencing.
[1] A trial court may accept a defendant's waiver of counsel if the defendant makes the waiver voluntarily, knowingly, understandingly, and intelligently.
[2] A trial court is not required to assess the wisdom of a defendant's decision to waive counsel and represent himself.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant waived his right to counsel for trial and represented himself. At sentencing, the trial judge confirmed this waiver but did not inquire abou…
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COWART, Judge.
The record discloses an adequate basis for the trial court to have concluded that the appellant voluntarily, knowingly, understandingly and intelligently1 waived his right to have counsel to represent him at trial. The trial judge satisfied himself that appellant had enough information to make an informed decision and was competent enough to know he was making such a decision. The trial judge is not required to inquire as to an accused’s technical legal knowledge and ability or to satisfy himself that the accused is making a wise decision in exercising his right to waive counsel and to defend himself.
However, the trial judge was caught in another snare. An accused is entitled to have counsel at every critical stage of a criminal prosecution. Sentencing is such a critical stage.2 Due process requires that a defendant have counsel at sentencing or that the record show his solvency or valid waiver at that time.
The record on appeal, as supplemented, shows that at the sentencing proceeding in this case the trial judge, recalling that appellant had waived counsel for, and represented himself at, trial, merely confirmed his recollection by asking appellant if he had represented himself and, upon receiving an affirmative reply, proceeded with the sentencing.
Accordingly the judgment of conviction is affirmed and the sentence is vacated and the cause remanded for inquiry as to appellant’s desire for counsel to represent him at sentencing and for resentencing.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, SENTENCE VACATED, CAUSE REMANDED.
COBB and FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., JJ., concur. . See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); Fla.R. Crim.P. 3.160(e).
. Machwart v. State, 222 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969); Wingard v. State, 200 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967); Fulmore v. State, 198 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967); Langlois v. State, 191 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966); Reader v. State, 168 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964); Williams v. State, 165 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964); Evans v. State, 163 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964).
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Citator
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Chestnut v. State, 578 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)…nsidered a knowing waiver of the right to counsel. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.111(d)(1); Singleton v. State, 344 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 354 So. 2d 986 (Fla.1977). Sentencing is a critical stage in criminal proceedings. See Carter v. State, 408 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). Likewise, resentencing is a critical stage in which a defendant has the right to be present and has the right to assistance of counsel. The resentencing in the instant case was not merely for the correction of a clerical error.…
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Brown v. State, 479 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)…at sentencing. The record fails to affirmatively show that the trial judge offered the defendant the assistance of counsel at this critical state1 of the criminal proceedings. See Sayers v. State, 423 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Carter v. State, 408 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.160(e), 3.111(d)(5). The sentence is vacated and the cause remanded for resentencing at which the defendant shall either have counsel or properly waive his right to counsel. REVERSED and REMANDED. DAUKSCH a…
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Sayers v. State, 423 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…CURIAM. Although we find no merit in the appellant’s attacks upon his convictions, we do agree that the trial court erred in failing to renew the offer of assistance of counsel at the sentencing hearing. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.111(d)(5); Carter v. State, 408 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Baranko v. State, 406 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Billions v. State, 399 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); see generally Machwart v. State, 222 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969). [*986] Accordingly, the judgments of conviction ar…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975)
- Evans v. State, 163 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)
- MacHwart v. State, 222 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)
- Reader v. State, 168 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)
- Wingard v. State, 200 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)
- Williams v. State, 165 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)
- Warren v. State, 165 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964)
- Fulmore v. State, 198 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)
- Baker v. State, 191 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966)
- Langlois v. State, 191 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)