TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
ANTHONY J. FURLAN, APPELLEE
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Travelers Insurance Company appealed a judgment requiring it to pay personal injury protection benefits to Anthony Furlan, a pedestrian injured by a vehicle insured under Travelers' policy. The appellate court reversed, holding that Furlan was excluded from coverage under the at-fault vehicle's policy because he was entitled to benefits from his mother's insurance policy as a resident of her household.
Furlan was not entitled to coverage under Meeks' Travelers policy because he fell within the statutory exclusion in section 627.736(4)(d)4, which denies coverage to persons entitled to personal injury protection benefits from another source. As a resident of his mother's household, Furlan was entitled to coverage under her policy and therefore excluded from coverage under the at-fault driver's policy.
[1] A pedestrian injured by a motor vehicle is not entitled to personal injury protection benefits from the vehicle owner's insurer if the pedestrian is entitled to such bene…
[2] A person residing in the household of a motor vehicle owner is entitled to personal injury protection benefits under that owner's policy, even if the person does not own…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“accidental injury sustained by one other than the owner of the vehicle, through contact with the vehicle, is covered only so long as the injured person is not himself either the owner of a motor vehicle with respect to which personal injury protection coverage is required to have been secured or "entitled to personal injury benefits from the insurer of the owner or owners of such a motor vehicle."”
The statutory exclusion that bars Furlan from coverage under the at-fault vehicle's policy because he is entitled to benefits from another source.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn June 10, 1979, eighteen-year-old pedestrian Anthony Furlan was struck and injured by an automobile owned and operated by Meeks, insured by Traveler…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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COBB, Judge.
In this appeal, Travelers Insurance Company contests a final judgment adjudging it liable to pay personal injury protection benefits to the appellee, Anthony J. Furlan, in Furlan’s action for coverage.
Furlan’s complaint against Travelers seeking to have Travelers declared liable to pay personal injury protection benefits to Furlan was tried completely on the parties’ stipulation of facts, from which the following facts were taken. On June 10, 1979, Furlan, an eighteen-year-old pedestrian, was struck and injured by an automobile owned and operated by Meeks. Meeks and his automobile were insured by Travelers, the policy providing for $10,000 personal injury protection coverage with no deductible. At the time of the accident, Furlan did not own a motor vehicle and was a resident in the household of his mother. Furlan’s mother owned an automobile upon which she had an insurance policy from Allstate providing for $10,000 personal injury protection coverage with an $8,000 deductible. The parties agreed that Furlan was entitled to personal injury protection coverage from Allstate, but disputed whether Furlan was covered by Meeks’ Travelers policy.
The trial judge ruled that Furlan was entitled to coverage under Meeks’ Travelers policy and entered judgment for Furlan. This appeal followed.
The question of whether Furlan was entitled to benefits under Meeks’ personal injury protection policy is governed by section 627.736, Florida Statutes (1979). Section 627.736(4)(d)4 provides that accidental injury sustained by one other than the owner of the vehicle, through contact with the vehicle, is covered only so long as the injured person is not himself either the owner of a motor vehicle with respect to which personal injury protection coverage is required to have been secured or "entitled to personal injury benefits from the insurer of the owner or owners of such a motor vehicle.” (Emphasis added.)
At the time of the accident, Furlan’s mother owned a motor vehicle upon which she was required to carry personal injury protection coverage and upon which she did carry personal injury coverage for $10,000 with an $8,000 deductible. Furlan was a resident of his mother’s household at the time of the accident; therefore, he was entitled to coverage under her policy. § 627.736(4)(d)3, Fla.Stat. (1979). Since Furlan was entitled to personal injury protection benefits from another source, he fell squarely within the exclusion of section 627.736(4)(d)4.b and was thus not entitled to personal injury protection coverage under the policy of the owner of the car which struck him. See State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Guerra, 340 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Farley v. Gateway Ins. Co., 302 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974).
This result, of course, relegates Furlan to collecting personal injury protection benefits under his mother’s policy, with an $8,000 deductible, rather than under Meeks’ policy with no deductible. We reject his argument against this “inequity.” Cf. Tapscott v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 330 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). Section 627.739, Florida Statutes (1979), provides that a named insured’s election of a deductible will bind not only the named insured but also any person subject to the coverage. Continental Ins. Co. v. Roth, 388 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). The constitutionality of this statute has not been challenged in this case and, therefore, is not addressed.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this cause remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the appellant, Travelers Insurance Company.
REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions.
ORFINGER and SHARP, JJ., concur.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Farley v. Gateway Ins. Co., 302 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
- Tapscott v. State Farm Mut. Auto. INS. Co., 330 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
- The Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Roth, 388 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Lambert v. Lambert, 340 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)