L. H., A CHILD; C. J. D., A CHILD; G. P. S., A CHILD; D. T. H., A CHILD; H. A., A CHILD; M. D. B., A CHILD; A. C., A CHILD; R. A. J., A CHILD; T. O., A CHILD; AND K. G. D., A CHILD, PETITIONERS,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

Fla. | 1982-01-07
No. 60061
SUNDBERG, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, ALDERMAN and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.
408 So. 2d 1039 Florida Supreme Court (1982) Caution
Cited by 104 cases

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Holding

The legislature has the substantive authority to establish the time period for filing a delinquency petition after a complaint is referred to a juvenile intake officer.


Facts & Procedural History

The case involves a conflict between two appellate decisions regarding the time limit for filing a delinquency petition after a complaint referral. Th…

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Opinion of the Court
OVERTON, Justice.

OVERTON, Justice.

This is a petition to review a decision of the Second District Court of Appeal reported at 392 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), which directly conflicts with the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in P. L. H. v. Brownlee, 389 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla.Const. The issue is whether the amount of time the state had to file a delinquency petition, after a complaint had been referred to a juvenile intake officer, was thirty days, as provided in then Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.110(e), or forty-fivé days, as provided in section 39.05(6), Florida Statutes (1979). Our decision in this case is of limited application because we have since amended Rule 8.110(e) to conform with the forty-five-dáy statutory period. See In re Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, 389 So. 2d 197 (Fla.1980).

We agree with the Second District Court of Appeal that our decision in State Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Golden, 350 So. 2d 344 (Fla.1976), is inapplicable under the circumstances of this cause and approve the district court’s reasoning that the legislature had the substantive authority to establish' the time period. Accordingly, we approve the instant decision of the Second District Court of Appeal and disapprove the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Brownlee.

It is so ordered.

SUNDBERG, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, ALDERMAN and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.


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Cited By (52 total)

  • D.C.W. v. State, 445 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1984)
    …to exceed an additional 15 days, upon such motion by the state attorney when, in the opinion of the court, such additional time is justified because of exceptional circumstances. This paragraph confers a substantive right. See, e.g., L.H. v. State, 408 So. 2d 1039 (Fla.1982). The provision calling for dismissal if the rule is not strictly followed is mandatory. S.R. v. State, 346 So. 2d 1018 (Fla.1977). The district court held that the 45-day period should not be considered activated on a juvenile being pros…
    1 / 2
  • State v. D. B. C., 413 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
    …7, 1980, it is clear that the new statutory language applies. Thus, section 39.05(6) is in direct conflict with Rule 8.110(e). The statute, rather than the rule, controls because the matter is one of substantive, not procedural, law. L. H. v. State, 408 So. 2d 1039 (Fla.1982). Since the statute controls, we must determine “the date the child was taken into custody.” This determination also is necessary for resolution of the second issue raised on appeal — the propriety of the trial court’s holding that the spe…
  • Palm Beach Cnty. v. Town OF Palm Beach, 579 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1991)
    …interest can be implied from the language of a statute which waives soverign immunity. For this proposition the county relies primarily upon Berek v. Metropolitan Dade County, 422 So. 2d 838 (Fla.1982); University Presbyterian Homes, Inc. v. Smith, 408 So. 2d 1039 (Fla.1982); and Mailman v. Green, 111 So. 2d 267 (Fla.1959). Presbyterian Homes and Mailman are distinguishable in that they involve the question of prejudgment interest, a question not presented here. Berek is distinguishable by the fact that a spe…

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