STATE OF FLORIDA, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
SAMUEL RUSHING, DEFENDANT IN ERROR
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The court considered whether the State of Florida, when prosecuting a writ of error, is required to post a bond for costs. The court held that general statutes requiring bonds for costs do not apply to the State, as specific statutes govern costs in State cases and do not mandate such bonds.
No, the general statutory requirement for a bond for costs does not apply to the State of Florida when it prosecutes a writ of error. Specific statutes govern costs in State cases and do not require the State to post a bond.
“We do not think the general statute controlling the subject of costs in writs of error regulates the right • of the defendant in-error, where the State prosecutes such writ.”
Establishes that general cost statutes do not apply to the State when it is the prosecuting party on a writ of error.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe State of Florida filed a writ of error, and the defendant in error moved to dismiss it, arguing the State failed to provide the statutory bond for…
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delivered the opinion of the court.
The defendant in error in this case moves to dismiss the writ of error, upon the ground that the State has failed to give the statutory, bond. It-is insisted by defendant in error that while there may not be a judgment against the Stale without her consent given in a legal manner, still the State, when she enters her own courts as a plaintiff seeking judicial remedies, paust conform to the general statutory , requirements of practice which she has prescribed by the legislation controlling the subject.
'. On. the other hand, the State here insists that the statute, construed according to the. rules of construction prevailing in other courts in cases of like nature, must be held not to embrace the State. Again it is insisted, no provision being made by the Legislature authorizing any officer to give *63a bond, that to give such a construction to the act as requires a bond from, the State, would result in a denial of' justice to the State, would be to require of it something which it cannot do, and to make it impossible under existing statutes for the State to sue out a writ of error in any case. A construction attended with such consequences, it is contended, should not be given.
We do not think the general statute controlling the subject of costs in writs of error regulates the right • of the defendant in-error, where the State prosecutes such writ. Looking to all of the legislation of this State upon the subject of costs, the only reasonable constructic(n to be given to this statute is such as will not embrace the State in its provisions. This is a general statute not naming the State. It requires generally a payment of costs accrued * and a ‘bond for costs to accrue of the original plaintiff prosecuting the writ. There are particular statutes naming the State which regulate the matter of costs in State cases, civil and criminal. By them the rights of a defendant in error as to costs against the State are' secured, and the method 'of their collection is prescribed. These statutes control this subject. They require .no bond of the State, for costs in any judicial proceeding;’ They prescribe another and different right and remedy as to costs, and con- ' stitute the measure of the obligation and duty of the State, as well is the measure of the. right of parties engaged in litigation with it.
It is the rule of the common law that costs are payable, by each party during the progress of the cause. This rqle .as to services performed for the State in its own courts does not prevail, because the statutes regulating the matter provide for an auditing of verified accounts by the Comptrbl-‘ler and their payment by the Treasurer upon warrant. So also this rule of practice prescribed by a general law requiring bond 'for costs is not applicable to the State, as there are other statutes prescribing other methods of obtaining, costs of the State when she is liable therefor. We find but one case covering the question, and that sustains the conclusion we reach. (6 Cal., 389.)
Motion denied.
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State Rd. Dep't of the State of Fla. v. Zetrouer, 105 Fla. 650 (Fla. 1932)…that it is not necessary for the state or one of its departments in addition to the required supersedeas bond to give an additional bond to secure the payment of the award by the jury, as a prerequisite to taking a writ of error. State vs. Rushing, 17 Fla. 223. Appellant is within the protection of this rule. Hampton vs. State Board of Education, 90 Fla. 88, 105 So. 323. Even if this were not the case under the law (Section 1511 Revised General Statutes of 1920, Section 2289 Compiled General Laws of 1927)…
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The Rio Vista Hotel & Improvement Co. v. Belle Mead Dev. Corp., 132 Fla. 88 (Fla. 1937)…by the County Clerk as provided by Section 60. “The Revenue Act of 1874 required the County Assessor to annex to the assessment! roll delivered to the Collector a warrant directing him to collect the State and county taxes. In The State v. Rushing, 17 Fla. 223, and in Donald v. McKinnon, ib., 746, this court held that in the absence of a warrant to the Collector of Revenue he was not authorized to make a sale, and the sale would pass no title. “The twenty-third section of the Act of 1869 authorized and r…
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City OF Miami v. Murphy, 132 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)…ircumstance of the transfer to a different court of the same complaint cannot be said to have reversed the positions of the plaintiff and defendant, inasmuch as it is clear that the transfer was of a pending cause.4 It was held in State v. Rushing, 17 Fla. 223, in interpreting a statute similar to Section 59.09, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., that the state is not required to give bond when it prosecutes a writ of error, and that the state does not come within the purview of the statute requiring an original plaintif…
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