SUSAN M. BRUNER, PETITIONER,
v.
BOARD OF REAL ESTATE AND DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, RESPONDENT
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Susan Bruner sought a writ of prohibition to prevent revocation of her real estate broker's license after the Board of Real Estate found probable cause against her. The court clarified its prior order denying the writ, explaining that a statutory amendment effective July 1, 1981 eliminated the requirement for an informal conference before probable cause determination, making the timing of hearings procedural rather than substantive.
The statutory amendment to section 120.60(6) was retroactively applicable because the timing of when and before whom a hearing must occur is procedural in nature, not substantive. The amendment did not conflict with Pilcher because the court in that case did not consider the statutory change.
[1] A statutory amendment that changes the timing or nature of a required administrative hearing is procedural and may apply retroactively.
[2] A licensee is entitled to a hearing prior to the entry of a final agency order, but the prior requirement for an informal conference before a probable cause determination…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the facts in this case are virtually indistinguishable from Pilcher, where we issued a writ of prohibition”
Establishes the factual similarity to the precedential Pilcher case
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Board of Real Estate found probable cause to commence formal action against Bruner's real estate broker's license, and the Department of Professio…
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SHARP, Judge.
Petitioner, Susan Bruner, seeks a rehearing and/or clarification of our order denying her petition for a writ of prohibition in light of our recent holding in Pilcher v. Peeples, 402 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). She sought a writ of prohibition from this court to prevent the Department of Professional Regulation from proceeding to revoke or suspend her real estate broker’s license. The Board of Real Estate found probable cause to commence formal action against the license of petitioner Bruner and the Department of Professional Regulation concurred in that finding.
We deny the motion for rehearing but we grant the motion for clarification because the facts in this case are virtually indistinguishable from Pilcher, where we issued a writ of prohibition. In Pilcher we construed section 120.60(6), Florida Statutes (1979), as entitling the licensee to an informal conference at which the licensee would be afforded the opportunity to demonstrate compliance with licensing requirements and we held that the informal conference must be held before the Board embarks on a determination of probable cause.
However, as respondent pointed out in this case, section 120.60(6) was changed effective July 1, 1981. Pursuant to that change, a licensee is entitled to a hearing sometime prior to the entry of a final agency order,1 but the requirement for the informal conference was dropped. We deemed the statutory change procedural in nature and concluded it applied retroactively to this case.2 While we agree that the right to a hearing before a final administrative order is rendered is clearly substantive, we believe the timing of when and before whom that hearing must occur is procedural. We therefore denied the writ for prohibition.
The recent change in section 120.60(6) was not considered by the court in Pilcher and therefore it is not in conflict with this case.
MOTION FOR REHEARING DENIED; MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION GRANTED.
DAUKSCH, C. J., and COBB, J., concur. . Ch. 81-180, Laws of Fla. . See Walker & LaBerge, Inc. v. Halligan, 344 So. 2d 239, 243 (Fla.1977); Johnson v. State, 371 So. 2d 556 (Fla.2d DCA 1979); cf. Turner v. State, 410 F. 2d 837 (5th Cir. 1969) (no vested right in a form of administrative procedure).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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L.C. Peeples v. Barton B. Pilcher, 423 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 1982)…to that change, a licensee is entitled to a hearing sometime prior to the entry of a final agency order, but the requirement for the informal conference was dropped. We agree with the fifth district court’s ruling in Bruner v. Board of Real Estate, 409 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), that this statutory change was procedural in nature and applies retroactively in this case. The right to a hearing before a final administrative order is rendered is substantive in nature, but the timing of when and before whom…
Authorities Cited
- Walker & LaBERGE, Inc. v. Halligan, 344 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1977)
- Johnson v. State, 371 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Turner v. United States, 410 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1969)
- Barton B. Pilcher v. Peeples, 402 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)