MARIE A. POWERS, APPELLANT,
v.
ROBERT G. POWERS, APPELLEE
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In a dissolution of marriage, the wife appeals from a final judgment awarding her permanent periodic alimony and lump sum alimony but requiring her to deed her entire interest in the jointly owned marital home to the husband. The appellate court reversed because the trial judge lacked authority to award the wife's property interest without partition, a special equity finding, or the wife's agreement, and could not use equitable distribution as an independent basis for such an award.
No. The trial judge erred in awarding the wife's interest in the marital domicile to the husband. Property in dissolution proceedings must be disposed of by resort to alimony and special equities, not through equitable distribution as an independent vehicle for property awards.
[1] A trial court errs in awarding a party's interest in the marital domicile to the other party when neither party requested partition, the husband did not establish a speci…
[2] The theory of equitable distribution is not an independent vehicle for an award of property in a dissolution of marriage proceeding.
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The core holding that the trial court lacked authority to transfer the wife's property without proper legal grounds.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial judge awarded the wife permanent periodic alimony and lump sum alimony (the husband's interest in a residential condominium unit). The judge…
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[*178] DANAHY, Judge.
The wife appeals from a final judgment of dissolution of marriage in which the trial judge, after awarding the wife permanent periodic alimony and lump sum alimony, directed the wife to deed over to the husband all of the wife’s right, title and interest in the jointly owned marital domicile. Neither party requested partition of jointly owned property, the husband did not establish a special equity in the marital domicile, and the wife did not agree to a disposition of the marital domicile. Under these circumstances, the trial judge erred in awarding the wife’s interest in the marital domicile to the husband.
The husband points out that the trial judge made a lump sum award to the wife of the husband’s interest in a residential condominium unit and justifies the award of the marital dwelling to the husband as a means of accomplishing an “equitable division” of the party’s marriage assets. Recently, the Fourth District Court of Appeal confronted a similar argument and held that the theory of equitable distribution is not an independent vehicle for an award of property in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. Sangas v. Sangas, 407 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). We agree with our sister court’s analysis and holding in that case; here, the property of the parties should have been disposed of by resort to the concepts of alimony and special equities with due regard given for the contribution of both parties.
Since the dispositions and awards in the final judgment are interrelated, we reverse all financial aspects of the final judgment and remand this cause for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
BOARDMAN, A. C. J., and GRIMES, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (12 total)
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Tronconi v. Tronconi, 466 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1985)…t court affirming a property distribution in a mari [*204] tal dissolution proceeding. Tronconi v. Tronconi, 425 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). The decision conflicts with Leonard v. Leonard, 414 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), and Powers v. Powers, 409 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3), of the Florida Constitution. Felicia and Francis Tronconi wed in 1955 in Connecticut. In 1981, their marriage was dissolved in a Florida court. During the course of th…1 / 2
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Althea B. HU v. HU, 432 So. 2d 1389 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)…has recently adopted the doctrine of equitable distribution as a vehicle for dividing or allocating marital property. Tronconi v. Tronconi, 425 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). We respectfully disagree and adhere to our decision in Powers v. Powers, 409 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), in which we held that the theory of equitable distribution is not an independent vehicle for an award of property in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. We held in that case that property of the parties in a dissolution of marr…
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Maas v. Maas, 440 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)…. . Claughton v. Claughton, 393 So. 2d 1061 (Fla.1980); Canakaris; Lynch v. Lynch, 437 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Tronconi v. Tronconi, 425 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); But see Hu v. Hu, 432 So. 2d 1389 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Powers v. Powers, 409 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Sangas v. Penelope Sangas, 407 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)