WILLIAM HUMPHREYS, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, DEFENDANT IN ERROR

Fla. | 1879-06-01
17 Fla. 381 Florida Supreme Court (1879) Positive Treatment
Cited by 31 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

William Humphreys was convicted of false swearing after taking an oath at a voter challenge in 1878. The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that the indictment was fatally deficient because it failed to allege all material elements of the statutory offense.


Holding

The indictment was insufficient and the conviction must be reversed. Where an offense is prescribed by statute, the indictment must charge all material elements of the offense in language equivalent to the statute's words, and the defendant must be brought within all material provisions of the statute. The indictment failed to allege that Humphreys offered to vote, was challenged by an inspector or elector, and was informed of voter qualifications—all conditions precedent making the oath necessary and material.


Key Quotes

“where the offence is one prescribed and defined by statute, it must be charged in the very language of the statute, or in language of equivalent import.”

States the fundamental rule that statutory offenses must be charged in statutory language

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Humphreys presented himself as a qualified elector at a November 1878 election in Alachua County, Florida. His right to vote was challenged, and he to…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
Mr, Justice VanYalkenburgh

Mr, Justice VanYalkenburgh

delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff in error, William Humphreys, having been challenged as not qualified to vote at the fall election of 1878, in Alachua county, and having, as is alleged, taken the oath prescribed by the statute, was indicted for false swearing, tried and-'Convicted. The statute in relation to challenges and the oath of party challenged, approved on the 27th day of February, 1877, and being §7 of Chapter 3021, is as follows:

“If .any person offering to vote shall be challenged as not qualified by an inspector or elector, one of the inspectors shall declare lo the person challenged the qualifications of an elector. If such person shall claim that he is qualified and the challenge be not withdrawn, one of the inspectors shall administer to him the following oath. * * * If §ny person so challenged shall take suck oath, his vote shall be received, provided, his name is on the registration list for such election district; and, provided further, that if he has been naturalized, or declared his intention to become’a citizen of the United States, he shall present to the inspectors his certificate of naturalization, or a duly sealed and certified copy thereof, or a duly sealed and certified copy of his declaration of intention, as the case may be. Should .the name of any person who has been duly registered according to the requirements of this act not appear on the registration list-of the election' district in which he resides, he shall, on offering to vote at the voting place or precinct in sucli election district, be required to .state under oath that he is twenty-one years of age,” &c..

The indictment, as presented by the grand jury, is in following form.

“In the Circuit Court for the Fifth Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida for Alachua county, at the Fall Term thereof, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy-eight.

“Alachua county, to-wit: The grand jurors of the State of Florida, inquiring in and for the body of the county of Alachua, on their oaths do present that William Hum-phreys, late of the county of Alachua aforesaid, in the circuit and State aforesaid, laborer, on the fifth day of November, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy-eight, with force and arms at and in the county of Alachua aforesaid, at a general election held in said Alachua county, in the State aforesaid, in election district number ten, in the town of Micanopy,. did present himself as a duly qualified elector to the duly qualified and acting inspectors of said election, and that his right to -vote at- said election was then and theré challenged and questioned. Whereupon, as is provided and authorized and required by the statute in such cases made and provided, the said William Humphreys was then and there duly, legally and solemnly sworn by one Daniel C. Hart, a duly appointed and qualified inspector of the election aforesaid, at said voting precinct or district, who was duly -authorized and required by law to administer the oath provided for by the statute in such cases made and provided, and the said William Humphreys being so sworn as aforesaid, then and there upon his oath aforesaid, falsely, corruptly, knowingly, wilfully and maliciously before the said- inspector of the election aforesaid, the said Daniel G. Hart, and did swear amongst other things in substance, and to the effect following, that is to say, that he, the said William Hum-phreys had lived and resided in the State of Florida twelve months, and in the said county of Alachua for six months, next preceding said day, the fifth day of November, in the year aforesaid, whereas in truth* and in fact the said William Humphreys had not lived or resided in the said county of Alachua for six months next preceding the said fifth day of November, in the year aforesaid, against the form of the statute in such case made and provided, to the evil example of all others in the like case offending and against the peace'and dignity of the State of Florida.”

A motion was made by the counsel for the prisoner to quash this indictment upon several specific grounds, which was denied by the court, and after verdict a like motion in arrest of judgment was also denied by the court, when the prisoner sued out his writ of error.

The errors assigned are as follows:

1. The court erred in overruling the motion in arrest of judgment, because, first, the indictment does not follow the words of the statute in this: it charges that Humphreys presented himself, as a qualified voter, but it does not allege that he offered to vote.

2. The indictment does not show that one of the inspectors declared to Humphreys the qualifications ‘of an elector before administering the oath.

3. The indictment does not charge any crime in the body of the same, nor in any concluding averment.

4. The indictment does not charge that the matter sworn to was material.

5. The indictment does not allege that the plaintiff in erorr knew or believed that the matters sworn to by'-him were false.

This indictment is clearly insufficient, and the motion made on behalf of the prisoner to quash it should have been granted. It nowhere alleges that the prisoner “offered to vote” previous to being challenged, or that he was challenged “as not qualified by an inspector or by any other elector,” or that “one of the board declared to the person *103challenged the qualification of an elector,” or that the challenge was not subsequently withdrawn. This is an offence prescribed by statute, and the person committing it is made liable to punishment for "false swearing,” and on conviction shall "suffer the pains and penalties of perjury.” (Chap. 10, §1 of Chap. 1637, Laws of Florida, approved August 6, 1868.)

It has long been well settled that where the offence is one prescribed and defined by statute, it must be charged •in the'very language of the statute, or in language of .equivalent import.

In the case of Morgan vs. The State, (13 Fla., 671,) this court says, "it is a general rule ,that unless the words of the statute (creating an offence) be recited, neither the words 'contrary to the form of the statute/ nor any periphrase, intendment or conclusion, will make good an indictment which does not bring the fact prohibited or commanded, in doing .or not doing, whereof the offence consists, within all the material words of the statute.”

In Wharton's Crim. Law, (6th Ed., §364,) it is said, "where the words of the statute are descriptive, of the of-fence, the indictment should follow the language, and expressly charge the described offence of the defendant, or it will be defective.”

It is necessary that the defendant should be brought within all the' material words of the statute, and nothing can be taken by intendment.

• This indictment does not charge that the defendant offered to vote or presented himself for the pulpóse of voting, nor does it allege that he was challenged either by an "inspector or/by any other elector,” nor does it appear that he was informed by an inspector of elections of the necessary qualifications of a voter. These are the conditions precedent which render the oath necessary and material, and it is only after an oath so taken, these conditions having been fully complied with, that the statute punishes "the false swearing” with the pains and penalties of perjury. The indictment does not state all the facts and circumstances which constitute the statute offence, and the party indicted is not brought within the provisions of the statute. "When the facts which the indictment charges may be true, yet the defendant not be prima facia guilty of crime, it* is insufficient, for there still remains at least one thing of which he is not informed; and that he may know certainly what each thing is wherewith lie is charged, all the facts which, enter into his offence must, especially in felony, be set down by express averment, nothing being left to intendment. In other words, the indictment must allege everything which it is necessary for his conviction to prove'against him.” Bishop Crim. Prac., §519; Beasley vs. The State, 13 Ala., 535; Sarah vs. The State, 28 Miss., 267; Kit vs. The State, 11 Humph., 167; see also State vs. Pratt, 10 Lou. Ann., 191; Thompson vs. People, 3 Parker Crim. R., 208; The People vs. Allen, 5 Denio, 76; Com. vs. Hampton, 3 Grat., 590.

The cause in remanded to the Circuit Court with directions to arrest the judgment and discharge the defendant.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (16 total)

  • Pell v. State, 97 Fla. 650 (Fla. 1929)
    …the language of equivalent import. An indictment for an offense prescribed and defined by statute, must state all the facts and circumstances which constitute the offense, or the party indicted is not brought within the provisions of such statute.” 17 Fla. 381. See also 30 Fla. 229; 34 Fla. 181; 58 Fla. 68. These judicial statements should be considered in connection with a subsequent statutory enactment, as Sec. 2892 of the Rev. Stats, of 1892, that “every indictment shall be deemed and adjudged good wh…
  • Russell v. State, 71 Fla. 236 (Fla. 1916)
    …ch constitute the definition of the offense denounced by the statute must be stated in the indictment. Nothing will be taken by intendment. The de [*239] fendant should be brought within all the material words of the statute. See Humphreys v. State, 17 Fla. 381; Barber v. State, 13 Fla. 675; Cook v. State, 25 Fla. 698, 6 South. Rep. 451. Section 3221 defines two phases of the crime of rape, one where the crime is committed upon a female child of the age of ten years or more by force and against her will,…
  • Strobhar v. State, 55 Fla. 167 (Fla. 1908)
    …titute for it. We are quite sure, however, that the phrase “by nature of” which is the language of the indictment, is equivalent to the phrase “by reason of,” which is the language of the existing statute, and that is sufficient. Humphreys v. State, 17 Fla. 381; 7 Ency. Pl. & Pr., 423. Nature is defined as meaning character, sort or kind. Standard Dictionary; State v. Murphy, 23 Nev. 390, 48 Pac. Rep. 628. The expression “by nature' of his employment” means through the character of his employment, or “by r…

Previewing 3 of 16 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw