FLORIDA ROCK INDUSTRIES, INC. AND UNDERWRITERS ADJUSTING CO., APPELLANTS,
v.
JOAN B. BEACH, APPELLEE
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Impairment Rating cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM,
The deputy erred in awarding workers’ compensation disability benefits based on physical impairment to the body as a whole under section 440.15(3)(u), Florida Statutes (1978 Supp.), because there is no substantial competent evidence of any permanent injury to any unscheduled part of the body. Accordingly, the deputy’s award must be limited to the scheduled benefits under section 440.15(3)(s) for lost use of a leg, based on the highest impairment rating testified to by any physician, 7 percent of the left leg. Baird-Ray Datsun v. Butler, 400 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); section 440.25(3)(b), Fla.Stat. (1978 Supp.).
Claimant’s average weekly wage also was erroneously calculated on the basis of claimant’s 1978 annual income reported to the federal government and unreported earnings. Because claimant worked “substantially the whole” of the 13-week period preceding her injury, her average wage should be one-thirteenth of the wages she actually earned during this period. Section 440.14(1), Fla.Stat. (1977).
REVERSED and REMANDED.
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., C. J., and LARRY G. SMITH, and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
S & S Stove Repair, Inc. v. Dumas, 465 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…s from the schedule only when there was no competent substantial evidence of any permanent injury to any unscheduled part of the body. See Taylor v. International Paper Co., 404 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. Beach, 409 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). In the instant case, Dr. Gilbert testified, and the deputy agreed, that the injury to claimant involving the intertrochanteric fracture permanently affected the body as a whole by way of the muscular connection between the leg a…
Authorities Cited
- Baird-Ray Datsun & Lynn Underwriting Co. v. Butler, 400 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)