GILBERT L. O'NEAL AND MARTA O'NEAL, HIS WIFE, APPELLANTS,
v.
STELLA BOLLING, APPELLEE
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The O'Neals appealed a summary judgment in Stella Bolling's favor for $22,800. The court reversed in part, holding that whether the money was a gift or a loan presented a factual dispute that could not be resolved by summary judgment, and remanded for trial on the disputed $22,800 portion while affirming the judgment on an undisputed $5,000 loan.
Summary judgment was improper because the characterization of the $22,800 transfer as a gift or loan presented a material factual dispute. Even if a fiduciary relationship created a presumption of invalidity for gifts, the facts concerning the relationship and the fairness of the gift were disputed issues requiring trial.
[1] Summary judgment is inappropriate when the sole undisputed fact is that a party received money, and the central issue is whether the transaction was a loan or a gift.
[2] A presumption of invalidity for a gift arising from a fiduciary relationship can be overcome by evidence of the gift's fairness and validity, even if the existence of the…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Whether Mrs. Bolling, as she asserted, made a loan of $22,800 to Gilbert O'Neal in 1972 or, as O'Neal asserted, Mrs. Bolling gave him this money as a gift, was most clearly an issue which could not be resolved by a summary judgment where the sole undisputed fact is that O'Neal received the money.”
Establishes the fundamental legal principle that factual disputes regarding gift versus loan characterization preclude summary judgment.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGilbert O'Neal received $22,800 from Stella Bolling in December 1972. Bolling asserted this was a loan, while O'Neal claimed it was a gift. The partie…
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DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge.
Whether Mrs. Bolling, as she asserted, made a loan of $22,800 to Gilbert O’Neal in 1972 or, as O’Neal asserted, Mrs. Bolling gave him this money as a gift, was most clearly an issue which could not be resolved by a summary judgment where the sole undisputed fact is that O’Neal received the money. Even if, arguendo, the trial court premised the summary judgment on the theory that any gift was presumptively invalid because O’Neal occupied some fiduciary relationship with Bolling, see, e.g., Crane v. Stulz, 136 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961), the material facts concerning the relationship were in dispute; and, in any event, this presumption of invalidity may be overcome by showing the fairness and validity of the gift, matters which were also in dispute.
Accordingly, we must reverse that part of the judgment in Bolling’s favor which awarded her $2,800 with interest at seven per cent commencing December 13, 1972, and $20,000 with interest at seven per cent commencing December 26, 1972. We affirm that part of the judgment, conceded by O’Neal to be based on an unrepaid loan, which awards Bolling $5,000 with interest at seven per cent per annum commencing December 4, 1972, and which denies Bolling attorneys’ fees on her claim.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part, and remanded for trial.1
. Since the case is remanded for trial, we note for the future guidance of the trial court that Mrs. Bolling’s recently-fashioned typed likenesses of the $2,800 and $20,000 promissory notes are not duplicates as defined by Section 90.951(4), Florida Statutes (1981). See Law Revision Council Note (1976) (manually reproduced copies, as by typing or handwriting, are excluded from the definition [of duplicate]). The Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 1001(4) provides that: “Copies subsequently produced manually, whether handwritten or typed, are not within the definition [of duplicate].” (emphasis supplied). If the trial court is satisfied with Bolling’s predicate proof that the originals are lost and no duplicates ever existed, it may allow Bolling to establish the contents of the notes in the manner provided in Section 90.954, Florida Statutes (1981), which may be by oral testimony. See United States v. Standing Soldier, 538 F. 2d 196, 203 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1025, 97 S.Ct. 646, 50 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976); Klein v. Frank, 534 F. 2d 1104, 1107 (5th Cir. 1976); see also Action Fire Safety Equipment, Inc. v. Biscayne Fire Equipment Company, Inc., 383 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
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Authorities Cited
- Sellars v. California, 429 U.S. 1025 (U.S. 1976)
- Spates v. Vollero, 429 U.S. 1025 (U.S. 1976)
- Crane v. Stulz, 136 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961)
- Action Fire Safety Equip., Inc. v. Biscayne Fire Equip. Co., Inc., 383 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- The United States v. Soldier, 538 F.2d 196 (8th Cir. 1976)
- Klein v. Frank, 534 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1976)