IN RE THE ADOPTION OF BRIDGETT DANIELLE BRAITHWAITE, JOHN R. POMEROY, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
RONALD CHARLES BRAITHWAITE, APPELLEE
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John Pomeroy appeals from a judgment approving the adoption of his biological child by the child's stepparent without his consent. The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court failed to make adequate findings regarding whether statutory abandonment had been clearly established as the sole basis for dispensing with parental consent in stepparent adoptions.
The appellate court reversed the adoption judgment because the trial court failed to make explicit findings of fact and conclusions of law demonstrating that abandonment under the applicable statute had been clearly established. The court remanded for the trial court to properly address whether abandonment occurred, given conflicting evidence about whether infrequent contact resulted from abandonment or from legitimate impediments including the father's employment, distance, economic circumstances, and the custodial parent's obstruction of the relationship.
[1] Severance of a parent-child relationship is an extreme and harsh judicial act requiring clear statutory basis.
[2] Abandonment is a statutory ground for adoption without parental consent.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The severance of a parent-child relationship is an extreme and harsh judicial act, and it should not be done unless the trial judge is convinced that the statutory basis for this remedy has been clearly established.”
Establishes the stringent standard required for severing parental rights in adoption proceedings, rejecting a mere best-interest-of-the-child test.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePomeroy's biological child was in the custody of the mother in Florida while Pomeroy worked on an offshore oil rig in Texas, creating significant dist…
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SHARP, Judge.
Pomeroy appeals from a judgment approving the adoption of his child by a stepparent, and severing his parental relationship with her. We reverse and remand for the reasons stated in this opinion.
The severance of a parent-child relationship is an extreme and harsh judicial act, and it should not be done unless the trial judge is convinced1 that the statutory basis for this remedy has been clearly established.2 The applicable statute provides the only grounds for an adoption in this context:
The court may excuse the consent of the following individuals to an adoption:
(1) A parent who has deserted a child without affording means of identification or who has abandoned a child;3
In this case the only possible statutory basis for granting an adoption without Pomeroy’s consent is abandonment because there was no evidence of desertion. The trial court here merely found the adoption was in “the best interest of the child” and that the stepparent was a “fit and proper person to adopt the minor child.”
Our review of the record shows that the facts tending to show abandonment are in conflict. Although the contacts between Pomeroy and his child were infrequent during the two years prior to filing the petition, this could have been largely caused by the nature of the father’s job (a worker on an off-shore oil rig), the long distances between the parent and child (Texas — Florida), adverse economic circumstances experienced by the father, and a conscious effort on the part of the custodial parent to extinguish the relationship between the child and her natural father. She returned his Christmas presents, did not allow a requested summer visitation, and did not keep Pomeroy informed of the child’s current address.4
As an appellate court we did not hear the testimony, and we cannot resolve the conflicts in the record, nor determine credibility of witnesses. Therefore, we reverse the judgment and remand this cause to the trial court for entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether this petition should be granted. Because of the lapse of time between the trial (May 4, 1981) and this court’s opinion, the trial court may, in its discretion, take additional testimony on the relevant issues.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
ORFINGER and FRANK D. UP-CHURCH, Jr., JJ., concur. . Roy v. Holmes, 111 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959).
. The relationship between a parent and child is also constitutionally protected. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972).
.§ 63.072(1), Fla.Stat. (1979); see Solomon v. McLucas, 382 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
. The custodial parent of a child also owes an obligation to the non-custodial parent, to encourage and nurture the parent-child relationship. It is often only too easy for the custodial parent to undermine and starve the non-custodial parent’s contacts and relationships with the child, particularly where the parties are separated by long distance. There is some suggestion in the record that this (in part) occurred here.
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Laurel D. Schutz v. Schutz, 581 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. 1991)…nurture the relationship between the child and the noncustodial parent. See Schütz v. Schütz, 522 So. 2d at 875; Gardner v. Gardner, 494 So. 2d 500, 502 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), appeal dismissed, 504 So. 2d 767 (Fla.1987); In re Adoption of Braithwaite, 409 So. 2d 1178, 1180 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). This duty is owed to both the noncustodial parent and the child. This obligation may be met by encouraging the child to interact with the noncustodial parent, taking good faith measures to ensure that the child visit and o…
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In re the Adoption OF John DOE v. DOE, 524 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)…re Guardianship of D.A. McW., 429 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) approved, 460 So. 2d 368 (Fla.1984). . See Webb v. Blancett, 473 So. 2d 1376 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Hinkle v. Lindsey, 424 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); In re Adoption of Braithwaite, 409 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). . Webb, supra.; see Turner v. Adoption of Turner, 352 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). . Fla.R.App.P. 9.030(a)(2)(B)(i).…
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Gardner v. Elinor Chechak Gardner, 494 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)…r responsibility. The custodial parent may not merely remain neutral with regard to visitation, but has an affirmative obligation to the noncustodial parent “to encourage and nurture the parent-child relationship.” In re the Adoption of Braithwaite, 409 So. 2d 1178, 1180, n. 4 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); see also Gordon v. Gordon, 368 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). In the Gordon case this court recognized that suspension of alimony payments is a drastic measure, but found it appropriate where, as here, the wife and…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (U.S. 1972)
- Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (U.S. 1972)
- Quilloin v. Walcott et vir, 434 U.S. 246 (U.S. 1978)
- Solomon v. Donald L. McLUCAS et ux., 382 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
- ROY v. Holmes, 111 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959)