WILLIAM LEE THOMPSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Thompson, convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death, sought collateral relief under Rule 3.850 by recanting his trial testimony that blamed him for the crime and claiming his codefendant forced this testimony. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of relief, holding that an unsubstantiated recantation standing alone is insufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing, particularly where the underlying issue was already fully litigated on direct appeal.
The Court held that Thompson's recantation statement, standing alone without supporting evidence of coercion, is insufficient to justify an evidentiary hearing, particularly where the issue of dominance was already fully litigated on direct appeal. The Court affirmed the trial court's denial of collateral relief as a matter of law.
[1] A collateral relief proceeding cannot be used to raise issues that could have been raised on direct appeal.
[2] Collateral relief proceedings are not a vehicle to retry issues previously litigated on direct appeal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Collateral relief proceedings may not be used as a vehicle to raise, for the first time, issues that the petitioner could have raised during the initial appeal on the merits, nor may they be used to retry issues previously litigated on direct appeal.”
Establishes the primary limitation on collateral relief—it cannot resurrect issues already addressed on direct appeal
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThompson was adjudicated guilty of first-degree murder following his second guilty plea and was sentenced to death. He had previously testified under …
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from a denial of collateral relief brought under Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Appellant was adjudicated guilty of first-degree murder, following his second plea of guilty to that offense, and was sentenced to death. This Court affirmed. Thompson v. State, 389 So. 2d 197 (Fla.1980). Prior to that decision, we allowed appellant to withdraw his first plea of guilty. See Thompson v. State, 351 So. 2d 701 (Fla.1977). Although this is the first application for collateral relief, it is the third time this cause has been before this Court. We have jurisdiction, article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution, and affirm, finding that the trial court properly denied relief.
As stated in detail in our second opinion, appellant was sentenced to death for his part in the brutal torturing and slaying of a female victim, in which we determined appellant was the dominant force. See 389 So. 2d 197. In this proceeding, appellant contends that his codefendant, Rocco James Surace, forced him to take the full blame for the murder and that, contrary to appellant’s testimony at Surace’s trial, Surace was the moving force in the torture-murder. Appellant also argues that his death sentence is inappropriate because Surace received a life sentence. See Surace v. State, 378 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
Appellant contends Gafford v. State, 387 So. 2d 333 (Fla.1980), and Slater v. State, 316 So. 2d 539 (Fla.1975), require a reduction of his sentence to life imprisonment to make the sentences consistent and not disparate.
The record is clear that appellant testified under oath at codefendant Su-race’s trial and took the full blame for the murder. It is apparent that his testimony resulted in Surace’s conviction of only second-degree murder. Thompson claims in his statement for collateral relief that “[t]he whole testimony at [Surace’s] trial was the end product of [Surace’s] coaching. I wouldn’t have said any of it if I wasn’t scared that he would either kill me himself or have someone else do it.” The statement is signed by appellant as “true to the best of my memory.” Appellant offers no evidence, other than his present statement, to establish that his testimony at Surace’s trial was the product of coercion.
We find that this statement recanting his sworn in-court testimony, standing alone in the manner it is presented, is insufficient to justify an evidentiary hearing for collateral relief, particularly where that testimony goes toward the issue of dominance which was fully litigated in the second full appeal before this Court.
Collateral relief proceedings may not be used as a vehicle to raise, for the first time, issues that the petitioner could have raised during the initial appeal on the merits, nor may they be used to retry issues previously litigated on direct appeal. Barclay v. State, 408 So. 2d 1020 (Fla.1981); Hargrave v. Wainwright, 388 So. 2d 1021 (Fla.1980); Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla.1980). On this record, no evidentiary hearing was required. We conclude the trial court properly determined that appellant is not entitled to any relief as a matter of law. Graham v. State, 372 So. 2d 1363 (Fla.1979); Spenkellink v. State, 350 So. 2d 85 (Fla.1977); State v. Weeks, 166 So. 2d 892 (Fla.1964); see Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F. 2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978).
We affirm the trial court’s denial of collateral relief. No motions for rehearing will be entertained.
It is so ordered.
SUNDBERG, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, ALDERMAN, McDONALD and EHRLICH, JJ., concur.
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Cited By (25 total)
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Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 2000)…denying relief on Thompson’s first postconviction motion, in which Thompson claimed that his codefendant Surace was the dominant actor in the murder and that Surace’s life sentence rendered the death sentence disproportionate. See Thompson v. State, 410 So. 2d 500 (Fla.1982). Thompson then pursued relief in the federal courts, which was denied. See Thompson v. Wainwright, 787 F. 2d 1447 (11th Cir.1986) (affirming denial of petition for writ of habeas corpus); Thompson v. Wainwright, 714 F. 2d 1495 (11th Cir.…
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Johnson v. Louie L. Wainwright, 463 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1985)…en and, if properly protested and preserved for appeal, could have been raised by the initial appeal and therefore are not proper grounds for relief by motion to vacate under rule 3.850. Booker v. State, 441 So. 2d 148 (Fla.1983); Thompson v. State, 410 So. 2d 500 (Fla.1982). Indeed, point (6) is merely a reiteration and amplification of an argument that was decided adversely to appellant. The trial court’s summary denial of relief on all of the above grounds was therefore proper. As for points (4) and (8) a…
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Thompson v. State, 619 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1993)…ial judge imposed the death penalty and this Court affirmed the trial judge’s order in Thompson v. State, 389 So. 2d 197 (Fla.1980). Thompson then filed a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion, which this Court denied in Thompson v. State, 410 So. 2d 500 (Fla.1982). After this Court [*263] denied the rule 3.850 motion, Thompson sought federal habeas corpus relief. Both the United States District Court and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals denied Thompson relief. Thompson v. Wainwright, 787 F. 2d…
Previewing 3 of 25 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (13 total)
- Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980)
- Spinkellink v. Louie L. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978)
- State v. Weeks, 166 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1964)
- The Petition of Andrew A. Graham v. State, 372 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. 1979)
- Darius Slater v. State, 316 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1975)
- Spenkelink v. State, 350 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 1977)
- Lenson A. Hargrave v. Louie L. Wainwright, 388 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1980)
- Thompson v. State, 351 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1977)
- Rocco James Surace v. State, 378 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Biro Mfg. Co. v. Maurice P. Aube et ux., 387 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1979)