STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
DANIEL DENNIS DERATANY, APPELLEE
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The court held that the speedy trial period for the second charge began upon the defendant's arrest for that charge, not the earlier charge.
The defendant was charged with two separate crimes. The first charge was nolle prossed. He was arrested for the second charge and later moved for disc…
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SHARP, Judge.
The State appeals from the trial court’s order discharging Deratany because the “speedy trial” time of one hundred eighty (180) days1 had expired before he was brought to trial. We reverse because the record shows less than one hundred eighty (180) days had passed following Deratany’s arrest when he made his motion for discharge.
The question in this case, as in State v. Van Winkle, 407 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), is when the one hundred eighty (180) day time period began to run. On October 11, 1980 Deratany made a report to a police officer and on October 15, 1980 he presented an insurance claim, both relating to jewelry he claimed had been stolen. Deratany was charged with making a false report to a police officer, and he appeared and answered the charge on December 17, 1980. Later the State nolle pressed this charge. Deratany was arrested on April 12, 1981 on the charge of presenting a false insurance claim. He filed a motion for discharge on June 22, 1981. The one hundred eighty (180) day period had run if calculated from December 1980, but it had not if calculated from April, 1981.
We conclude that, as in Van Winkle, this defendant was charged with two separate and distinct crimes committed at different times. His arrest or being held to answer charges on the first crime had no impact, for Speedy Trial Rule purposes, on his arrest for the second crime. The one hundred eighty (180) day period began to run on the second crime when Deratany was arrested on April 12, 1981, and it had not run when he filed his motion for discharge.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
ORFINGER and COBB, JJ., concur. . Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(a)(1).
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State v. Roxie Lynn Hanna, 858 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)…cisions leads us to the following observations. First, generally, when crimes occur on different days, not as a part of one uninterrupted event, they are not part of the same criminal episode, even when they are related. See e.g., State v. Deratany, 410 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (false report of theft to police; false claim of same theft to insurance company four days later); Giglio v. Kaplan, 392 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (burglary of auto on day one; forgery of credit card slip next day for card…
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State v. Domonique T. Pelham, 99 So. 3d 599 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)…“same conduct” test in more recent years. Hanna, 858 So. 2d at 1250; Cummings v. State, 64 So. 3d 712 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011); State v. Banks, 50 So. 3d 730 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010); Clevenger v. State, 967 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); State v. Deratany, 410 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). However, as pointed out by Pel-ham, this was not the test that we applied in Deiches v. Kaney, 375 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979), the primary case upon which Pelham relies in his argument on appeal. In Deiches, law enforcement…
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JAY v. State, 443 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…other pending case against appellant is immaterial. Crimes not involving the “same conduct or criminal episode” have separate speedy trial periods which run from the date the defendant is taken into custody on each of the charges. State v. Deratany, 410 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); State v. Van Winkle, 407 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Additionally, the State may not use its prosecuting procedures to unlawfully extend a speedy trial period. State v. Kelly, 407 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). Because we…
Authorities Cited
- State v. van Winkle, 407 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)