JOHNNIE R. COPELAND, APPELLANT,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Citator

Cited By

• Bray v. Elec. Door-Lift, Inc., 558 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
  …evidence is mot merely cumulative or impeaching. Dade National Bank of Miami v. Kay, 131 So. 2d 24, 26 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 135 So. 2d 746 (Fla.1961). It is the movant’s burden to establish the exercise of due diligence. King v. Harrington, 411 So. 2d 912, 915 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), review denied, 418 So. 2d 1279 (Fla.1982). While the requirement of due [*48] diligence is not a legal absolute, Ragen v. Paramount Hudson, Inc., 434 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), review denied, 444 So. 2d 417 (Fla.1984); J…
• Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. Nat Ratner, 497 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
  …First, a trial judge is vested with broad discretionary power to grant or deny a new trial. Eley v. Moris, 478 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Second, granting a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence is disfavored. King v. Harrington, 411 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 418 So. 2d 1279 (Fla.1982). Third, newly discovered evidence is a valid basis for a new trial only where the evidence could not have been discovered before trial by the exercise of due diligence, and where the evidence…
• Fla. Dep't OF Corr. v. Provin, 515 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
  …to an issue that was not timely asserted. We disagree. Although a due diligence standard has been applied in judicial proceedings to bar evidence that could have been discovered before trial by the exercise of due diligence, see King v. Harrington, 411 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 418 So. 2d 1279 (Fla.1982), we do not, for the reasons previously stated, regard judicial standards as wholly applicable to administra [*306] tive proceedings. In fact, in regard to an agency’s power to consider reheari…