JAMES A. DILLMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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James Dillman appealed his armed robbery conviction, challenging both the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss based on violation of the 180-day speedy trial rule and the admission of prejudicial hearsay evidence. The court affirmed the denial of the speedy trial motion but reversed the conviction due to improper admission of statements implicating Dillman in an unrelated murder, which served only to establish criminal propensities.
The court held that Dillman's insistence on his right to a full extradition hearing constituted an effective revocation of his earlier waiver, depriving him of any right to be tried within 180 days. However, the court held that the State's introduction of statements implicating Dillman in an unrelated murder, which established nothing beyond criminal propensities, was improper and required reversal.
[1] A prisoner's subsequent insistence on a full extradition hearing effectively revokes an earlier waiver of extradition and deprives the prisoner of the right to be tried w…
[2] Evidence of a defendant's criminal propensities, unrelated to the charges being tried, is inadmissible.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the defendant's subsequent insistence on his right not to be returned to Florida without a full and complete extradition hearing was an effective revocation of his earlier waiver of extradition”
Establishes that revocation of extradition waiver deprives defendant of speedy trial protections
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDillman, a prisoner in Colorado, requested final disposition of a Florida detainer. Within 180 days of his request, he demonstrated unwillingness to w…
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DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge.
The State established by adequate proof that the defendant, a prisoner in Colorado who had requested final disposition of a detainer resulting from pending Florida charges, see Section 941.45(3), Florida Statutes (1979), did within 180 days of his request evince his unwillingness to waive extradition. We hold that the defendant’s subsequent insistence on his right not to be returned to Florida without a full and com-píete extradition hearing was an effective revocation of his earlier waiver of extradition 1 and deprived him of any right to be tried within 180 days of his request under Section 941.45(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), or Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(b)(3) (1979), see O’Bryan v. State, 326 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss under the statute and motion for discharge under the rule.2
However, because the State, over the defendant’s objection,3 persisted in eliciting statements of the defendant made to a State witness, which statements implicated the defendant in a murder totally unrelated to the armed robbery charge being tried4 and established nothing more than the criminal propensities of the defendant, we are compelled to reverse the defendant’s conviction and remand the cause for a new trial. Rodriguez v. State, 372 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Paul v. State, 340 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 348 So. 2d 953 (Fla.1977). See Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.1959).
Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded for a new trial.
. A request for final disposition is deemed to be a waiver of extradition. § 941.45(3)(e), Fla. Stat. (1979).
. Our holding makes it unnecessary to address the State’s various other contentions in support of the trial court’s order. . While the defendant’s objection on hearsay grounds to his own admission was off the mark, his objection on the grounds that the statements were irrelevant and prejudicial, made before trial in a motion in limine and during trial, were well taken. The fact that these statements were made by the defendant does not, of course, entitle them to admission. See, e.g., Paul v. State, 340 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 348 So. 2d 953 (Fla.1977); Jenkins v. State, 177 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965); Minturn v. State, 136 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962); Hooper v. State, 115 So. 2d 769 (Fla.3d DCA 1959).
. The State’s witness (Wake) related a conversation between the defendant and one Kiever (who was charged, but not tried, with the defendant in the present case) in which the defendant, having heard Kiever’s admission that he killed someone during a poolroom fight, purportedly stated, “Man, that was a coldblooded scene.” The witness further testified that the defendant then placed a scorpion ring on his finger and made a sinister remark that he was like a scorpion, which when “he stings you, you’re going to die.”
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Vernal E. Malcolm v. State, 415 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…eously admitted evidence of the defendant’s involvement in another drug investigation and a previous similarly unrelated sale at the premises where the one in question allegedly occurred. State v. Norris, 168 So. 2d 541 (Fla.1964); Dillman v. State, 411 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), and cases cited; Beneby v. State, 354 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), cert. denied, 359 So. 2d 1220 (Fla.1978); Roche v. State, 326 So. 2d 448 (Fla.2d DCA 1976); see Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.1959); Sec. 90.404(2), Fl…
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Rolle v. State, 431 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…hese references to a revolting act with which the defendant had nothing to do, requires no extensive documentation. E.g. Chapman v. State, 417 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); see Malcolm v. State, 415 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Dillman v. State, 411 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). The same is true of the harmful effect of the evidence upon the jury [*328] who may well have believed that, in order to punish someone for the sexual battery which had undoubtedly occurred, it was necessary to convict the only p…
Authorities Cited
- Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959)
- Jackson Holloway Hooper v. State, 115 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)
- Paul v. State, 340 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- O'Bryan v. State, 326 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
- Minturn v. State, 136 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)
- Jenkins v. State, 177 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)
- Rodriguez v. State, 372 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)