W. L. PHILBRICK AND CHRISTINE J. PHILBRICK, HIS WIFE, SUBSTITUTED FOR W. L. PHILBRICK, INC., APPELLANTS,
v.
RONALD A. WEDEL AND DORIS N. WEDEL, HIS WIFE, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court reversed a specific performance judgment, holding that no enforceable contract existed because the financing terms were indefinite and the buyers made a counteroffer that was never accepted.
No enforceable contract existed because the financing portion was indefinite and the buyers' counteroffer on financing was never accepted by the sellers.
[1] Financing terms that are entirely indefinite in their provisions are not susceptible to enforcement by specific performance.
[2] A counteroffer on material contract terms, when not accepted by the other party, prevents formation of an enforceable contract.
Previewing 2 of 2 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Philbricks and Wedels negotiated a real estate transaction, but disagreed over the financing terms of the agreement.…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Real Estate Transactions cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
The final judgment of specific performance which is under review by this appeal is reversed upon a holding that there was never an enforceable contract entered into by the parties herein because: (a) the financing portion of the subject agreement was, in our view, entirely indefinite in its terms and was, therefore, not susceptible to a decree of specific performance, see e.g., Chaney v. Brown, 158 Fla. 489, 29 So. 2d 209 (1947); Maloy v. Boyett, 53 Fla. 956, 43 So. 243, 245 (1907); Brown v. Dobry, 311 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), and (b) the plaintiff buyers, Ronald Wedel and Doris Wedel, in any event, never accepted the financing portion of the subject agreement, but made a counter proposal thereon, which was never acted upon by the defendant sellers W.
L. Philbrick and Christine Philbrick. See e.g., Mehler v. Huston, 57 So. 2d 836 (Fla.1952); Bullock v. Harwick, 158 Fla. 834, 30 So. 2d 539 (1947); Strong & Trowbridge Co. v.
H. Baars & Co., 60 Fla. 253, 54 So. 92, 93-94 (1910); Brickell Townhouse, Inc. v. Hirschfield, 404 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Mintzberg v. Golestaneh, 390 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). The cause is, accordingly, remanded to the trial court with directions to enter a judgment in this action for the defendant sellers, W.
L. Philbrick and Christine Philbrick.
Reversed and remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Maloy v. Boyett, 53 Fla. 956 (Fla. 1907)
- Strong & Trowbridge Co. v. H. Baars & Co., 60 Fla. 253 (Fla. 1910)
- Bullock v. Harwick, 158 Fla. 834 (Fla. 1947)
- Burneo v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 273 So. 3d 154 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019)
- Mehler v. Huston, 57 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1952)
- Brown v. Dobry, 311 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- Kartee v. Manchero, 390 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Chaney v. Brown, 158 Fla. 489 (Fla. 1947)
- Henderson v. State, 404 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Brickell Townhouse, Inc. v. Hirschfield, 404 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)