KENNETH MARTINEZ, PETITIONER,
v.
DAVID DEMERS, COUNTY JUDGE, RESPONDENT

Fla. 2d DCA | 1981-12-04
No. 81-2041
BOARDMAN, A.C.J., and GRIMES and OTT, JJ., concur.
412 So. 2d 5 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1981) Caution
Cited by 7 cases

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Synopsis

A county judge denied a defendant's motion for sanity inquisition in a misdemeanor case based on an administrative order requiring such motions to be heard by a circuit court judge. The appellate court held the administrative order invalid because it impermissibly divested county courts of their statutory and constitutional jurisdiction over misdemeanor cases.


Holding

Administrative Order No. 55 is invalid because it violates the jurisdictional authority of county judges over misdemeanor cases. Although Rule 2.050(b)(4) permits assignment of judges for temporary service, it does not authorize a blanket reassignment of an entire category of misdemeanor motions to a circuit judge.


Headnotes

[1] An administrative order that diverts a specific type of motion in misdemeanor cases from county court to a circuit court judge is invalid as it contravenes the jurisdicti…

[2] A chief judge's authority to assign a judge for temporary service does not permit the wholesale diversion of a category of cases from one court to another.

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Key Quotes

“we do not agree that Rule 2.050(b)(4) is authority for giving a portion of all misdemeanor cases (such as motions for sanity inquisitions) to a circuit judge. The rule contemplates assignment for 'temporary service.' The administrative order does not assign a particular judge for a limited amount of time.”

The court's primary reasoning for finding the administrative order invalid—the rule authorizes only temporary assignments, not permanent diversion of categories of cases.

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Facts & Procedural History

Kenneth Martinez was charged with trespass after warning, a misdemeanor, in Pinellas County. His appointed counsel filed a Motion for Sanity Inquisiti…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner was charged with trespass after warning, a misdemeanor. Trial was set in the County Court of Pinellas County. Petitioner’s appointed counsel filed a Motion for Sanity Inquisition pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.216(a). The respondent county judge entered an order denying the Motion for Sanity Inquisition stating as follows:

It is the ruling of this Court that said motion is sufficient on its face, and an expert would have been appointed had it not been for Administrative Order No. 55 issued by Robert E. Beach, Chief Judge of the Sixth Judicial Circuit on September 24, 1981 which provides:
It is ordered that henceforth all petitions for sanity inquisitions in misdemeanor cases shall be brought before the Criminal Administrator for determination.

The criminal administrator is a circuit court judge. Petitioner has filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus alleging that the above-quoted administrative order violates the constitutional and statutory provisions giving misdemeanor jurisdiction to county courts and is not otherwise authorized. Respondent contends that the administrative order is authorized by Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.050(b)(4) which provides, in part, that “the chief judge [of a circuit] may assign any judge to temporary service for which the judge is qualified in any court in the same circuit.” He argues that the administrative judge functions as an assigned county court judge when hearing motions for sanity inquisition in misdemeanor cases. Respondent further points out that Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.050(b)(5) permits the chief judge to designate an administrative judge “to assist with the administrative supervision of the court or division.” Finally, respondent suggests that the order is a proper exercise of the responsibility for the economical operation of the courts within the circuit as illustrated by section 925.036, Florida Stat utes (1979), providing that the rate at which a special public defender is to be paid in all cases is set by the chief or senior judge in the circuit.

We perceive respondent’s strongest argument in support of the administrative order to be the authority provided by Rule 2.050(b)(4). If this rule authorizes Administrative Order No. 55, then the constitutional and legislative jurisdictional problems are met because the administrative judge would be sitting as a county judge. However, we do not agree that Rule 2.050(b)(4) is authority for giving a portion of all misdemeanor cases (such as motions for sanity inquisitions) to a circuit judge. The rule contemplates assignment for “temporary service.” The administrative order does not assign a particular judge for a limited amount of time.

Thus, Administrative Order No. 55 is invalid because it contravenes the jurisdictional authority of county judges. This Petition for Writ of Mandamus is granted to the extent that respondent shall rule on the merits of the Motion for Sanity Inquisition filed by petitioner. BOARDMAN, A.C.J., and GRIMES and OTT, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • The Honorable John E. Crusoe v. Rowls, 472 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 1985)
    …assignment of a county judge to a circuit court position. The district court recognized that we have a two-tier trial system and believed that the administrative order impermissibly changed the jurisdiction of the two tiers. See Martinez v. Demers, 412 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). We understand the reluctance of the district court to approve an administrative order that seemingly directs the hearing of a particular type of circuit court work by county judges on a permanent basis, but we place no such cons…
  • Rowls v. The Honorable John E. Crusoe, 463 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
    …court cases to county judges. Although perhaps not a model to be followed, we think that the administrative order, in effect, assigns the named county judges to serve as circuit judges in certain child support enforcement cases. Martinez v. Demers, 412 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), cited by petitioner in support of his argument, is distinguishable. In that case, an administrative order was entered by the chief judge which provided that “all petitions for sanity inquisitions in misdemeanor cases shall be bro…
  • Wells v. State, 654 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
    …nd, Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.020(c) provides that an administrative order may not be inconsistent with the Constitution. An administrative order also may not contravene the jurisdictional authority of the courts. Martinez v. Demers, 412 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). Third, section 741.30(9)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), grants the circuit court jurisdiction to enforce compliance with an injunction against domestic violence through civil or indirect criminal contempt proceedings. Administrati…

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