FLORANDO INVESTMENT CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
ESTER FRIED AND LAWRENCE FRIED, APPELLEES

Fla. 2d DCA | 1982-02-03
No. 80-2254
SCHEB, C. J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.
412 So. 2d 14 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1982) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Florando Investment Corporation sold mobile home lots and mobile homes to the Frieds, financing the transaction with promissory notes secured by purchase money mortgages. When Florando foreclosed after the Frieds failed to pay, the trial court found fraud and securities law violations, and fashioned an equitable remedy that left the Frieds in possession of the property without requiring repayment. Florando appealed, and the appellate court reversed, holding that rescission was the appropriate remedy to prevent Florando from profiting from its illegal and fraudulent conduct.


Holding

The appellate court held that rescission is the appropriate remedy and that the trial court abused its discretion by leaving the parties where it found them. Rescission should be ordered to place the parties as nearly as possible back in their original positions, with the sale of Lot 88 to the third party being allowed to stand and credited against what Florando owes the Frieds.


Headnotes

[1] A transaction induced by fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation may be subject to rescission.

[2] The sale of lots coupled with a rental arrangement can constitute the sale of unregistered securities.

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Key Quotes

“Although it is within the discretion of the trial court to formulate equitable remedies, we are of the opinion that the remedy evidenced in the final judgment is unduly harsh.”

Establishes the appellate court's standard of review and finding that the trial court abused its discretion despite having discretion to fashion remedies.

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Facts & Procedural History

In 1973, Ester and Lawrence Fried purchased two mobile home lots and five new mobile homes from Florando for a total of $106,591, with a $21,706 down …

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Opinion of the Court
HOBSON, Judge.

HOBSON, Judge.

Ester and Lawrence Fried purchased two mobile home lots and five new mobile homes from Florando Investment Corporation (Florando) in 1973. The total purchase price was $106,591, and the Frieds made a $21,706 down payment. The $84,885 balance was represented by two promissory notes from the Frieds to Florando, secured by purchase money mortgages on each lot. The Frieds never made a mortgage payment, and in 1978, Florando initiated foreclosure actions on each mortgage. The Frieds filed two affirmative defenses: fraud and misrepresentation on the part of Florando, and violation of Florida securities law, chapter 517, Florida Statutes (1977). Prior to trial, the Frieds sold one of the lots (Lot 88) and one mobile home thereon to a third party for $15,000.

After a nonjury trial, the court entered a final judgment holding that Florando, through its sales agent, had induced the Frieds to enter the transaction by fraud, deceit and misrepresentation. The court further held that the sale of the lots, coupled with the rental arrangement, constituted the sale of unregistered securities, in violation of chapter 517, Florida Statutes.

The final judgment denied Florando enforcement of the notes and mortgages and held them to be null and void. It ordered Florando to endorse the titles to the mobile homes so that the Frieds would own them free and clear. Finally, the court awarded the Frieds $9,305.25 in rental income, plus any additional sums collected, along with court costs of $97.55. Florando does not appeal the portion of the final judgment which ruled in favor of the Fried’s affirmative defenses. The only issue raised in this appeal is the correctness of the trial court’s choice of remedies. The two choices considered by the court were: 1) to rescind the transaction and place the parties back in their original positions, or 2) to leave the parties where the court found them. Florando argues that the effect of the court’s decision to leave the parties where it found them is to give the Frieds possession of the lots and mobile homes for which they made only a $21,706 down payment and to forgive the mortgage payments with accrued interest amounting to approximately $165,000. Further, the Frieds retain the benefit of all rentals earned, an amount in excess of $9,000.

Florando urges this court to reverse the portion of the final judgment which provided an inequitable remedy and order the entire transaction rescinded in order to place the parties back in their initial respective positions. In that event, the Frieds would be required to tender back the property and be reimbursed by Florando for the down payment, unpaid rental fees, interest, court costs and attorney fees.

Although it is within the discretion of the trial court to formulate equitable remedies, we are of the opinion that the remedy evidenced in the final judgment is unduly harsh. We agree that Florando cannot be allowed to profit from an illegal transaction induced by fraud and misrepresentation. Rescission precludes this result.

We hold that the trial court abused its discretion in leaving the parties where it found them under the facts of this case. We reverse the final order and remand the cause in order that the trial court may rescind the entire transaction and devise a formula by which the parties will be placed, as nearly as possible, in their original respective positions. In so doing, the trial court shall allow the sale of Lot 88 to stand and reduce the amount that Florando owes the Frieds by the amount of the purchase price received or to be received by the Frieds from the third party.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

SCHEB, C. J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • W.F. Yost v. Rieve Enters., Inc., 461 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
    …misrepresentation, and it is within the discretion of the trial court to formulate equitable remedies, including rescission of the transaction and restoration of the parties to their original positions. See Florando Investment Corporation v. Fried, 412 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). Moreover, a party may defend against liability on a claim or obligation by demonstrating that he was fraudulently induced to enter into a contract or transaction upon which such liability is asserted. See Poneleit v. Reksmad, Inc…
  • Hutchinson v. Kimzay OF Fla., Inc., 637 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
    …operty. The trial court had the discretion to formulate equitable remedies because, otherwise, inequity could be done by Hutchinson terminating the lease and inheriting the windfall of the improvements to this property. Florando Inv. Corp. v. Fried, 412 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). There is no doubt the 18 December order was a temporary injunction because it provided injunctive relief. The order forbids appellant from asserting any action whatsoever to terminate the lease. An injunction is an order “forbid…
  • Walker v. Eris, 886 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)
    …mplained about the presence of the lien, and apparently they are willing to deal with the property in the condition received. The trial court placed the parties, as nearly as possible, in their original positions. Florando Investment Corp. v. Fried, 412 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).…

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