ROUNDTREE TRANSPORT, INC., AND CARRIERS INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANTS,
v.
JOHN C. GODEK, APPELLEE
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In a workers' compensation case, the trial deputy awarded an attorney's fee of $7,710.00 that exceeded the statutory schedule provided in Florida Statute 440.34. The appellate court found the deputy's reasons for departing from the schedule insufficient and reversed, requiring redetermination of fees based on the statutory factors and the correct hours worked.
The court reversed the fee award because the deputy's articulated reasons for departing from the statutory schedule were insufficient. The court required redetermination of attorney's fees in compliance with statutory factors and based on the correct time expended (81 hours and 5 minutes, not 91 hours and 5 minutes).
[1] A court must consider all statutory factors when determining attorney's fees, even when departing from a fee schedule.
[2] An award of attorney's fees must be supported by findings that consider the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions, and the skill requisite…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Mindful of the legislative intent to standardize fees except in exceptional circumstances, we find the articulated reasons given by the deputy insufficient to justify the disparity between the statutory fee and the award.”
Establishes that the court applies a strict standard requiring sufficient justification for departing from the statutory fee schedule.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceClaimant's counsel secured workers' compensation benefits worth $17,104.98 and was awarded an attorney's fee of $7,710.00. The deputy found that the a…
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SHAW, Judge.
Claimant’s counsel secured benefits for the claimant worth $17,104.98 and was awarded an attorney’s fee of $7,710.00. The employer/carrier argues that the fee is excessive and violates Florida Statute 440.-34 (1980). We agree and REVERSE. Section 440.34 provides the deputy with a sliding fee schedule to be followed. In addition to the schedule, the statute provides that the deputy shall consider:
(a) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.
(b) The likelihood, if apparent to the claimant, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude employment of the lawyer by others or cause antagonisms with other clients.
•(c) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
(d) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the claimant.
(e) The time limitation imposed by the claimant or the circumstances.
(f) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the claimant.
(g) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing services.
(h) The contingency or certainty of a fee.
After considering these factors, if it is his judgment that the circumstances of the particular case so warrant, he may vary from the suggested schedule by increasing or decreasing the fee.
The deputy’s departure from the schedule in this instance was based upon findings that claimant’s attorney expended ninety-one hours and five minutes of professional non-handholding effort in obtaining the benefits, the claim was not routine, claimant’s counsel exhibited a high degree of professional skill, and a customary fee would range from $3,315.74 to $12,500.00.
Mindful of the legislative intent to standardize fees except in exceptional circumstances, we find the articulated reasons given by the deputy insufficient to justify the disparity between the statutory fee and the award. When a deputy chooses to depart from the schedule, the order should reflect that he considered all of the relevant, prescribed factors to the extent that circumstances permit. East Coast Tire Co. v. Denmark, 381 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). The order under consideration does not meet this standard. We note also in this case that the deputy awarded benefits on the basis of ninety-one hours and five minutes of professional time, whereas the record shows that the claimant’s attorney claimed only eighty-one hours and five minutes. REVERSED and REMANDED for a redetermination of attorney’s fees in compliance with this order and based upon eighty-one hours and five minutes of attorney’s time.
McCORD and ERVIN, JJ., concur.
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Martin Marietta Corp. & Scott Wetzel Servs. v. Glumb, 523 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)…440.34, Florida Statutes, embodies legislative intent to standardize attorney’s fee awards in the workers’ compensation area, unless exceptional circumstances warrant a departure from the recommended fee schedule. Roundtree Transport, Inc. v. Godek, 412 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), pet. for review denied, 443 So. 2d 979 (Fla.1983). Although the amount of benefits obtained is a significant factor, it is not determinative of the maximum amount that can be awarded as a fee. Davis v. Keeto, Inc., 463 So. 2d 3…
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Fiesta Fashions, Inc. v. Matilde Capin and the Division of Workers' Compensation, 450 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…ional circumstances, and when a deputy commissioner departs from the statutory schedule, the order should reflect that he considered all of the relevant, prescribed factors to the extent that circumstances permit. Roundtree Transport, Inc. v. Godek, 412 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). In the instant case, the order restates the statutory criteria and states that these factors were considered. The only specific fact mentioned, however, was the amount of time expended in prosecuting the claim, 49½ hours. The…
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Brevard Cnty. Mental Health Ctr. & St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 420 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…ermit. In this case the deputy commissioner appears to have based his determination solely on the number of hours expended by claimant’s attorney. A similar situation resulted in reversal and remand in the case of Roundtree Transport, Inc. v. Godek, 412 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), which found the articulated reasons given by the deputy commissioner insufficient to justify the disparity between the statutory fee and the awarded fee. This would be especially true in the case at bar. Here, claimant’s attorne…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- E. Coast Tire Co. & the Home Ins. Co. v. Denmark, 381 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)