BARBARA BEVACQUA, APPELLANT,
v.
MICHAEL BEVACQUA, APPELLEE
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The trial court's dissolution judgment was affirmed except for its refusal to award attorney's fees, which was reversed and remanded for the trial court to award reasonable attorney's fees based on the wife's need and the husband's ability to pay.
A trial court acts within its discretion in awarding rehabilitative alimony and denying the marital home as lump sum alimony, but must award attorney's fees when the spouse has a clear need and the other party has sufficient ability to pay.
[1] In a dissolution proceeding, a trial court must award attorney's fees when the spouse seeking fees demonstrates a clear need for counsel and the other party has sufficien…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBarbara Bevacqua appealed a final judgment of dissolution in which the trial court awarded her $35 per week in rehabilitative alimony, denied her the …
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant seeks reversal of a final judgment of dissolution because the trial court 1) refused to award her the marital home as lump sum alimony; 2) awarded her only $35 per week rehabilitative alimony; 3) refused to award her attorney’s fees, costs and expenses; 4) refused to require appellee to satisfy a lien on the parties’ condominium; and 5) refused to award lump sum child support.
Although the award of rehabilitative alimony was somewhat meagre, we hold that the trial judge acted within the parameters of his discretion in making the various determinations complained of with the exception of his refusal to award appellant any attorney’s fees in the final judgment. It appears from the record and oral argument that appellant had a clear need for attorney’s fees over and above the award pen-dente lite. While the appellee’s ability to pay is not abundant, it is certainly sufficient to meet appellant’s need to obtain counsel.
Accordingly, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all respects except the failure to award appellant attorney’s fees is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to award appellant a reasonable attorney’s fee for services of her counsel in the trial court.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART, and remanded with directions.
DOWNEY and HERSEY, JJ., and OWEN, WILLIAM C., Jr., Associate Judge, concur.