RINKER MATERIALS CORPORATION AND LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANTS,
v.
JOHNNIE M. HARRIS, APPELLEE
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An employer/carrier appeals a workers' compensation award that included attorney's fees, and the court affirms the wage loss and penalty benefits but reverses the attorney's fee award due to insufficient findings on the statutory prerequisites for such fees.
The order is affirmed with respect to wage loss and penalty benefits but reversed regarding attorney's fees because the deputy commissioner failed to make the required finding of bad faith under Florida Statutes § 440.34(2)(b) and did not conduct a separate evidentiary hearing specifically on the attorney's fee issue.
[1] An award of attorney's fees in a workers' compensation case arising from an accident on or after August 1, 1979, is governed by specific statutory provisions.
[2] A statutory provision allowing attorney's fees for passive disapproval and rejection of claims on technical matters of form requires a finding of bad faith by the employe…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The award of attorney's fees for services rendered in connection with a claim arising out of an accident which occurred on or after August 1, 1979, is governed by the provisions of § 440.34(2), Florida Statutes (1979).”
Establishes the controlling statutory framework for determining attorney's fee awards in workers' compensation cases.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceClaimant Johnnie Harris suffered a compensable industrial accident on October 23, 1979. At the conclusion of the hearing on his claim for benefits, th…
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PER CURIAM.
The employer/carrier appeals an order of the deputy commissioner awarding wage loss benefits, penalties, and attorney’s fees. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Only one of the three issues raised by the employer/carrier requires discussion. Claimant suffered a compensable industrial accident on October 23, 1979. At the close of a hearing held on his claim for benefits, the deputy commissioner awarded attorney’s fees finding only that the services rendered by claimant’s attorney were reasonable. This was error. The award of attorney’s fees for services rendered in connection with a claim arising out of an accident which occurred on or after August 1, 1979, is governed by the provisions of § 440.34(2), Florida Statutes (1979). Laws of Florida, Chapter 79-312, Section 15.
The claimant did not file a claim for medical benefits only, nor did the employer/carrier deny that an injury occurred for which compensation benefits were payable. Accordingly, neither Section 440.34(2)(a), nor Section 440.34(2)(c) would justify the award of attorney’s fees in this case.
Claimant argues that the award of attorney’s fees may be justified under Section 440.34(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), in that the conduct of the employer/earrier amounted to the kind of passive disapproval and rejection of claims on mere technical matters of form which was condemned in Florida Erection Services, Inc. v. McDonald, 395 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). However, the deputy commissioner did not make a finding of bad faith on the part of the employer/earrier as required by Section 440.34(2)(b), nor was the question of entitlement to attorney’s fees on the basis of bad faith specifically litigated as a separate issue with factual evidence presented going directly to that issue as that subsection requires. See, Embry Riddle Aeronautical U. v. Vestal, 399 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Accordingly, the order of the deputy commissioner is affirmed except as to the award of attorney’s fees. The cause is remanded, and the deputy commissioner is directed to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the question of claimant’s entitlement to attorney’s fees.
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., C. J., and LARRY G. SMITH and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Ardmore Farms & Esis v. Smith, 423 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…on mere technical matters of form.” 395 So. 2d at 211. Cf., Layne Atlantic Co. v. Scott, 415 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Exceptional Children’s Home v. Fortuna, 414 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Rinker [*1043] Materials Corporation v. Harris, 413 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Sam Rogers Enterprises v. Williams, 401 So. 2d 1388 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Even assuming for purposes of discussion, that certain errors or irregularities in the form of filing of wage loss claim forms might be considered “mere t…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- Fla. Erection Servs., Inc. v. Raymer McDONALD, 395 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Univ. & the Hartford Ins. Grp. v. Vestal, 399 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)