ST. JOE PAPER COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
HUBERT R. ADKINSON, PROPERTY APPRAISER OF WALTON COUNTY, FLORIDA; JACK LITTLE, TAX COLLECTOR OF WALTON COUNTY, FLORIDA; BOB ANDERSON, LAWTON MATHEWS, HUGHIE INFINGER, MILFORD BASS AND JOHNNIE MOORE, AS MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF TAX ADJUSTMENT OF WALTON COUNTY, FLORIDA; AND J. ED STRAUGHN, DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEES
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St. Joe Paper Company appealed a nonfinal trial court order on remand that authorized parties to submit additional evidence on property valuation after this court had previously reversed and remanded the case. The court granted certiorari and quashed the order as excessively broad, limiting any new evidence to only the gulf-front property at issue.
The trial court's order is excessively broad. While the trial court has broad discretion in handling the cause after reversal and remand, and may properly reopen proceedings for further evidence on the gulf-front property whose testimony was excluded, the order's broad terms improperly permit additional evidence on other properties. The order must be limited to the gulf-front property only.
[1] A nonfinal order that does not qualify for review under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130 may be treated as a petition for common law writ of certiorari.
[2] Upon reversal and remand with general directions for further proceedings, a trial judge possesses broad discretion in directing the course of the cause.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Upon reversal and remand with general directions for further proceedings, the trial judge has broad discretion in handling or directing the course of the cause thereafter.”
Establishes the general principle that trial judges have discretion on remand, but this discretion is not unlimited.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn a prior appeal (St. Joe Paper Company v. Adkinson, 400 So.2d 983), this court had excluded certain appraisal testimony relating to gulf-front prope…
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McCORD, Judge.
This is an appeal from a nonfinal order entered by the trial court upon remand following our opinion in St. Joe Paper Company v. Adkinson, 400 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). The nonfinal order does not qualify for review under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130. We treat it as a petition for common law writ of certiorari.
The order entered by the trial court on remand finds that as a result of the appraisal testimony excluded by this Court’s mandate, there is insufficient evidence upon which to render a competent decision as to the assessed value of the properties in question. The trial court further finds that justice will best be served by allowing both plaintiff and defendants to present additional evidence on the assessed value of the property in question, and it authorizes the parties to submit such additional evidence. The excluded testimony referred to in the trial court’s order was the appraisal testimony of the two expert witnesses of appel-lee property appraiser and part of the testimony of one expert witness of appellant. The excluded testimony related only to the gulf-front property and had no relation to the agricultural land values.
Upon reversal and remand with general directions for further proceedings, the trial judge has broad discretion in handling or directing the course of the cause thereafter. Lucom v. Potter, 131 So. 2d 724 (Fla.1961); The City of Pensacola v. Capital Realty Holding Co., Inc. (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), Case No. AF-45, opinion filed March 29, 1982. Insofar as-the trial court’s order reopens the proceedings below for further evidence as to the value of the gulf-front property, we find no departure from the essential requirements of law. While the trial court may not intend to allow additional testimony as to property values other than of the gulf-front property, it appears that such additional evidence could be presented under the broad terms of the order. If allowed, such would be a departure from the essential requirements of law. Prior to the final judgment which was the subject matter of the previous appeal, each party had, of course, closed its case, and our opinion did not require deletion of any of the evidence other than that relating to value of the gulf-front property. Thus, the order is excessively broad in its terms and must be limited only to the gulf-front property.
Certiorari is granted, and the order appealed from is quashed.
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., C. J., and BOOTH, J., concur.
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Collins v. State, 680 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…1); City of Pensacola v. Capital Realty Holding Co., Inc., 417 So. 2d 687, 688 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Where the remand instruction is specific, it is improper to exceed the bounds of that instruction. See, generally, St. Joe Paper Company v. Adkinson, 413 So. 2d 107, 108 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). In this case, the remand instructions were narrow and specific. This court reversed the consecutive habitual offender sentences which arose out of the same criminal episode, pursuant to Hale v. State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla.1…
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Veiner v. Veiner, 459 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…er proceedings, a trial judge is vested with broad discretion in handling or directing the course of the cause thereafter. City of Pensacola v. Capital Realty Holding Co., Inc., 417 So. 2d 687, 688 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); St. Joe Paper Co. v. Adkinson, 413 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). The trial court reacquired jurisdiction over the cause upon the issuance of our mandate. Murphy v. Murphy, 378 So. 2d 27 (FLa. 3d DCA 1979). Obviously it had to do so or otherwise our mandate would have been an exercise in futil…
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COX v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 203 So. 3d 204 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)…ee. There were no instructions in the opinion as to the remand. Id. When there is a remand with general directions for further proceedings, a trial judge is vested with broad discretion regarding proceedings on remand. St. Joe Paper Co. v. Adkinson, 413 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in the conduct of the proceedings on remand. Its order sufficiently complied with the opinion in Cox, and its findings were supported by competent substantial evidence. In her second…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Virginia Willys Lucom (formerly Virginia Willys de Landa) v. Fay Hall Potter, 131 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1961)
- ST. JOE Paper Co. v. Adkinson, 400 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)