MARLENE MARKS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA AND SOUTH CAROLINA INSURANCE COMPANY AND CRAWFORD AND COMPANY, APPELLEES
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Marlene Marks was injured in two separate work accidents covered by different insurers. The deputy commissioner awarded permanent partial disability benefits using a formula that departed from the statutory 350-week schedule. The court held that because it had previously rejected a challenge to the 350-week schedule provision, the deputy was bound by that precedent and could not depart from it.
The deputy commissioner was bound by the court's prior rejection of the challenge to the 350-week schedule and improperly departed from it in computing the compensation rate. Departure from the statutory schedule was error.
[1] A deputy commissioner's prior ruling on the applicability of a statutory schedule, if not appealed or if an appeal is unsuccessful, is binding upon that deputy commission…
[2] A deputy commissioner errs in departing from a statutory schedule for computing compensation rates when the claimant's overall disability exceeds 10% and the prior ruling…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Our rejection of the cross-appeal challenging use of the 350-week schedule is binding upon the deputy upon remand. His departure therefrom was error.”
This quote establishes the core holding that the deputy was bound by the appellate court's prior disposition and could not depart from the statutory schedule.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMarks suffered compensable work accidents in February 1978 (insured by South Carolina Insurance Company) and May 1979 (insured by Crawford and Company…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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SHAW, Judge.
Claimant suffered compensable accidents in February of 1978 when the employer was represented by South Carolina Insurance Company, and May of 1979 when the employer was represented by Crawford and Company, a Division of Risk Management. The deputy commissioner found an overall impairment rating of 25% to the body as a whole, which he apportioned as follows: South Carolina Insurance Company 20%, Crawford and Company 5%. He ordered South Carolina to pay claimant permanent partial disability benefits for 70 weeks at $126.00 a week, and Crawford and Company to pay permanent partial disability benefits for 17.5 weeks at the stipulated compensation rate of $130.00. South Carolina appealed the award, and the Division of Risk Management cross-appealed the use of the 350-week schedule provided in section 440.-15(3)(u)(l), Florida Statutes (1978 Supp.), as amended July 1, 1978.
We reversed the award as being unsupported by medical evidence and disallowed penalties, but found no merit in the cross-appeal.
Upon remand the deputy reduced the overall physical impairment rating to 20% of the body as a whole and found South Carolina Insurance Company responsible for 52.5 weeks of permanent partial disability benefits at $126.00 per week. Crawford and Company was ordered to pay 17.5 weeks of permanent partial disability benefits at the weekly compensation rate of $130.00. The deputy later amended the latter award by changing the 17.5 weeks to 8.75 weeks. In her appeal from the amended order, the claimant takes the position that the deputy erred in departing from the 350-week schedule in computing the compensation rate.
We agree. In both the original hearing and the hearing on remand, the deputy found that the claimant’s overall disability exceeded 10%, 5% of which he apportioned to the Division of Risk Management. Our rejection of the cross-appeal challenging use of the 350-week schedule is binding upon the deputy upon remand. His departure therefrom was error. See Walker v. Atlantic Coastline Railroad Co., 121 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960). The amend7 ed order of the deputy commissioner is accordingly REVERSED.
MILLS and LARRY G. SMITH, JJ., concur.