FRANK CHESNEY, APPELLANT,
v.
NATIONAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT AND LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court reversed a deputy commissioner's decision, holding that a claimant was entitled to attorney's fees despite the employer/carrier's eventual acceptance of the claim. The employer's initial denial of compensability triggered the entitlement to fees.
Yes, the claimant is entitled to attorney's fees because the employer explicitly denied that the injury was compensable, which is sufficient to trigger the statutory provision for attorney's fees when the claimant prevails on the issue of compensability.
[1] An employer's statement to a claimant that an injury is "no way a compensation case" constitutes a denial of compensability for the purpose of awarding attorney's fees.
[2] A claimant is entitled to an attorney's fee when the employer/carrier initially denies compensability, even if the carrier later accepts the claim as compensable before a…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The employer in this instance informed the claimant in no uncertain terms that his injury was' not compen-sable.”
Establishes the employer's explicit denial of compensability.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe claimant suffered an industrial injury and reported it to his supervisor, who stated it was not a compensation case. The claimant hired counsel, a…
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PER CURIAM.
Claimant suffered an industrial injury on March 25, 1980, when a motorcycle he was riding overturned. After his release from the hospital, the claimant formally reported the accident to his supervisor in early April and was told “[TJhere’s no way it’s a compensation case.” Claimant thereafter contacted counsel, and a claim was filed with the Division of Workers’ Compensation on April 16, 1980. The employer consistently denied compensability, even when it notified the carrier on April 23 that an accident had occurred. After deposing witnesses and completing its investigation, the carrier informed the claimant on June 16, 1980, the date of the scheduled pre-hearing conference, of the carrier’s decision to accept the case as compensable. The deputy commissioner found that the claimant was not entitled to an attorney’s fee because: (1) the carrier did not deny that an injury occurred for which compensation benefits were payable; (2) there was insufficient evidence to substantiate a claim that the employer/carrier acted in bad faith in the handling of the claim.
We agree with the deputy’s conclusions that the carrier did not act in bad faith in handling the claim and never denied that a compensable injury occurred.
Nevertheless, a fee is due claimant’s counsel in this instance.
Section 440.34(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1979), unambiguously states that a claimant shall be entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee “where a carrier or employer denies that an injury occurred for which compensation benefits are payable, and the claimant prevails on the issue of compensability.” The employer in this instance informed the claimant in no uncertain terms that his injury was' not compensable. This remained the position of the employer and the carrier for more than two months until the carrier accepted compensability on the day of the pre-hearing conference. Under such circumstances, the claimant is entitled to an attorney’s fee despite the carrier’s subsequent acceptance of the case as compensable.
REVERSED and REMANDED for award of attorney’s fee.
MILLS, LARRY G. SMITH, and SHAW, JJ., concur.
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Gulledge v. Dion OIL Co. & Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 605 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…sdiction of a judge of compensation claims before notice of acceptance of the claim is communicated to the claimant, and the claimant prevails on the claim through a favorable settlement with the carrier. See Chesney v. National Property Management, 414 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). [*487] As the appealed order is based on a construction and application of subsection 440.34(3)(c) that conflicts with this opinion, the order is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this op…
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Fleetwood Homes OF Fla. & Crawford & Co. v. Ouida Biagiano, 543 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…PER CURIAM. Finding that competent substantial evidence does not support the statutory award of attorney’s fees under section 440.34(3)(c) Florida Statutes, [see Chesney v. National Property Management, 414 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) ] we reverse and remand to the deputy commissioner to consider, in a separate hearing, whether competent, substantial evidence would support such an award under section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes. Reversed and Remanded. B…