VIRGINIA WEST, PETITIONER,
v.
RICHARD B. WEST, RESPONDENT

Fla. | 1982-04-29
No. 57305
BOYD, ALDERMAN and McDONALD, JJ., concur’., SUNDBERG, C. J., and ADKINS, J., dissent.
414 So. 2d 189 Florida Supreme Court (1982) Negative Treatment
Cited by 24 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court held that a former spouse cannot maintain an independent tort action against the other spouse for an intentional tort committed during marriage, but clarified that a trial court in a divorce proceeding has authority to address such intentional torts through alimony awards, medical expense compensation, and consideration of permanent injuries when establishing support obligations.


Holding

A former spouse cannot maintain an independent tort action against the other spouse for an intentional tort committed during marriage. However, the trial court in a dissolution proceeding has authority to address such intentional torts by directing the offending spouse to pay medical expenses and by considering any permanent injury, disfigurement, or loss of earning capacity caused by the intentional tort when establishing appropriate alimony.


Headnotes

[1] A former spouse cannot maintain an action in tort against the other spouse for an intentional tort committed during the marriage after the marriage has been dissolved by…

[2] In a dissolution proceeding, a court has the authority to direct the offending spouse to pay necessary medical expenses not covered by insurance resulting from an intenti…

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“WHETHER A FORMER SPOUSE CAN MAINTAIN AN ACTION IN TORT AGAINST THE OTHER SPOUSE FOR AN INTENTIONAL TORT ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED DURING MARRIAGE WHERE SUCH MARRIAGE HAS SINCE BEEN DISSOLVED BY DIVORCE.”

The certified question presented to the Florida Supreme Court

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Virginia West sued her former husband Richard B. West for intentional tort, alleging he threw her to the floor during their marriage in 1977, causing …

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
OVERTON, Judge.

OVERTON, Judge.

Petitioner, Virginia West, sued her former husband, Richard B. West, alleging that during their marriage the husband intentionally injured her by throwing her to the floor, causing a triple fracture of her left ankle. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action on the ground of interspousal tort immunity. She appealed to the Second District Court of Appeal which affirmed the trial court’s dismissal and certified to us, pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution (1972), the following question:

WHETHER A FORMER SPOUSE CAN MAINTAIN AN ACTION IN TORT AGAINST THE OTHER SPOUSE FOR AN INTENTIONAL TORT ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED DURING MARRIAGE WHERE SUCH MARRIAGE HAS SINCE BEEN DISSOLVED BY DIVORCE.

West v. West, 372 So. 2d 170, 172 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).

In Hill v. Hill, 415 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1982), we have answered the question in the negative. However, we emphasized that, where an intentional tort has occurred, the trial court in a subsequent dissolution proceeding has the authority

to direct the offending spouse to pay the necessary medical expenses not covered by insurance and the . . . authority to consider any permanent injury, disfigurement, or loss of earning capacity caused by an intentional tort in establishing appropriate alimony under section 61.08, [Florida Statutes 1979] particularly that provision which provides “the court may consider any other factor necessary to do equity and justice between the parties.”

Hill v. Hill, at 24.

We note that in the instant proceeding the parties were married in 1976. The incident occurred in 1977, and the marriage was dissolved in 1978. The trial judge in the dissolution proceeding retained jurisdiction to award permanent alimony “in the event that modification is necessary in the future case of any disability the wife may have that is directly related to the injuries she sustained during her marriage to the Husband.” The trial judge in the dissolution proceeding further directed the husband to pay all doctor, medical, and hospital bills, not otherwise covered by insurance, which resulted from the husband’s tortious injury to the wife.

The trial court in the dissolution proceeding has properly complied with our decision in Hill v. Hill. Accordingly, the instant decision of the Second District Court of Appeal is approved.

It is so ordered.

BOYD, ALDERMAN and McDONALD, JJ., concur’.

SUNDBERG, C. J., and ADKINS, J., dissent.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (11 total)

  • Siegel v. Siegel, 564 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)
    …’ marital assets, or that it permanently affected Victoria’s earning capacity or caused her any lasting emotional or physical disability. See generally, Noah v. Noah, 491 So. 2d 1124 (Fla.1986); Hill v. Hill, 415 So. 2d 20 (Fla.1982);5 West v. West, 414 So. 2d 189 (Fla.1982). Reprehensible conduct by a former spouse is not a sufficient basis, standing alone, to justify the award of permanent alimony in a case where rehabilitative alimony is appropriate.6 II. ATTORNEY FEE AWARD. The trial court awarded Victo…
  • Waite v. Beres Waite, 593 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)
    …k compensation in the dissolution proceeding, Hill v. Hill, 415 So. 2d 20 (Fla.1982); Roberts v. Roberts, 414 So. 2d 190 (Fla.1982), we question whether that rule remains viable after Sturiano. Appellee argues that the earlier ease of West v. West, 414 So. 2d 189 (Fla.1982), bars Mrs. Waite’s action. Mrs. West alleged that she sustained a triple fracture of her left ankle when her husband intentionally threw her to the floor. West, 414 So. 2d at 189. The West court held that a wife could not bring a post-dis…
    1 / 2
  • Mosbarger v. Mosbarger, 547 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
    …osbarger’s criminal conduct, which is not a statutorily recognized act of marital misconduct, should be treated more severely in this domestic proceeding. § 61.08(1), Fla.Stat. (1987); Noah v. Noah, 491 So. 2d 1124 (Fla.1986). See also West v. West, 414 So. 2d 189 (Fla.1982) (intentional tort claim barred by interspousal immunity, but divorce court may consider economic damages caused by the intentional tort in award of alimony to injured spouse). Beyond the consequential economic damage to the family unit ca…

Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw