HARRY A. SWEETEN, SR., APPELLANT,
v.
JUNE A. ANDERSON AND THE CHURCH OF THE LITTLE FLOWER, APPELLEES

Fla. 4th DCA | 1982-05-19
No. 81-980
GLICKSTEIN, J., and OWEN, WILLIAM C., Jr., (Retired) Associate Judge, concur.
414 So. 2d 258 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1982) Caution
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

A divorced father appealed a garnishment proceeding seeking to enforce a final judgment for child support arrearages. The court held that once child support arrearages are reduced to a final judgment, they fall outside the statutory exemption from wage garnishment, thus reversing the lower court's decision.


Holding

Once child support arrearages are reduced to a final judgment, they fall outside the exception carved out by Section 61.12, and therefore the wage garnishment exemption of Section 222.11 applies, precluding garnishment of wages.


Headnotes

[1] Wages for personal labor or services are exempt from garnishment, absent a statutory exception.

[2] An exception to the wage garnishment exemption exists for debts arising from court orders for alimony, suit money, or child support.

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Key Quotes

“Section 61.12, Florida Statutes (1981) carves out of the Section 222.11 exemption an exception where the debt for which garnishment is sought arises from ".. . orders of the court of this state for alimony, suit money, or child support .. . . "”

Establishes the statutory framework for the exception to wage garnishment for family support obligations.

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Facts & Procedural History

June A. Anderson obtained a final judgment against Harry A. Sweeten, Sr. for $39,217.00 in child support arrearages. A writ of garnishment was served …

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Opinion of the Court
HERSEY, Judge.

HERSEY, Judge.

Appellee, June A. Anderson, obtained a final judgment for arrearages of child support in the amount of $39,217.00 which she then sought to recover in garnishment proceedings.

A writ of garnishment was served on appellant’s employer who thereupon confessed indebtedness. In reliance on the exemption from garnishment of wages for personal labor or services created by Section 222.11, Florida Statutes (1981), appellant filed his affidavit alleging head of household status.

A preliminary but transient issue is raised by an affidavit made by appellee’s attorney which apparently was filed within the two day period established by Section 222.12, Florida Statutes (1981) and which ostensibly was for the purpose of contesting appellant’s eligibility for homestead status. This issue is rendered moot, however, by counsel’s concession in open court (transcribed and made part of the record on appeal) that appellant is, indeed, entitled to claim the homestead exemption.

The stage is thus set for the main thrust of appellant’s appeal. Section 61.12, Florida Statutes (1981) carves out of the Section 222.11 exemption an exception where the debt for which garnishment is sought arises from “.. . orders of the court of this state for alimony, suit money, or child support .. . . ” The ultimate issue is whether or not this exception applies where arrearages in “alimony, suit money, or child support” have been reduced to final judgment, as here. This question has recently, and irrevocably been put to rest in appellant’s favor. Sokolsky v. Kuhn, 405 So. 2d 975 (Fla.1981). We therefore merely echo the holding of our supreme court that reducing arrearages to a final judgment precludes resort to the exception of Section 61.12.

We therefore reverse and remand for such further proceedings as may be necessary and appropriate to reflect this conclusion.

Appellant has additionally questioned the validity of the judgment itself; however, no appeal was timely taken from that judgment and we are without jurisdiction to consider that point in this appeal.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

GLICKSTEIN, J., and OWEN, WILLIAM C., Jr., (Retired) Associate Judge, concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Elton H. Schwarz v. Honorable Tom Waddell, Jr., 422 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
    …ed by relator, the Supreme Court of Florida recently settled it in the affirmative in Sokolsky v. Kuhn, 405 So. 2d 975 (Fla.1981), which held that reducing arrearages to final judgment precludes resort to section 61.12. See also Sweeten v. Anderson, 414 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). [*63] Issue two lacks merit on its face since the amounts due under the continuing writ of garnishment pertain only to the amounts accruing subsequent to the final judgment entered on September 21,1978. The appeal of that judgme…
  • Cooper v. Ina P. Cooper, 546 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)
    …eduction of the amounts due to a final judgment made the exception contained in 61.12 inapplicable and the judgment unenforceable via a continuing writ of garnishment pursuant to Sokolsky v. Kuhn, 405 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1981), and Sweeten v. Anderson, 414 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). In 1984 the legislature amended section 61.12(1) to include “judgments” as well as “orders” within the purview of the statute and thus available for enforcement by garnishment as an exception to the exemption contained in secti…

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