ROSS SZELL, APPELLANT,
v.
LAWSON L. LAMAR, ETC., ET AL., APPELLEES
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Appellant deputy sheriff sued for damages after termination, claiming the sheriff's general order created a contractual right to certain procedural protections before dismissal. The court affirmed dismissal, holding that a deputy sheriff is an officer, not an employee, and the sheriff has absolute control over retention without owing constitutional or contractual due process protections.
A deputy sheriff holds office by appointment rather than employment and is thus an officer, not an employee. The sheriff has absolute control over selection and retention of deputies. A deputy has no property interest in his office and no constitutional due process protections upon dismissal, nor does he acquire contractual rights from a unilaterally adopted disciplinary procedure that the sheriff may modify or revoke at will.
[1] A sheriff may authorize a deputy to act in his name, place, and stead in all matters, including termination of other deputies.
[2] A deputy sheriff is an officer by appointment, not an employee, and therefore has no property interest in their office.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A deputy sheriff holds office by appointment, rather than by employment, and is thus an officer, rather than an employee.”
Establishes the fundamental legal status that determines appellant's lack of constitutional protections
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant was appointed deputy sheriff in 1972 and was terminated by Sheriff Colman on July 11, 1980, following an internal investigation based on a c…
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ORFINGER, Judge.
Appellant filed suit for damages against Melvin G. Colman, as Sheriff of Orange County, contending that the sheriff had improperly dismissed him from his position as deputy sheriff, claiming that he was thus entitled to back wages, lost benefits, costs and attorney’s fees. During the course of the litigation, Colman went out of office and an amended complaint was filed naming his successor, Lawson L. Lamar, as defendant, purportedly under authority of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.260(d).1 The trial court dismissed the amended complaint with leave to amend, and declining to amend further, appellant suffered the entry of a final judgment from which he appeals. We affirm.
Appellant was appointed deputy sheriff in 1972, and the appellant was terminated by Sheriff Colman on July 11, 1980, following an internal investigation based on a citizen’s complaint. Appellant contends that based on a general order promulgated by Sheriff Colman, he was entitled to certain procedural rights prior to his termination, and that he could not be terminated, except for cause.2 He further contends that the general order created a contractual right in him and a corresponding obligation on the sheriff, so that his termination constitutes a breach of that contract. We disagree on both points.
A sheriff is authorized to appoint deputies for whose acts he is responsible, to act in his stead. Section 30.07, Florida Statutes (1981). A deputy sheriff holds office by appointment, rather than by employment, and is thus an officer, rather than an employee. Murphy v. Mack, 358 So. 2d 822 (Fla.1978). The sheriff has absolute control over the selection and retention of deputies in order that law enforcement be centralized in the county, and in order that the people be able to place responsibility upon a particular officer for failure of law enforcement. Section 30.53, Florida Statutes (1981); Tanner v. McCall, 625 F. 2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1980); Blackburn v. Brorein, 70 So. 2d 293 (Fla.1954); Murphy, 358 So. 2d at 825. Thus, a deputy sheriff has no property interest in his office and no constitutional due process protections when he is dismissed. Evans v. Hardcastle, 339 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). Neither does he acquire a contract right by virtue of a disciplinary procedure unilaterally adopted by the sheriff, which the sheriff may similarly modify or completely revoke at will.3
Finding no merit to appellant’s remaining issues, the judgment appealed from is
AFFIRMED.
FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., and CO-WART, JJ., concur. . One of the issues presented by the parties is the propriety of the substitution, but in light of our decision here, we need not reach that issue.
. The general order relied on was promulgated by the sheriff during appellant’s tenure as a deputy. It provides for certain disciplinary procedures, but clearly gives the sheriff the right to summarily take action in any matter. . Cf. Ison v. Zimmerman, 372 So. 2d 431 (Fla.1979), where the Supreme Court held that the enactment of a valid civil service law did not unconstitutionally restrict the duties of the office of sheriff. No civil service law is alleged to exist here. Zimmerman is thus inapposite.
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Cited By (15 total)
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Fuller Crews, Sr. v. Ellis, 531 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)…s dismissed. See Blackburn v. Brorein, 70 So. 2d 293 (Fla.1954); Wilkerson v. Butterworth, 492 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Evans v. Hardcastle, 339 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). However, the trial court also cited the case of Szell v. Lamar, 414 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). In Szell, a deputy sheriff argued, based on a general order promulgated by the Sheriff, that he was entitled to certain procedural rights prior to his termination and that he could not be terminated except for cause. On this poi…
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McRAE v. Douglas, 644 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)…5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 907, 101 S.Ct. 1975, 68 L.Ed.2d 295 (1981); Crews v. Ellis, 531 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Brevard County v. Miller, 452 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 459 So. 2d 1042 (Fla.1984); Szell v. Lamar, 414 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Evans v. Hardcastle, 339 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). The same principle has been applied to correctional officers appointed by the sheriff. See Blair v. Martin County Sheriff's Department, Case No. 92-14107, 1993 WL 757478…
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Wilkerson v. Butterworth, 492 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)…hat this uncontroverted recitation of fact controlled, notwithstanding disciplinary procedures which recited that except for oral reprimand and emergency suspension, all discipline was subject to the sheriffs approval. We approve of Szell v. Lamar, 414 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), which provided: A sheriff is authorized to appoint deputies for whose acts he is responsible, to act in his stead. Section 30.07, Florida Statutes (1981). A deputy sheriff holds office by appointment, rather than by employment,…
Previewing 3 of 15 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Tanner v. McCALL, 625 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1980)
- Blackburn v. Brorein, 70 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1954)
- Murphy v. Mack, 358 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1978)
- Charley F. Ison v. Rollin W. Zimmerman, 372 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1979)
- Evans v. Hardcastle, 339 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)