CHAPMAN REALTY CORPORATION, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, PETITIONER,
v.
MADEIRA MANAGEMENT, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, RESPONDENT
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Chapman Realty sought certiorari to quash an order granting a motion for new trial. The District Court of Appeal held that a successor judge lacked authority to rule on a motion for new trial when the original trial judge remained able and willing to act, and that the proper remedy was mandamus to compel the original judge to render a decision.
A successor judge lacks authority to entertain a motion for new trial unless the original trial judge is unable to act by reason of death, disability, or other equivalent cause, or is unwilling due to recusal. The proper remedy when an original judge delays ruling is mandamus to compel the judge to render a decision, not a motion for new trial before a successor judge.
[1] A successor judge may not entertain a motion for rehearing or new trial unless the original trial judge is unable or unwilling to consider it.
[2] A successor judge should not rule on a motion for rehearing or new trial when the original judge's authority to rule has not terminated.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Unless the original trial judge is unable by reason of death, disability or other equivalent reason, or is unwilling by reason of recusation to consider a motion for rehearing, that judge should review and determine the motion.”
Establishes the governing legal standard that the original trial judge must rule on post-trial motions unless unable or unwilling to do so
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA case was tried before Judge Murphree on August 6, 1979, and the judge took the case under advisement but never entered a final judgment. On Septembe…
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RYDER, Judge.
Petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari quashing an order granting a motion for new trial. We grant certiorari.
The ease was originally heard before a visiting circuit judge, the Honorable John A. H. Murphree, on August 6, 1979, and upon conclusion of the trial, the judge took the case under advisement. On September 14, 1981, respondent, the plaintiff below, filed a motion for retrial alleging that a final judgment in the cause had never been entered and it appeared that Judge Mur-phree was not prepared to make a ruling. The Honorable Allen C. Anderson heard argument of counsel and entered an order stating he would treat the motion as a motion for new trial, and if a final judgment was not rendered within twenty days, the motion for new trial would be considered granted. A copy of Judge Anderson’s order was mailed to Judge Murphree but no response was received.
We find that it was a departure from the essential requirements of law for Judge Anderson to entertain the motion for new trial. In Kirkham v. Kirkham, 385 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), a husband’s petition to annul his marriage was granted and the wife timely moved for rehearing. Before a hearing was set on the wife’s motion, the judge who entered the final judgment of annulment rotated to a different division and a successor judge ruled on the motion. This court stated:
Unless the original trial judge is unable by reason of death, disability or other equivalent reason, or is unwilling by reason of recusation to consider a motion for rehearing, that judge should review and determine the motion. Epperson v. Epperson, 101 So. 2d 367 (Fla.1958). Here, even though the circuit court assigned Judge Walker to another division, his jurisdiction to hear a motion for rehearing continued.
Judge Anderson was not presented with any evidence that Judge Murphree’s authority to rule in this case had terminated. On the contrary, the order granting the motion for new trial allowed an interim period of twenty days for Judge Murphree to render a final judgment, indicating Judge Anderson’s apparent belief that Judge Murphree still had authority. Therefore, it was error for Judge Anderson to entertain the motion and to order a new trial.
We note that petitioner correctly argues that unless a showing can be made that Judge Murphree’s authority to act has terminated, the proper remedy under these circumstances is to file a mandamus action compelling Judge Murphree to render a decision in this case.
GRIMES, A. C. J., and DANAHY, J., concur.
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Cited By
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Madeira Mgmt., Inc. v. Chapman Realty Corp., 459 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)…phree. Chapman Realty Corporation filed a petition in this court seeking a writ of common law certiorari to quash Judge Anderson’s January 4 order. We granted the petition and quashed the order. See Chapman Realty Corp. v. Madeira Management, Inc., 414 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). We found that Judge Anderson was not presented with any evidence that Judge Murphree’s authority to rule on the case had terminated by reason of death, disability, or other equivalent reason for his failure to rule. We noted that…
Authorities Cited
- Epperson v. Epperson, 101 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1958)
- Kirkham v. Kirkham, 385 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)