WALTER L. TUCKER A/K/A BEAU TUCKER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1982-05-12
No. 81-987
LETTS, C. J., and BERANEK, J., concur., ANSTEAD, J., concurs specially with opinion.
415 So. 2d 51 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1982) Caution
Cited by 6 cases


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

LETTS, C. J., and BERANEK, J., concur. ANSTEAD, J., concurs specially with opinion.

Concurrence
ANSTEAD, Judge,

ANSTEAD, Judge,

specially concurring:

The appellant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion for severance and in refusing to have certain expert medical testimony read to the jury upon its request.

The Florida Supreme Court has held that the mere fact that one defendant may attempt to shift the blame for the crime to a co-defendant is insufficient to require a severance. Hawkins v. State, 199 So. 2d 276 (Fla.1967) vacated on other grounds at 408 U.S. 941, 92 S.Ct. 2857, 33 L.Ed.2d 765 (1972). Also see State v. Talavera, 243 So. 2d 595 (Fla.1971). I do not believe Crum v. State, 398 So. 2d 810 (Fla.1981) has overruled that proposition.

On the other hand I agree with appellant that the trial court erred in failing to allow the jury to have the testimony of the two medical experts read to them. However, in view of the overwhelming evidence of appellant’s involvement in the crime for which he was convicted and the limited value that the medical testimony was to him I believe this error was harmless. Appellant was charged with first degree murder but only convicted of second degree murder while his co-defendant was convicted of first degree murder. It is apparent by its verdict that the jury has already given appellant the benefit of any doubt as to the extent of his participation in the murder.


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    …th the exception of our holding in Whitt, there are no Florida decisions [*1062] imposing liability upon a property owner based on natural conditions contained wholly within the boundary of the private property. See Stevens v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 415 So. 2d 51, 52 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (asserting that in the absence of a violation of a statute, a landowner does not have a duty to “maintain his property in a condition so that a motorist approaching a public highway intersection can see other approaching motor…
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  • Piedra v. City OF N. BAY Vill., 193 So. 3d 48 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)
    …ther the vegetation extended beyond the property boundaries and whether such growth created a visual hazard to those approaching the intersection such that it was a legal cause of the accident in question. See, e.g. Stevens v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 415 So. 2d 51, 52 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (asserting that in the absence of a violation of a statute, a landowner does not have a duty to “maintain his property in a condition so that a motorist approaching a public highway intersection can see other approaching motor…
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