COMMERCIAL UNION INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT,

v.

SUSAN RIFKIN, APPELLEE

Citator

Cited By

• State v. Beja, 451 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
  …8 So. 2d 1095 (1981); and that other cases have held that passengers of automobiles must establish a legitimate expectation of privacy before a motion to suppress can be granted. See State v. Bartz, 431 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); State v. Davis, 415 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). Appellee Lennon contends that a legal distinction exists when an individual challenges the lawfulness of the initial stop. According to appellee, a passenger has standing to challenge the initial stop and where the stop is foun…
• State v. Hernandez, 718 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)
  …e he disavowed any possessory interest in the items seized); State v. Lagree, 595 So. 2d 1029, 1031 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)(“A mere passenger normally does not have standing to contest the search [*837] of a car in which he is riding.”); State v. Davis, 415 So. 2d 82, 84 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). We therefore reverse the order under review and remand for further proceedings. . Section 316.090 “Driving on divided highways” provides as follows: (1) Whenever any highway has been divided into two or more roadways by l…
• State v. Rome, 500 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
  …claim the protection of the fourth amendment in order to invoke the benefit of the exclusionary rule. See Rakas v. Illinois, supra; State v. Sears, 493 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Acebo v. State, 415 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); State v. Davis, 415 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); and State v. Bartz, 431 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Accordingly, the trial court’s order granting appellee’s motion to suppress is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. MILLS and…

Authorities Cited

• Chapman v. Dillon, 415 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1982)