BRIAN RUSSELL HOOD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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This case addresses the application of Florida's speedy trial rule to a defendant who failed to appear for trial and was later rearrested. The court held that the defendant was entitled to discharge because he remained continuously available for trial for over 180 days after arrest, satisfying the speedy trial requirement under the former rule.
Hood is entitled to discharge. Under the former rule 3.191(e), unavailability only temporarily suspended the speedy trial period; a new period began when the accused again became available. Because Hood was incarcerated and therefore available for trial for over 180 days after arrest, he satisfied the speedy trial requirement.
[1] A successor trial judge cannot review, modify, or reverse on the merits the final orders of a predecessor except in special circumstances of mistake or fraud.
[2] A motion for rehearing after an order of discharge is not authorized by rule unless based on mistake of fact, fraud on the court, or matters cognizable at common law.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Under this version of the rule, unavailability only temporarily suspended the time period; a new speedy trial period began to run after the accused again became available for trial.”
Explains the mechanics of the former rule 3.191(e) and its application to Hood's situation.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHood was arrested on April 3, 1980, and failed to appear for trial on July 30, 1980. He was rearrested on August 15, 1980, and remained incarcerated c…
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COWART, Judge.
This is another case involving the speedy trial rule, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191.
Arrested on April 3,1980, appellant failed to appear for trial on July 30, 1980. He was rearrested on August 15, 1980, and remained incarcerated continuously until his motion for discharge under the speedy trial rule was filed on March 20,1981. That motion was granted by one judge, but the State filed a motion for rehearing1 of the order of discharge and another judge2 heard and granted the State’s motion and vacated the order of discharge. Appellant pled nolo contendere reserving the right to seek this appellate review of the denial of his motion for discharge.
The former 3 rule 3.191(e) is applicable.4 Under this version of the rule, unavailability only temporarily suspended the time period; a new speedy trial period began to run after the accused again became available for trial. Being in jail the whole time, appellant was obviously available for trial for over 180 days after he was arrested and before his motion for discharge. Accordingly, the order setting aside the order of discharge is hereby quashed and this cause is remanded for entry of an order of discharge.
ORDER QUASHED.
DAUKSCH, C. J., and SHARP, J„ concur. . A motion for rehearing after an order for discharge is not authorized by rule; nor, in this case, was it based on any mistake of fact or fraud on the court; nor did it involve any matter cognizable at common law as adequate to modify a judgment. See, e.g., State v. Burton, 314 So. 2d 136 (Fla.1975); Lovett v. State, 29 Fla. 384, 11 So. 176 (1892); State v. Pierce, 370 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). In view of our disposition on the merits, we do not consider the authority of a trial court to rehear the matter of appellant’s speedy trial discharge.
. A successor trial judge cannot review, modify or reverse on the merits and same facts the final orders of a predecessor except in special circumstances of mistake and fraud. See, e.g., Lawyers Coop. Pub. Co. v. Williams, 149 Fla. 390, 5 So. 2d 871 (1942); City of Miami Beach v. Chadderton, 306 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), cause dismissed, 312 So. 2d 757 (Fla.1975). This rule especially applies to a motion for rehearing not based on any change or misrepresentation of law or fact. See, e.g., Epperson v. Epperson, 101 So. 2d 367 (Fla.1958); Groover v. Walker, 88 So. 2d 312 (Fla.1956).
. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(e) was amended effective January 1, 1981. In re Rules of Criminal Procedure, 389 So. 2d 610 (Fla.1980). Under the new rule, unavailability waives speedy trial rule rights until they are reinvoked by the filing of a demand for speedy trial.
. This court held in Harris v. State, 400 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), that the operative event that determined whether the former rule 3.191(e) or the amended rule 3.191(e) applied was the defendant’s failure to appear at arraignment. However, in Holmes v. Leffler, 411 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), this court held that the operative event that determined whether the former rule 3.191 or the amended rule 3.191 applied was the taking of the defendant into custody. Whether these cases are inconsistent or not does not need to be determined in this case, since the operative event under either Harris or Holmes occurred in 1980, prior to the effective date of the amended rule.
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Iqbal Zabrani v. The Honorable Edward D. Cowart, 502 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)…Amendment to Rules — Criminal Procedure, 462 So. 2d 386 (Fla.1984). The problem before us, however, is the determination of the relevant “proceeding” or, otherwise stated, the “operative event” to which the rule is to be applied. See Hood v. State, 415 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Arnold v. State, 429 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Holmes v. Leffler, 411 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), pet. for review denied, 419 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1982); Jackson v. Green, 402 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). State v. Gree…
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Wright v. Wright, 559 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)…Globe Aero Ltd., Inc. v. Air and General Finance Ltd., 537 [*1195] So. 2d 628 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), review dismissed, 542 So. 2d 1332 (Fla.1989); State v. Powell, 460 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), dismissed, 466 So. 2d 218 (Fla.1985); Hood v. State, 415 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); and Boeing Company v. Merchant, 397 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), review denied, 412 So. 2d 468 (Fla.1982). No such special circumstances were shown. REVERSED. COWART, J., concurs. SHARP, W., J., dissents with opinion.…
Authorities Cited (13 total)
- Groover v. Walker, 88 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1956)
- The Fla. Bar. in re Rules of Crim. Procedure, 389 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1980)
- State v. Ollis Burton, 314 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 1975)
- Epperson v. Epperson, 101 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1958)
- Lovett v. State, 29 Fla. 384 (Fla. 1892)
- Holmes v. The Honorable Kenneth M. Leffler, 411 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- Lawyers Co-Operative Publ'g Co. v. Bradford G. Williams, 149 Fla. 390 (Fla. 1942)
- Bowden v. State, 306 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)
- Delano B. Harris v. State of Fla. & Honorable C. Welborn Daniel, 400 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Schutt v. Schutt (Fla. 1st DCA 2019)