DONALD SCHREIER AND LUMBERMENS MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY, APPELLANTS,
v.
RUFUS BYRON PARKER, JR., AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF RUFUS B. PARKER, III, CLIFFORD B. MARTIN, PAUL H. MARTIN AND ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEES
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In this personal injury case arising from a fatal traffic collision, the appellate court reversed and remanded due to improper admission of privileged testimony and traffic court proceedings in a civil negligence action, despite affirming the jury's negligence verdict allocating 80% fault to the truck owner and 20% to the deceased passenger.
The court reversed on the first two issues, finding both the privileged officer testimony and the traffic court proceedings were improperly admitted into evidence. However, the court affirmed the summary judgment on the contribution claim, finding it properly barred under Florida Statute 768.31(5) because the Martins and Allstate tendered their policy limits and obtained a release.
[1] Testimony regarding conversations with an investigating officer is privileged under Section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes, and its admission requires reversal.
[2] It is improper to present evidence of a traffic court proceeding to a jury in a civil negligence action.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The testimony which was elicited, and which was properly objected to, was clearly privileged and, thus, reversal is required.”
Establishes that admission of privileged officer testimony constitutes reversible error
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRufus Parker, III, a passenger in a northbound Ford Mustang driven by Bradford Martin, was killed when the vehicle swerved into the southbound lane to…
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JORGENSON, Judge.
Rufus Parker, III, was a passenger in a Ford Mustang driven by Bradford Martin. The car in which Parker was riding struck a truck owned by Donald Schreier and insured by Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company, appellants here. The collision occurred in a residential area in southern Dade County. The speed limit in this area was 30 mph. It was nighttime and the weather conditions were rainy. The Mustang, which was northbound, swung into the southbound lane in order to pass an uninvolved motor vehicle and struck Schreier’s truck which protruded onto the southbound driving surface. The Mustang struck the stationary truck at a speed between 50 and 65 mph. Rufus Parker was ejected from the vehicle during the collision and, according to the medical evidence, died of blunt trauma to the head. The jury returned a verdict finding Schreier eighty percent negligent and Rufus Parker twenty percent negligent.
We affirm in part and reverse in part. The first point on this appeal concerns the testimony of the investigating officer regarding his conversations with Mr. Schreier, alleged to be privileged under Section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1979). The testimony which was elicited, and which was properly objected to, was clearly privileged and, thus, reversal is required. Elder v. Robert J. Ackerman, Inc., 362 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v. Ellsworth, 129 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961).
The second point raised deals with the propriety of bringing before the jury testimony which occurred during a traffic court proceeding regarding this accident. Appellant suggests, and we agree, that it is wholly improper to bring the traffic court proceeding before a jury trying a civil negligence action. Albertson v. Stark, 294 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); Walton v. Robert E. Haas Construction Corporation, 259 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); Riedel v. Driscoll, 124 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960).
Schreier also complains that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the cross-claim of Donald Schreier and Liberty Mutual which sought contribution. The trial court appropriately entered summary judgment in favor of Clifford B. Mar-Paul H. Martin and Allstate Insurance Company pursuant to the provisions of Section 768.31(5), Florida Statutes (1979). Since the Martins and Allstate tendered their policy limits to Parker and obtained a release therefor, the contribution claim was barred. Metropolitan Dade County Transit Authority v. Simmons, 375 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied 386 So. 2d 639 (Fla.1980); Martinez v. Gonzalez, 368 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company v. Gordon, 328 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
We turn now to one other point which merits discussion. During the close of the case, counsel for defendant Schreier, and counsel for plaintiff Parker, made arguments which, in the court’s view, are wholly inappropriate.1 The prophylactic effect hoped for by Judge Schwartz in his special concurrence in Eastern Steamship Lines, Inc. v. Martial, 380 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) apparently has not been forthcoming. Arguments in derogation of Fla.Bar Code Prof.Resp. EC7—24, DR7— 106(CX3), (4) will not be condoned in this court, nor should they be condoned by the trial court, even absent objection. Hillson v. Deeson, 383 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
We trust that on retrial, counsel will limit their arguments to their views of the evidence in conformance with the provisions of the Florida Bar Code of Professional Responsibility.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the views expressed herein.
. The arguments here are remarkably similar to those found in Metropolitan Dade County v. Dillon, 305 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974) (Barkdull, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 317 So. 2d 442 (Fla.1975).
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Borden, Inc. v. Young, 479 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…, and then, on the ground that the loser has asked for what he received, obediently raise the hand of the one who emerges victorious.6 We demean ourselves and [*852] the system of justice we serve when we permit this to occur. In Schreier v. Parker, 415 So. 2d 794, 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), we gave notice that “[ajrguments in derogation of Fla.Bar Code Prof.Resp. EC 7-24, DR 7-106(C)(3), (4) will not be condoned in this court, nor should they be condoned by the trial court, even absent objection. Hillson v. Dee…1 / 2
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B.G. Wasden v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 474 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)…f by appellee, post-trial, rise to the level of fundamental error absent a preserving contemporaneous objection. A trial judge can and should intervene to prohibit improper comments even when opposing counsel does not object. See Schreier v. Parker, 415 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Hillson v. Deeson, 383 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). This is not to say, however, that the duty of counsel to object is in any way alleviated. Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Marcus, 440 So. 2d 373, 376 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). As sug…
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Marga R. Silva v. Nightingale, 619 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)…e accused the defendant of securing expert testimony from “country club” doctors eager to testify in behalf of the defendant physician. The third district reversed and remanded for a new trial, commenting: “The promise we made in Schreier v. Parker, 415 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), that we would not condone arguments such as that made in the present case, even absent objection, fulfilled in Borden, Inc. v. Young, 479 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), is fulfilled once again.” Bloch, 493 So. 2d at 541. In the i…
Previewing 3 of 25 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (13 total)
- Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Dillon, 305 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- Albertson v. Stark, 294 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)
- E. S.S. Lines, Inc. v. Lamy Martial, 380 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v. Ellsworth, 129 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)
- Yost v. Cong. Int'l Dev. Corp., 383 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Clark v. Hofacker, 124 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960)
- Elder v. Robert J. Ackerman, Inc., 362 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- Walton v. Robert E. Haas Constr. Corp., 259 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Gordon, 328 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
- Blasco v. Krantz, 317 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1975)