STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
EMILY O'STEEN ISHIE A/K/A EMILY FRANCES ISHIE, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Florida appeals the dismissal of a vehicular homicide charge against a defendant who was also charged with DWI-manslaughter and driving without a valid license, all arising from a single transaction. The appellate court reversed, holding that double jeopardy does not bar the state from charging both offenses even if vehicular homicide is a lesser included offense.
Double jeopardy does not bar the state from charging a defendant with both a greater offense and a lesser included offense. While a defendant may not be convicted and sentenced for both offenses at a single trial, the state is not prohibited from charging both offenses initially.
[1] Double jeopardy does not bar the state from charging a defendant with both a greater offense and a lesser included offense arising from a single transaction.
[2] The double jeopardy clause does not prohibit the state from seeking convictions on both the greater and lesser included offenses in a single trial.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“in a single trial setting the double jeopardy clause does not bar the state from convicting a defendant of both the greater and lesser included offenses but that only one sentence, for the greater offense, is proper”
Establishes the court's holding that while conviction on both charges is possible at trial, only one sentence for the greater offense is permitted
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellee Emily O'Steen Ishie was charged by information with three offenses arising from a single transaction: DWI-manslaughter, vehicular homicide, a…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Standard Jury Instructions cases and more on FLexlaw
[*836] SHIVERS, Judge.
The state appeals from a final order granting appellee’s motion to dismiss.
Appellee was charged by information with the following offenses, all of which arose out of a single transaction: (1) DWI-manslaughter, in violation of section 860.01, Florida Statutes (1981); (2) vehicular homicide, in violation of section 782.071, Florida Statutes (1981); and (3) driving without a valid driver’s license, in violation of section 322.03, Florida Statutes (1981). Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the vehicular homicide charge, which was granted by the trial court on the grounds that vehicular homicide was a lesser included offense of DWI-manslaughter. This appeal followed.
The state argues that under the Block-burger test, Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), vehicular homicide is not a lesser included offense of DWI-manslaughter and that, therefore, double jeopardy does not bar the state from charging appellee with both offenses. In response, appellee contends that double jeopardy does apply because In the Matter of Use by the Trial Courts of Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases and the Standard Jury Instructions in Misdemeanor Cases, 6 FLW 305 (Fla.1981), the Florida Supreme Court adopted a schedule of lesser included offenses which lists vehicular homicide as a lesser included offense of DWI-manslaughter. The Court has considered the arguments presented by both parties and finds that the double jeopardy clause does not bar the state from charging appellee with both offenses. In State v. Hegstrom, 401 So. 2d 1343 (Fla.1981), the Florida Supreme Court held that in a single trial setting the double jeopardy clause does not bar the state from convicting a defendant of both the greater and lesser included offenses but that only one sentence, for the greater offense, is proper. See also State v. Thompson, 413 So. 2d 757 (Fla.1982).
Since the state is not prohibited by double jeopardy from seeking a conviction on both the greater and lesser included offenses, double jeopardy cannot bar the state from charging a defendant with both offenses. Regardless of whether vehicular homicide is a lesser included offense of DWI-manslaughter, double jeopardy does not bar the state from charging appellee with both offenses. The judgment is REVERSED.
MILLS, J., and VICTOR M. CAWTHON, Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (U.S. 1932)
- State v. Hegstrom, 401 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. 1981)
- State v. Rivers, 401 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. 1981)
- State v. Thompson, 413 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 1982)