CROWN FABRICS CORPORATION

v.

AMERICAN VISCOSE CORPORATION

Several of appellee’s witnesses stated that, in their opinion, there would be no confusion between appellant’s trademarks and those of appellee if used concurrently on the goods of the respective parties. Such opinions, although entitled to be given consideration for what they are worth, are not binding on the tribunals of the Patent Office or on this court.

It is contended by counsel for appellant that the adoption and use of appellant’s trade-marks are not covered by the license agreements entered into by the parties, but grow out of appellant’s corporate name. Counsel also contends that appellee is estopped from asserting confusing similarity of the marks of the parties, because, it is alleged, appellee condoned appellant’s use of the trade-marks here involved. In support of his conten tions, counsel cites the cases of Heger Products Co. v,. Polk Miller Products Corp., 47 F. 2d 966, 18 C.C.P.A., Patents, 1106, and Malone v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 65 F. 2d 154, 20 C.C.P.A., Patents, 1150.

In each of those cases it was held, in substance, that where an applicant for the registration of his mark had, by his conduct, led others, who used similar marks on goods of the same descriptive properties as those of the applicant, to believe that there was no objection to such use and, in fact, consented to such use, he would be estopped from claiming exclusive ownership of the mark and from registering the same.

Those cases have no hearing on the issues here presented.

We find nothing in the record to indicate that appellee ever condoned appellant’s use of its involved marks, except as such marks might have been used under the license agreements entered into by the parties.

As stated in the decision of the commissioner, appellant has appropriated opposer’s marks in their entirety. It has appropriated the word "Crown,” as well as a pictorial representation of a crown, and has used them on goods of the same descriptive properties as those on which appellee uses its marks.

That the marks of the parties are confusingly similar can not be seriously questioned.

Whatever right appellant might have to use its marks under its license agreements with appellee, it obviously is not entitled to the exclusive use of such marks, and, therefore, is not entitled to register them.

For the reasons stated, the decision of the commissioner is affirmed.

Affirmed.

GARRETT, Presiding Judge, did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

LENROOT, Judge, sat during the arguments of this case, but resigned before the opinion was prepared.

These appeals were originally decided by this court on the nineteenth day of June 1944. Thereafter, counsel for appellee filed a petition for rehearing, requesting that the court revise certain language in its decision which, it was contended, was not necessary to a decision in the case. The rehearing was granted October 2, 1044, solely for the purpose of permitting the court to revise the language in its decision to which counsel for appellee had directed the court’s attention.