CHARLES MINTON AND VERNON MINTON, APPELLANTS,
v.
FRED SHAW, CARL BROWN AND WILLIAM PERCELLE, APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1982-06-01
No. 80-1148
Before HUBBART, C. J., and HENDRY and BASKIN, JJ.
416 So. 2d 3 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1982)

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Synopsis

In a malicious prosecution action, defendants appealed from a jury verdict and cost judgment against them. The appellate court affirmed, finding no reversible error in the trial court's admission of evidence regarding statements by defendants' counsel about dropping criminal charges, which defendants argued constituted inadmissible settlement offers.


Holding

The court held that the disputed statement was not barred from evidence as a settlement offer because: (1) the malicious prosecution action was neither pending nor contemplated when the statement was made, and (2) defendants lacked authority to drop criminal charges as only the state attorney may do so. The court also found no reversible error in the plaintiffs' counsel's closing arguments.


Headnotes

[1] A statement made by a party to drop criminal charges in exchange for a general release of claims is not considered a settlement offer inadmissible at trial when the crimi…

[2] A court will not hold that a statement constitutes an inadmissible settlement offer absent supporting authority or precedent.

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Key Quotes

“We have carefully and meticulously examined the authorities cited by both parties in their briefs and have further conducted extensive independent research of our own. In all, we have been cited to no authority and have found none which supports the proposition that the disputed evidence in this case was, in fact, a settlement offer and, therefore, inadmissible at trial; we decline to be the first court to so hold.”

Establishes the court's thorough analysis and refusal to create new law protecting such statements as settlement offers.

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Facts & Procedural History

Defendants Charles and Vernon Minton were sued for malicious prosecution by the plaintiffs. During trial, defendants' private counsel stated they woul…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The defendants Charles and Vernon Min-ton in a malicious prosecution action brought below appeal from an adverse final judgment entered upon a jury verdict and a subsequently entered adverse cost judgment. We find no reversible error in the points presented on appeal and affirm.

The central point on appeal concerns the ruling of the trial court in admitting in evidence, over objection, at trial certain testimony which is claimed to be a settlement offer. We have carefully and meticulously examined the authorities cited by both parties in their briefs and have further conducted extensive independent research of our own. In all, we have been cited to no authority and have found none which supports the proposition that the disputed evidence in this case was, in fact, a settlement offer and, therefore, inadmissible at trial; we decline to be the first court to so hold.

Without dispute, the defendants herein, through their private counsel, stated that they would “drop” criminal charges against the plaintiffs, an act which they were unauthorized to do, if the plaintiffs would sign a general release on claims which had not been made or discussed by anyone. We cannot view this statement as a routine offer to settle the instant action and, therefore, on that ground inadmissible because (a) such action was, at that time, neither pending nor contemplated, and (b) the defendants were, in any event, entirely unauthorized to make such a statement as only the state attorney may “drop” or nolle prosse a criminal case. In the Interest of S.R.P., 397 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); State v. Braden, 375 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).

We have no occasion, however, to address any other objections which might be made to the admissibility of the disputed statement as same were never made below or in this court; we hold only that the said statement was not barred from evidence as being a settlement offer. The defendants also complain about certain comments made by plaintiffs’ counsel in his final argument to the jury. This point seems to be, in part, a restatement of its first point on appeal as part of the comments attacked refer to the above disputed evidence. Beyond that, however, we believe the point otherwise presents no reversible error. LeRetilley v. Harris, 354 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 359 So. 2d 1216 (Fla.1978); Nelson v. Reliance Insurance Co., 368 So. 2d 361, 362 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).

Affirmed.


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