DERRICK JACKSON, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court reversed Jackson's conviction because the trial court manifestly erred in denying his motion for new trial based on newly discovered exculpatory testimony from two witnesses that would probably have changed the trial result.
A trial court commits manifest error by denying a motion for new trial when newly discovered, directly exculpatory testimony from multiple witnesses would probably have changed the trial result, even if the original evidence was legally sufficient.
[1] A trial court commits manifest error in denying a motion for new trial under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.600(a)(3) when newly discovered, directly exculpatory te…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the achievement of the ends of justice — which is the paramount, indeed the exclusive interest which concerns us — requires that a jury hear the witnesses in question before the defendant may be convicted and imprisoned for the crime with which he is charged”
Court explaining why new trial must be granted despite legal sufficiency of original evidence
Jackson was convicted at trial on evidence that, while legally sufficient, was highly dubious and uncertain. Two additional witnesses possessed direct…
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SCHWARTZ, Judge-
We reverse the conviction under review because the trial court was in manifest error in denying the defendant’s motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. It clearly appeared that the directly exculpatory testimony of two separate additional witnesses both would probably have changed the result of the trial, at which the evidence against Jackson, while legally sufficient, was highly dubious and uncertain, Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.600(a)(3); Jones v. State, 233 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970), and, of less significance, was not previously discoverable in the exercise of reasonable diligence. See Webb v. State, 336 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Jones v. State, supra. Even were the latter technically not the case, the due diligence requirement is not an inflexible one. Gaither v. Anderson, 103 Fla. 1190, 135 So. 840, 139 So. 587 (1932).
On this record, we conclude that the achievement of the ends of justice — which is the paramount, indeed the exclusive interest which concerns us — requires that a jury hear the witnesses in question before the defendant may be convicted and imprisoned for the crime with which he is charged.
Hence, that new trial must be afforded him. Jones v. State, supra; Hanson v. State, 187 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966).
Reversed.1
. We specifically note our total disapproval of the trial court’s at best presumptuous ruling denying Jackson bond pending appeal because, in part, there were no “fairly debatable” grounds for reversal. This ruling was shortly thereafter reversed by this court on i eview under Fla.R.App.P. 9.140(e)(4).
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Bray v. Elec. Door-Lift, Inc., 558 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…A 1982), review denied, 418 So. 2d 1279 (Fla.1982). While the requirement of due [*48] diligence is not a legal absolute, Ragen v. Paramount Hudson, Inc., 434 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), review denied, 444 So. 2d 417 (Fla.1984); Jackson v. State, 416 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), the general rule is that motions for new trial are looked upon with disfavor as tending to encourage looseness in practice. Jerrico, Inc. v. Washington National Insurance Co., 400 So. 2d 1316, 1319 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), review den…
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Venuto v. State, 615 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…nd for the filing fee. As a preliminary matter, we note that we are treating the defendant’s request as a motion seeking relief under rule 3.850.1 We conclude that “the achievement of the ends of justice” warrants this result. See Jackson v. State, 416 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). The defendant contends that the trial court erred in summarily denying his motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence without an evidentiary hearing where the motion was supported by an affidavit of the victim rec…
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McCALLUM v. State, 559 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)…cumulative of any other existing evidence. Thus, the question becomes, could appellant have secured this evidence prior to the trial, and does the failure to properly investigate Washington demonstrate a lack of due diligence? In Jackson v. State, 416 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), the Third DCA reversed the denial of a motion for new trial: It clearly appeared that the directly exculpatory testimony of two separate additional witnesses both would probably have changed the result of the trial, at which the…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Webb v. State, 336 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)
- Gaither v. Anderson, 103 Fla. 1190 (Fla. 1931)
- Click v. Dowd, 102 Fla. 336 (Fla. 1931)
- Hanson v. State, 187 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)
- Hutchins v. State, 233 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)