JAMES HARMON, III, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., Chief Judge.
Harmon complains that the six consecutive 100-year sentences imposed by Judge Nimmons for six felonies, each punishable by “imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment,” sections 782.-04(2), 787.01(2), and 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), exceed the statutory maximum sentence in that the court retained jurisdiction for one-third of each sentence, aggregating 200 years, to review the Parole Commission’s parole release order. Sec. 947.16(3).
While the effect of the sentence package is that the judge retained power to review and vacate any release order that the Commission may enter during Harmon’s lifetime pursuant to objective parole release criteria that are themselves mandated by statute, that, apparently, is precisely what the legislature intended by section 947.16(3) to make possible in these circumstances. The sentence for each offense is “no harsher than if the court had imposed the maximum sentence of life.” Alvarez v. State, 358 So. 2d 10 (Fla.1978).
Whether the otherwise lawful consecutive sentences are expressed as for life or for 600 years, Harmon’s life is both the practical and the lawful limit to the sentences imposed; only the period for exercising the court’s parole review powers, not the maximum period of imprisonment, has been extended by this order. Harmon suggests no convincing reason why the legislature may not thus empower the sentencing court to extend for the period of Harmon’s life the period of parole review, nor why the sentencing court may not in this fashion exercise that power. AFFIRMED.
ERVIN and SHAW, JJ., concur.
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Harmon v. State, 438 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 1983)…BOYD, Justice. This cause is before us to review a decision of a district court of appeal, Harmon v. State, 416 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), which passed upon a question certified to be of great public importance. We have jurisdiction. Art. Y, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Petitioner James Harmon pled guilty to two counts of second-degree murder, one count of robbery with…
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Hunter v. State, 435 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)…of 100 years for attempted first degree murder. Strickland v. State, 415 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). We also affirm appellant’s consecutive sentence of 150 years and the retention of jurisdiction over the sentence for 50 years. Harmon v. State, 416 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). The cause must be remanded to the trial court, however, for correction of the judgment and sentence to specifically reflect that appellant was adjudicated guilty of attempted first degree murder while in the possession of a fire…
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Elario Suraz Saname v. State, 427 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)…f 150 years with 50 years retained jurisdiction over parole entered following his guilty plea to second degree murder. We affirm in part and reverse in part. The sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum of life imprisonment, Harmon v. State, 416 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), review pending by the Supreme Court, Case No. 62,537. The sentencing judge did not state his justifications for the retention of jurisdiction with sufficient particularity. The justification stated was very similar to that in…
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- Alphonso Alvarez v. State, 358 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1978)