S. HAROLD ROACH ON BEHALF OF THE ESTATE OF HULDAH C. ROACH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, APPELLEE
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The Florida First District Court of Appeal denied the Division of Retirement's motion to dismiss an appeal based on untimely notice of appeal. The court held that because the Division failed to provide the certified order bearing the clerk's filing date notation as required by statute, the court would not assume a filing date and therefore could not dismiss the appeal as untimely.
The court denied the motion to dismiss because the Division failed to transmit to the court the appealed order bearing the clerk's indication of the filing date as required by statute. The court declined to assume a particular filing date or remand the case to determine when the order was filed.
[1] An appellate court may deny a motion to dismiss an appeal for untimeliness if the agency fails to provide a copy of the appealed order bearing the clerk's date of filing.
[2] Appellate jurisdiction is invoked by filing a notice of appeal within 30 days of the rendition of the order sought to be reviewed.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An agency decision shall be final when reduced to writing and filed with the person designated by the agency as clerk. The clerk shall indicate the date of filing-on the order.”
The amended statutory requirement that established the necessity of a clerk's filing date notation for jurisdictional purposes.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Division of Retirement claimed final agency action occurred on December 29, 1980, a motion for rehearing was denied January 20, 1981, and the noti…
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PER CURIAM.
The Division of Retirement moves to dismiss this appeal on the ground that the notice of appeal was not timely filed. The Division states that final agency action oc curred on December 29,1980, that a motion for rehearing was denied January 20, 1981, and that the notice of appeal was not filed until February 2, 1981. The Division contends that since the motion for rehearing did not toll the time of rendition of the final order, see Systems Management Associates, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 391 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), this appeal must be dismissed. We deny the motion to dismiss because the Division has not favored us in the certified record or otherwise with a copy of the appealed order bearing its clerk’s indication of the date the order was filed for record.
In Bank of Port St. Joe v. Department of Banking and Finance, 362 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), this Court pointed out that appellate jurisdiction is invoked by filing a notice within 30 days of rendition of the order sought to be reviewed, Fla.R.App.P. 9.110(b), and before an order is rendered it must be filed with the clerk of the lower tribunal, Fla.R.App.P. 9.020(g). The Court found no proof that the order sought to be reviewed had ever been filed with the clerk, and therefore remanded the cause to the agency for the purpose of holding a hearing to determine whether the order had been rendered. In Speed v. Florida-Department of Legal Affairs, 387 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), the notice of appeal was filed on May 15, 1978; the order appealed was dated April 6, 1978. However, there was nothing in the record to indicate if or when the order was filed, and the cause was remanded for a determination of the filing date.
When the orders on appeal in the above cases were entered, section 120.52(9), Florida Statutes (1977), read as follows:
“Order” means a final agency decision which does not have the effect of a rule and which is not excepted from the definition of a rule .... An agency decision shall be final when reduced to writing.
Subsequently, section 120.52(9) was amended by Chapter 79-299, section 1, Laws of Florida, and the following underlined language was added:
An agency decision shall be final when reduced to writing and filed with the person designated by the agency as clerk. The clerk shall indicate the date of filing-on the order. The obvious purpose of requiring an agency clerk to indicate the date of filing on an order is to establish with certainty the date of rendition, thus eliminating the necessity of remanding cases for fact-finding proceedings on that issue. Since the timely filing of the notice of appeal is jurisdictional, the filing date of the final order is of vital importance. By amending section 120.52(9), the Legislature recognized that the filing date of an order should not be subject to dispute and directed that the agency’s clerk indicate the date of filing on the order. In this case, the Division did not transmit to this Court, in its official record of the proceedings or otherwise, a copy of the order, if there is one, bearing the filing date noted by the Division’s clerk. In that circumstance, we decline to assume a particular filing date which is the predicate for the Division’s motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely. Because the statutory direction was quite clear, we decline to remand the case for a determination of the filing date, as we did in Speed; and we likewise will decline to revisit the matter should the Division at this stage attempt to cure the defect.
The Division’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., C. J., and McCORD and ERVIN, JJ., concur.
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Cutter v. State, 465 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)…PER CURIAM. It appearing from the record that this court does not have jurisdiction to hear this cause, the case is hereby dismissed. Fla.R.App.P. 9.020(g). Roach v. Department of Administration, 416 So. 2d 1194, 1195 (Fla. [*641] 1st DCA 1982); Belmont v. State, 370 So. 2d 1173, 1174 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). RYDER, C.J., and DANAHY and FRANK, JJ., concur.…
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Jerue Truck Brokers, Inc. v. Gator Produce Sales, Inc., 466 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)…is case is dismissed for failure to provide a written order upon which the court can determine if it has certiorari jurisdiction. Fla.R.App.P. 9.100(c); Fla.R.App.P. 9.020(g); Cf. Roach v. State, Department of Administration, Division of Retirement, 416 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). RYDER, C.J., FRANK, J., and BOARD-MAN, EDWARD F. (Ret.) J., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Sys. Mgmt. Assocs., Inc. v. State, 391 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
- Speed v. Fla. Dep't of Legal Affairs, 387 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
- Crumbley v. Crumbley, 362 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)