BALBOA INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
ST. JOHNS ENGINEERING COMPANY, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION; WALTER E. CARPENTER, AN INDIVIDUAL, EDNA CARNEGIE, AN INDIVIDUAL, AND ISAAC CARNEGIE, AN INDIVIDUAL, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Balboa Insurance Company appealed a final judgment where the trial court granted an opponent's motion to amend its answer to raise new affirmative defenses of estoppel and waiver, then entered judgment without allowing Balboa an opportunity to respond. The court held that denying Balboa the chance to address the new defenses violated its due process rights.
The court held that it was error for the trial court to refuse to allow the appellant to respond to the new affirmative defenses. Denying the appellant the opportunity to be heard on new issues raised after the case was submitted for judicial consideration violated the appellant's due process rights.
[1] A party is denied due process when the court refuses to allow a response to new affirmative defenses raised for the first time in an amended answer, especially after the…
[2] A trial court commits error by entering judgment without allowing a party to respond to newly raised affirmative defenses.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is basically unfair for the court to refuse to allow the appellant to respond to a new pleading raising new issues after it was agreed by all that the case was submitted to the court for its consideration”
The court's statement of the core due process violation—denying a party the opportunity to respond to newly raised issues.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties had agreed to submit the case to the trial court based on pleadings, a stipulated statement of facts, and opposing memoranda of law. After…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Amended Pleadings cases and more on FLexlaw
DAUKSCH, Judge.
This is an appeal from a final judgment which was entered after the parties presented the trial judge with the pleadings, a stipulated statement of facts and opposing memoranda of law. Among the various allegations of error is the assertion on the part of the appellant that it was denied due process of law by the court’s refusal to allow the appellant to answer allegations of estoppel and waiver which appellee raised as affirmative defenses. It is clear from the record that after the parties had agreed to present the case to the court upon the pleadings, the stipulated statement of facts and the legal memoranda, the appellee filed a motion to amend its Answer in order to raise for the first time the affirmative defenses of estoppel and waiver. Before any reply to those affirmative defenses could be filed the trial court entered an order granting the motion to amend the pleadings, allowed the defenses and entered judgment. Upon a motion for rehearing the court refused to reopen the case to permit a reply to the affirmative defenses. This was error because it violated appellant’s due process right to be heard in court. It is basically unfair for the court to refuse to allow the appellant to respond to a new pleading raising new issues after it was agreed by all that the case was submitted to the court for its consideration (with only the lawyers’ argument left to be submitted.) See Cavalier v. Ignas, 290 So. 2d 20 (Fla.1974); see also Ryan’s Furniture Exchange, Inc. v. McNair, 120 Fla. 109, 162 So. 483 (Fla.1935); Tomayko v. Thomas, 143 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962).
The judgment is reversed and this cause is remanded to the trial court to permit a response, by motion or otherwise, to the Motion for leave to Amend and the Amend ment to Answer and such other proceedings as might be needed.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
ORFINGER, C. J., and COWART, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Abbe v. Marnon F. Abbe, 475 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1985)…ning the property settlement and support. Sometimes parties to litigation may by agreement present a case to the trial judge on a stipulated statement of fact and legal memoranda. See, e.g., Balboa Insurance [*209] Co. v. St. Johns Engineering Co., 416 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). However, there was no stipulated statement of facts here, and there clearly were a number of fact issues. The lack of a trial also necessitated relinquishment of jurisdiction to the trial court for the purpose of proving subjec…
-
Terence Douglas v. Beulah Douglas, 363 So. 3d 157 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023)…017). the unfair and prejudicial ruling by the trial court in permitting a newly added witness to testify at trial but then denying the opposing party an opportunity to have its own witness in rebuttal); cf. Balboa Ins. Co. v. St. Johns Eng’g Co., 416 So. 2d 1268, 1268 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (“It is basically unfair for the court to refuse to allow the appellant to respond to a new pleading raising new issues after it was agreed by all that the case was submitted to the court for its consideration (with only th…
Authorities Cited
- Ryan's Furniture Exch., Inc. v. McNair, 120 Fla. 109 (Fla. 1935)
- Tomayko v. Thomas, 143 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)
- Cavalier v. Ignas, 290 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1974)