DAYTONA MIGI CORPORATION, ETC., APPELLANT,
v.
DAYTONA AUTOMOTIVE FIBERGLASS INC., ETC., APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal filed by a corporation because the notice of appeal was untimely and was signed only by a corporate officer rather than an attorney. The court held that corporations must be represented by licensed attorneys and cannot appear in court through corporate officers, making any pleading signed solely by a corporate officer a nullity.
The appeal must be dismissed on two independent grounds: (1) the notice of appeal was untimely because the amended order of January 29, 1982, made only immaterial changes and did not extend the time for appeal, making the March 1, 1982 filing more than thirty days late; and (2) the notice of appeal is invalid because a corporation must be represented by an attorney and cannot be represented by a corporate officer, making any pleading signed solely by a corporate officer a nullity.
[1] An immaterial amendment or modification of an order does not delay the time for seeking appellate review.
[2] The time for taking an appeal is tolled only if a subsequent order changes matters of substance or resolves a genuine ambiguity.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The time for taking an appeal is tolled only if the second order changes matters of substance or resolves a genuine ambiguity.”
Establishes the legal standard for when an amended order extends the deadline for filing an appeal
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFollowing remand from an earlier appeal, the trial court reconsidered damages and entered a final judgment on December 16, 1981. The trial court denie…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Tolling Of Appeal Time cases and more on FLexlaw
ORFINGER, Judge.
Following the remand of this case to the trial court after an earlier appeal,1 the trial court, in compliance with the mandate of this court, reconsidered the matter of damages and on December 16, 1981, entered a final judgment from which appellant takes this appeal.
On January 14, 1982, the trial court entered an order denying appellant’s motion for rehearing.2 This order also denied appellant’s motion for suggestion of disqualification, and taxed costs in favor of appel-lee. On January 29, 1982, the trial court entered an amended order, identical in every respect to the order of January 14,1982, except that paragraph 2 read: “Plaintiff’s motion for rehearing is denied.” Appellee moves to dismiss the appeal on two grounds: (1) that the notice of appeal was untimely, in that it was filed more than thirty days from rendition of the final judgment appealed from; and (2) even if timely, a notice of appeal is ineffective when signed only by an officer of a corporate appellant, not an attorney, and no attorney has signed the notice. We conclude that for either reason, the appeal should be dismissed.
Appellant is correct that the notice of appeal was timely if the time for filing began to run on January 29,1982, when the amended order was entered.3 However, the amendment or modification of an order in an immaterial way does not delay the time for seeking review. St. Moritz Hotel v. Daughtry, 249 So. 2d 27 (Fla.1971). The time for taking an appeal is tolled only if the second order changes matters of substance or resolves a genuine ambiguity. B. G. Leasing, Inc. v. Heider, 372 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). The test is whether the court in the second order has disturbed or revised legal rights and obligations which had been settled with finality in the original order. Id; cf. Salinger v. Salinger, 100 So. 2d 393 (Fla.1958) [trial court order amending final decree, per stipulation of the parties, to provide for a different effective date did not suspend rendition of the original order and postpone the time for taking appeal].
We note no substantive change between the order of January 14 and the amended order of January 29. In both, the petition for rehearing was denied. Neither does appellant point to any such change. Thus, the amended order did not extend the time for filing an appeal and final judgment was “rendered” when the motion for rehearing was disposed of by the order of January 14. The notice of appeal filed March 1, 1982, was too late.
Because the notice of appeal was signed by a corporate officer who is not an attorney, the notice of appeal would be dismissed in any event. A corporation must be represented in court by an attorney and may not be represented by a corporate officer. Quinn v. Housing Authority of Orlando, 385 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Southeastern Associates, Inc. v. First Georgia Bank, 362 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Angelini v. Mobile Home Village, Inc., 310 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). In Nicholson Supply Co., Inc. v. First Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. of Hardee County, 184 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966), the court denied a petition to amend the complaint for foreclosure of a lien to include an attorney’s signature after the time for foreclosure had run, holding the original complaint to be a nullity.
A corporation, unlike an individual, may not appear in court “in proper person” and represent itself. Neither may a pleading be signed by a corporate officer who is not a licensed attorney at law. Thus, any pleading purporting to be signed by such corporate officer is a nullity and has no effect. Nicholson, 184 So. 2d at 442.
The motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the appeal is DISMISSED.
DAUKSCH, C.J., and SHARP, J„ concur. . See Daytona Migi of Jacksonville, Inc. v. Day-tona Automotive Fiberglass, Inc., 388 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
. The precise language was:
“2. Plaintiffs Motion for Corrected Order, Rehearing and Explicit Finding of Fact is denied.”
. The thirtieth day fell on February 28, 1982, a Sunday, and the notice was filed March 1, 1982, the next day.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (22 total)
-
Szteinbaum v. Kaes Inversiones y Valores, 476 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…sure and Certification, 428 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), rev. denied, 449 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1984) (in dicta, adopting same view as third district in Great Southern Trucking Co.).10 But see Daytona Migi Corp. v. Daytona Automotive Fiberglass, Inc., 417 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (dismissing appeal on other grounds but noting in dicta, without discussion, that appeal would have been dismissed on ground that notice of appeal filed on behalf of corporation by non-attorney corporate officer is a nullity and…
-
Maxfly Aviation Inc. v. Cap. Airlines Ltd., 843 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…neywell Regulator Co., 344 U.S. 206, 73 S.Ct. 245, 97 L.Ed. 245 (1952)). Since the adoption of the current appellate rules, courts have continued to follow the earlier cases. For example, in Daytona Migi Corp. v. Daytona Automotive Fiberglass Inc., 417 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), the court explained: [*975] “the amendment or modification of an order in an immaterial way does not delay the time for seeking review. St. Moritz Hotel v. Daughtry, 249 So. 2d 27 (Fla.1971). The time for taking an appeal is tol…
-
Richter v. Higdon Homes, Inc., 544 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…So. 2d 247 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Punta Gorda Pines Dev., Inc. v. Slack Excavating, Inc., 468 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Hub Financial Corp. v. Olmetti, 465 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Daytona Migi Corp. v. Daytona Automotive Fiberglass, Inc., 417 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Angelini v. Mobile Home Village, Inc., 310 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). This rule applies even where the non-lawyer purporting to represent the corporation is the sole shareholder of the corporation. Southeastern Associates,…
Previewing 3 of 22 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- ST. Moritz Hotel v. Jimmy C. Daughtry & the Fla. Indus. Comm'n, 249 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1971)
- Nicholson Supply Co., Inc. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n OF Hardee Cnty., 184 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)
- Rolf Peter Salinger v. Salinger, 100 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1958)
- Quinn v. The Hous. Auth. OF the City OF Orlando, 385 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- B. G. Leasing, Inc. v. Heider, 372 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Se. Assocs., Inc. v. First Ga. Bank, 362 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
- Carey J. Walton v. State, 388 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
- Remo Joseph Angelini v. Mobile Home Vill., Inc., 310 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)