DEAN S. REBICH, EMPLOYEE, ROBERT K. FABRIC, M.D., APPELLANTS,
v.
BURDINE'S AND LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEES
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A treating physician appealed a workers' compensation order applying a two-year statute of limitations to his claims for payment of medical services. The court held that because physicians are not specifically mentioned in the relevant statute, the physician's claims are governed by the four-year statute of limitations for breach of contract, reversing the lower court's decision.
The court held that physicians are not specifically included within Section 440.19's two-year statute of limitations, and therefore Dr. Fabric's claims are governed by the four-year statute of limitations for breach of contract under Section 95.11(3)(k), Florida Statutes.
[1] A physician's claim for payment of services rendered in a workers' compensation case is not governed by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to claims under Cha…
[2] Courts may not insert words or phrases into a statute or supply omissions that were not apparent in the legislators' intent when the law was enacted.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“in none of the various permutations of Section 440.19 has the legislature seen fit to specifically include a physician's claim within that statute's ambit”
Establishes the key factual predicate—the legislature's omission of physicians from the statute—which is central to the court's holding
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDr. Robert K. Fabric provided medical services to a workers' compensation claimant and sought payment from the insurance company. The workers' compens…
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McCORD, Judge.
Dr. Robert K. Fabric, the claimant’s treating physician, appeals from a workers’ compensation order finding that certain of his claims for payment of services rendered to the claimant are barred by the two year statute of limitations of Section 440.19, Florida Statutes. Fabric essentially argues that because physicians are not specifically mentioned in Section 440.19, his claims are governed by the four year statute of limitations for breach of contract contained in Section 95.11(3)(k), Florida Statutes, and are thus timely. We agree and reverse.
A brief legislative history will aid in framing this issue. Prior to 1974, a physician did not have independent standing under Chapter 440, Florida Statutes to bring an action against an insurance company for the payment of his outstanding bill or bills before a deputy commissioner (then judge of industrial claims). § 440.10(1), Fla.Stat. (1973); Eastern Elevator Co. v. Hedman, 290 So. 2d 56 (Fla.1974). That statutory provision was subsequently amended to bring doctors’ claims for workers’ compensation bills under the provisions of the Act. Ch. 74-197, § 6, Laws of Fla. However, in none of the various permutations of Section 440.19 has the legislature seen fit to specifically include a physician’s claim within that statute’s ambit. We conclude that the court may not remedy this omission.
For guidance we turn to generally accepted principles of statutory construction. Usually, the courts in construing a statute may not insert words or phrases in that statute or supply an omission that to all appearances was not in the minds of the legislators when the law was enacted. Armstrong v. Edgewater, 157 So. 2d 422 (Fla.1963). When there is doubt as to the legislative intent, the doubt should be resolved against the power of the court to supply missing words. In Re: Estate of Jeffcott, 186 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966). Since the omission of the term “physician” from Section 440.19 certainly renders doubtful a legislative intent that his or her claims be specifically included, we decide against construing this statute in such a way. This conclusion is buttressed by the corollary doctrine of expressio unius est ex-clusio alterius. Under that doctrine, where a statute enumerates the thing or things on which it is to operate, it is ordinarily to be construed as excluding from its operation all those things not expressly mentioned. Thayer v. State, 335 So. 2d 815 (Fla.1976); Ideal Farms Drainage Dist. v. Certain Lands, 154 Fla. 554, 19 So. 2d 234 (1944).
Alternatively, it has been held that where there is a reasonable doubt concerning the legislature’s intention to provide for a shortened limitation period, the benefit of the doubt should be given to the plaintiff. See Haney v. Holmes, 364 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). As Dr. Fabric is the plaintiff in this dispute below, he should be given the benefit of the doubt as to the inapplicability of Section 440.19.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, we REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
MILLS and SHIVERS, JJ., concur.
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Special Disability Tr. Fund v. Motor & Compressor Co. & Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 446 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…ndemnity Company v. Williams, 85 So. 2d 619 (Fla.1956), we are unpersuaded that we are at liberty to read vocational rehabilitation benefits into “remedial treatment, care, and attendance pursuant to s. 440.13.” As we stated in Rebich v. Burdine’s, 417 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982): Usually, the courts in construing a statute may not insert words or phrases in that statute or supply an omission that to all appearances was not in the minds of the legislators when the law was enacted. Armstrong v. Edgewater,…
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Associated Coca Cola & Liberty Mut. Ins. v. Special Disability Tr. Fund, 508 So. 2d 1305 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)…f the general rule that a general statute of limitations may be applied to administrative proceedings in the absence of a specially applicable statute of limitations. See 2 Am.Jur.2d Admin [*1307] istrative Law § 322 (1962); cf. Rebich v. Burdine's, 417 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 424 So. 2d 762 (Fla.1982) (treating physician’s claims for payment for services rendered to workers’ compensation claimant governed by section 95.11(3)(k), Florida Statutes).…
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Devon-Aire Villas Homeowners Ass'n v. Americable Assocs., Ltd., 490 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…alterius, where statute enumerates the thing or things on which it is to operate, it is ordinarily to be construed as excluding from this operation all those things not expressly mentioned); Rebich v. Burdine’s and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 417 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied 424 So. 2d 762 (Fla.1982) (since physicians not specifically mentioned in two-year workers' compensation statute of limitations, their payment claims not governed by that statute). . The power of eminent domain is grante…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Thayer v. State, 335 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1976)
- Ideal Farms Drainage Dist. v. Certain Lands IN Said Dist. against which taxes have been assessed & Maurice Mountz, 154 Fla. 554 (Fla. 1944)
- Armstrong v. City OF Edgewater, 157 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1963)
- In re Est. of Kate Jeffcott v. Starnes, 186 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)
- Haney v. Holmes, 364 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- E. Elevator Co. v. Lenart C. Hedman, 290 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1974)