WILLIAM J. HOLTERHAUS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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William Holterhaus appealed the revocation of his probation for alleged violations of reporting requirements and failure to follow probation officer instructions. The Florida appellate court reversed, holding that a probation officer's directive to complete a drug rehabilitation program was not a validly imposed court-ordered condition and therefore could not support probation revocation.
A probation officer's requirement that a probationer complete a drug rehabilitation program is not a matter of routine supervision and cannot be imposed solely by probation officer directive without specific court approval. Such significant conditions cannot be delegated through a broad general condition requiring compliance with all officer instructions.
[1] A probationer's failure to comply with a probation officer's directive to complete a drug rehabilitation program is not a violation of probation if the directive was not…
[2] Probation may only be revoked for violation of a condition imposed by the court, not by a probation officer, unless the officer's instruction is a routine supervisory dir…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“probation may only be revoked for violation of a condition which is imposed by the court, rather than by a probation officer”
Establishes the foundational principle that court approval is required for probation conditions
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHolterhaus was on probation subject to conditions including filing monthly reports and complying with probation officer instructions. His monthly repo…
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CAMPBELL, Judge.
William J. Holterhaus appeals the revocation of his probation for violation of conditions (1) and (8); that is, for failure to file monthly reports (the required monthly report was received one day late in April and two days late in June), and failure to comply with all instructions of the probation officer. The latter condition was found to have been violated when Holterhaus was terminated from the DACCO Drug Rehabilitation Program after his probation officer instructed him to enroll in, attend and complete the program.
We reverse. The probation officer’s directive that Holterhaus complete the DAC-CO Program was not a validly imposed court-ordered condition of probation and was not encompassed by the requirement of condition (8) that the probationer comply with all instructions given by the officer. Barber v. State, 344 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), established that probation may only be revoked for violation of a condition which is imposed by the court, rather than by a probation officer. In Watkins v. State, 368 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), this court found that application of Barber would be contrary to the intent of probation because the nature of the probation officer’s instruction — a routine direction to file monthly reports — was dispositive. In a situation where the officer merely gives normal supervisory directions of this nature, it is not necessary for the court to specifically approve those directions in order for disobedience of them to constitute a violation of probation.
In the instant case, the requirement imposed by the probation officer that Holter-haus attend DACCO is not such a matter of routine supervision as to fall within the ambit of Watkins. The requirement that a probationer complete a drug, program is not such a reasonable and necessary condition of supervision that it could be specifically delegated merely by such a broad directive as is condition (8).1
In light of Chatman v. State, 365 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Page v. State, 363 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); and Barber, we would reverse this probation revocation and remand in order for the trial court to consider whether there were other violations or whether the technical violation of condition (1) was sufficient to support the revocation of probation, standing alone. Tuff v. State, 338 So. 2d 1335 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976).
GRIMES, A. C. J., and SCHOONOVER, J., concur. . Condition (8) reads as follows: You will promptly and truthfully answer all inquiries directed to you by the Court or the Probation Officer, and allow the Officer to visit in your home, at your employment site or elsewhere, and you will comply with all instructions he may give you.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (13 total)
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Rowland v. State, 548 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…nseling as directed by your probation officer.” Appellant argues that the trial court impermissibly delegated to the probation officer the exclusive authority to require that appellant attend the treatment and counseling, citing Holterhaus v. State, 417 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). In Holterhaus, the trial court imposed, as a condition of probation, that the probationer comply with all instructions given by his probation officer. The probation officer directed the probationer to complete a drug rehabilitati…
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Odom v. State, 15 So. 3d 672 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)…on, does not constitute a new, special condition of probation. Rather, it is a reasonable, necessary procedure for implementing the official “visitation” or meeting requirement that clearly is set forth in the written condition. Holterhaus v. State, 417 So. 2d 291, 292 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (stating that specific court approval is not necessary for “normal supervisory directions” given by the probation officer); Watkins v. State, 368 So. 2d 363, 365-66 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) (concluding that a court-approved probati…
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Eladio Morales v. State, 518 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…g counseling — cannot be considered one imposed by the court by virtue of the court’s general admonition that Morales comply with all instructions of the probation officer, Hutchinson v. State, 428 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Holterhaus v. State, 417 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), and such condition being therefore imposed by the probation officer only, the violation of it cannot serve as a basis for the revocation of probation. Hutchinson v. State, 428 So. 2d 739; Holterhaus v. State, 417 So. 2d 291; see…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Page v. State, 363 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
- Tuff v. State, 338 So. 2d 1335 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)
- Chatman v. State, 365 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- Watkins v. State, 368 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Barber v. State, 344 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)