THOMAS HARRIDD COLEMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Thomas Coleman appealed his nolo contendere plea conviction for kidnapping and life sentence, challenging the trial court's denial of his motions to suppress and discharge. The court remanded the case to allow Coleman to withdraw his plea after determining that his plea was based on an invalid assurance regarding his appellate rights.
Coleman's plea was not validly entered because it was predicated on an invalid assurance that he could appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The court remanded the case to allow Coleman to withdraw his plea and reinstate all charges, or to maintain his plea and proceed solely on the discharge issue.
[1] A nolo contendere plea entered under the mistaken belief that the right to appeal a suppression issue is preserved is invalid.
[2] A defendant should be allowed to withdraw a nolo contendere plea when the plea was predicated on an assurance that the right to appeal a suppression issue was preserved,…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court specifically advised the appellant that he was giving up the right to appeal all matters except the denial of his motion to suppress and motion for discharge”
Establishes the invalid assurance upon which Coleman's plea was based
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceColeman entered a nolo contendere plea to kidnapping shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. State, which held that defendants could no…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from a judgment entered pursuant to a plea of nolo contendere adjudicating appellant guilty of kidnapping and sentencing him to life imprisonment. On appeal appellant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress and discharge. Appellant further asserts that, should we find no error in the trial court’s denial of the motion to discharge, we must nevertheless remand and allow him the opportunity to withdraw his plea.
Appellant entered his plea of nolo conten-dere shortly after the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. State, 376 So. 2d 382 (Fla.1979), which held that a defendant could not, absent circumstances not present here, reserve the right to appeal an order denying a motion to suppress a confession upon a plea of nolo contendere. The Brown decision was not discussed at the time appellant changed his plea and the transcript of the hearing reflects that everyone was proceeding on the basis that the defendant could reserve the right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress his confession. Indeed, the trial court specifically advised the appellant that he was giving up the right to appeal all matters except the denial of his motion to suppress and motion for discharge. Since appellant’s plea was predicated on the assurance to him that he could appeal both issues, we do not believe it would be appropriate to rule on the discharge issue until appellant has had an opportunity to withdraw his plea based upon the invalidity of the agreement reserving his right to appeal the suppression issue.
Accordingly, this cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for the purpose of allowing the appellant to elect whether or not to withdraw his plea and have all of the charges filed against him reinstated, or to maintain his plea and proceed on appeal solely on the issue of his entitlement to discharge under the speedy trial rule.
LETTS, C. J., and ANSTEAD and HERSEY, JJ., concur.
[*691] ON REHEARING
PER CURIAM.
In its petition for rehearing the appellee asks that we reconsider our decision on the authority of Hardison v. State, 385 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). Although the plea colloquy is not set out in Hardison, we acknowledge that our ruling appears to conflict with the holding therein. Having acknowledged this apparent conflict, we deny the petition for rehearing.
LETTS, C. J., and ANSTEAD and HERSEY, JJ., concur.
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Cited By
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Turner v. State, 429 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…ed.” Alexander v. State, 399 So. 2d at 110, citing, Hardison v. State, 385 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). In refusing to allow appellant an opportunity to withdraw his plea, we acknowledge that our opinion appears to conflict with Coleman v. State, 417 So. 2d 690, 691 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), which the Fourth District Court of Appeal expressly acknowledged conflicted with Hardison. As such, Coleman implicitly conflicts with our opinion in Alexander. Although the factual scenario in Coleman is distinguishable fro…
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German A. Gomez and Florentino Molina v. State, 437 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…n misled into believing a ruling was dispositive only to have an appellate court find that it was not, and that, therefore, it was without jurisdiction over the appeal. See, e.g., Carr v. State, 421 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Coleman v. State, 417 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Kjersgaard v. State, 383 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Gray v. State, 381 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Arnold v. State, 379 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). Instead, as should be obvious, implicit in our earlier affirmance of…
Authorities Cited
- Brown v. State, 376 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1979)
- Hardison v. State, 385 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)