ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
JOSEPH PIATT, PATRICIA PIATT, AND KIMBERLY PIATT, APPELLEES
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Allstate Insurance appeals a summary judgment awarding uninsured motorist coverage to three insured passengers injured in a collision. The court affirms that coverage exists but reverses the amount, holding that the anti-stacking provision limits recovery to $100,000 per accident rather than $150,000, and affirms the trial court's denial of a PIP payment set-off.
Allstate's liability is limited to $100,000 per accident under the anti-stacking provision of Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes, because the Piatts paid premiums for only one policy. The trial court properly refused to allow a set-off of PIP payments because there was no showing of duplication of benefits.
[1] An anti-stacking provision in an insurance policy prevents the aggregation of coverage limits from multiple vehicles insured under a single policy when none of the insure…
[2] Aggregation of uninsured motorist coverage is permitted where multiple insurance policies are involved, even in the presence of an anti-stacking statute.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“if none of the insureds or named insured's vehicles is involved in the accident, coverage is available only to the extent of coverage on any one of the vehicles with applicable coverage. Coverage on any other vehicles shall not be added to or stacked upon that coverage.”
Establishes the anti-stacking provision of Section 627.4132 that limits recovery to a single vehicle's coverage when none of the insured's vehicles is involved in the accident.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJoseph, Patricia, and their minor daughter Kimberly Piatt were passengers in a vehicle owned and operated by Ronald Kulpeksa when it collided with ano…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal by Allstate Insurance Company from a summary judgment granted in favor of Joseph, Patricia and Kimberly Piatt. For the reasons which follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
Joseph, Patricia and their minor daughter, Kimberly, were passengers in a motor vehicle (owned and operated by Ronald Kul-peksa) which had a collision with another vehicle. The Piatts contended that the accident was caused by the negligence of Mr. Kulpeksa, who had no liability insurance. They, accordingly, sought uninsured motorist coverage from their own insurance company. Allstate insured Joseph Piatt under a single policy that covered two vehicles. The policy provided uninsured motorist coverage on both cars, with limits of liability of $50,000 each person, $100,000 each accident. The trial court, in granting summary judgment, concluded that coverage existed in the amount of $50,000 per plaintiff, for a total of $150,000. In our view, this was error. The anti-stacking provision of Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1977), in effect at the time of these events, provides that “.. . if none of the insureds or named insured’s vehicles is involved in the accident, coverage is available only to the extent of coverage on any one of the vehicles with applicable coverage. Coverage on any other vehicles shall not be added to or stacked upon that coverage.” Aggregation of coverage, despite the anti-stacking statute, is permitted where multiple policies are involved. See, e.g., South Carolina Insurance Company v. Kokay, 398 So. 2d 1355 (Fla.1981); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. Curry, 395 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1980); Cox v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Company, 378 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Lezcano v. Leatherby Insurance Company, 372 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). In the case sub judice, no qualifying exception exists since the Piatts paid premiums for only one policy and, therefore, Allstate’s liability is only to the extent of that policy and its limitation of $100,000 per accident.
On remand, the trial court is directed to limit Allstate’s coverage to the $100,000 per accident policy provision.
Allstate also assigns as error the trial court’s refusal to permit a set-off of PIP payment, made previously under this policy. There is no showing of duplication of benefits and, therefore, the trial court’s ruling was correct. Douglas v. Iowa National Mutual Insurance Company, 409 So. 2d 1029 (Fla.1982); Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company v. Lackore, 408 So. 2d 1040 (Fla.1982).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Pate v. Renfroe, 715 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)…f the PIP set-off provision that the benefits have been “paid” or are “payable.” The purpose of a set-off is tu avoid duplication of benefits. See, e.g., Galante v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 695 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Piatt, 417 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). It is the burden of the party seeking the set-off to prove the existence of an actual duplication of benefits in fact. Galante, 695 So. 2d at 457. In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Piatt, the court held that there had been no demonstr…
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Teachers Ins. Co. v. Bollman, 617 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)…t in this matter, “aggregating” necessarily results from multiple policies, such as are found in this case, each insuring a single vehicle. The Bollmans’ notion of aggregating coverage seems to derive from the comment in Allstate Insurance v. Piatt, 417 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), that the “Aggregation of coverage, despite the anti-stacking statute, is permitted where multiple policies are involved.” Apart from a mechanical application of the foregoing language, we find nothing in Piatt, the statute,…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Pierpont, 398 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 1981)
- Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Lackore, 408 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 1982)
- COX v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 378 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
- Bennett S. Cohn v. World Casino Tours, Inc., 372 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Curry, 395 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1981)
- Douglas v. Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 409 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 1982)