STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
MICHAEL KATZ, RESPONDENT
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Florida's Second District Court of Appeal granted the State's petition for certiorari to review a trial court's order granting a change of venue from Pasco to Hillsborough County in a first-degree murder case. The court held that the trial court violated the essential requirements of law by granting the change of venue when the indictment charged venue in only Pasco County rather than conjunctively in multiple counties.
The court held that pursuant to Article I, Section 16 of the Florida Constitution and Sections 910.02 and 910.03 of the Florida Statutes, the accused does not have the right to request a change of venue if the charging instrument does not allege conjunctive venue. The trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by misapplying the plain language of the constitutional and statutory sections.
[1] A trial court departs from the essential requirements of law when it grants a change of venue based on a constitutional or statutory provision that requires conjunctive v…
[2] The Florida Constitution, Article I, Section 16, permits charging venue in two or more counties conjunctively when the county of commission is unknown, granting the accus…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We hold that pursuant to Article I, Section 16, and its express terms, venue need not be charged conjunctively, and the accused does not have the right to request a change of venue pursuant to this section if the charging instrument does not allege conjunctive venue.”
Establishes the essential holding that conjunctive venue must be alleged in the indictment for a change of venue to be granted under this constitutional and statutory provision.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA Pasco County grand jury indicted respondent Katz for first-degree murder, alleging venue solely in Pasco County. Katz moved for a change of venue to…
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BOARDMAN, Acting Chief Judge.
The state petitions for writ of certiorari, asserting that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law when it granted a change of venue from Pasco to Hillsborough County. We grant certiorari.
A Pasco County grand jury charged respondent Katz with first-degree murder. The indictment alleged venue solely in Pas-co County, but the trial court granted respondent’s motion for change of venue to Hillsborough County. We hold that this order violates the essential requirements of law.
The trial court relied on Article I, Section 16 of the Florida Constitution, which provides that if the county where the crime was committed is not known, “the indictment or information may charge venue in two or more counties conjunctively and proof that the crime was committed in that area shall be sufficient; but before pleading the accused may elect in which of those counties he will be tried.” In this case, however, the indictment charged venue in only Pasco County. We hold that pursuant to Article I, Section 16, and its express terms, venue need not be charged conjunctively,1 and the accused does not have the right to request a change of venue pursuant to this section if the charging instrument does not allege conjunctive venue.
The trial court also relied on Sections 910.02 and 910.03, Florida Statutes (1981). These statutes, however, also require the charging instrument to allege venue conjunctively.
We conclude that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law by misapplying the plain language of the constitutional and statutory sections it relied on.
Accordingly, we grant certiorari, quash the order granting change of venue, and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
OTT, C. J., and SCHOONOVER, J., concur. . If venue is not charged conjunctively, however, the state must prove that the crime was committed in the county named in the charging instrument, Mounter v. State, 178 So. 2d 714 (Fla.1965), unless section 910.05, which provides that if the acts constituting one offense are committed in two or more counties, the offender may be tried in any county in which any of the acts occurred, is applicable to the facts here. See Smith v. State, 42 Fla. 605, 28 So. 758 (1900).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Just. Admin. Comm'n v. Peterson, 989 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…f the lower tribunal has departed from the essential requirements of the law. Id. When the circuit court does not apply the plain and unambiguous language of the relevant statute, it departs from the essential requirements of law. See State v. Katz, 417 So. 2d 716, 717 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (“We conclude that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law by misapplying the plain language of the constitutional and statutory sections it relied on.”); see also Orange County v. Lewis, 859 So. 2…
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State v. Stephens, 608 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)…ted. . Art. I, § 16, Fla. Const. . § 910.10, Fla.Stat. (1987); Tucker v. State, 100 Fla. 1440, 131 So. 327 (1930). . Copeland v. State, 457 So. 2d 1012 (Fla.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1030, 105 S.Ct. 2051, 85 L.Ed.2d 324 (1985); State v. Katz, 417 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 2d DCA1982), review denied, 429 So. 2d 6 (Fla.1983). . See Martin v. State, 488 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1st DCA1986). . Section 910.03 would have authorized this trial in Seminole County for the burglary in Volu-sia County, because the burglary was…
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State v. Stephens, 586 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)…ed), so that the evidence shows a crime was committed in a different county than the one charged, the conviction must be reversed. Mounier v. State, 178 So. 2d 714 (Fla.1965); McKinnie v. State, 44 Fla. 143, 32 So. 786 (1902); [*1079] State v. Katz, 417 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), rev. denied, 429 So. 2d 6 (Fla.1983). An exception to the strict venue rule is provided by section 910.05 for crimes where the acts constituting one offense are committed in two or more counties. Trial in any county where any of…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Mounier v. State, 178 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 1965)
- Smith v. State, 42 Fla. 605 (Fla. 1900)