STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
RANDY MANUCY, APPELLEE; STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT, V. JACK RICHARD SIMMONS, APPELLEE
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Florida appealed orders dismissing grand theft charges against Manucy and Simmons based on a consumer fraud theory arising from the purchase of lidocaine instead of cocaine. The court affirmed the dismissals, holding that consumers have no reasonable expectation of receiving illegal contraband and that criminal law should not enforce quality control in illegal drug transactions.
The court affirmed the dismissal of the grand theft charges, holding that a consumer has no reasonable expectation of receiving contraband and that the criminal theft statute is not meant to enforce quality control in illegal drug transactions.
[1] A pre-trial motion to dismiss a criminal information may be granted if there are no material disputed facts and the undisputed facts do not establish a prima facie case.
[2] When a State withdraws its traverse to a motion to dismiss, all facts in the motion are deemed admitted unless specifically denied.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The theft statute in this situation is meant to vindicate the reasonable expectations of the consumer. It is not reasonable to expect to receive contraband, even when that is what has been promised, and it is not reasonable to expect the criminal laws of the state to enforce quality control in illegal drug transactions.”
Establishes the core principle that the theft statute protects reasonable consumer expectations and does not apply to illegal drug transactions.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLaw enforcement officers purchased one pound of white powder from a co-defendant, believing they were buying cocaine based on price and the seller's r…
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[*1022] PER CURIAM.
The State appeals orders of the trial court granting appellees’ pre-trial motions to dismiss count II of the information on the ground that there were no material disputed facts and the undisputed facts did not establish a prima facie case. Fla.R. Crim.P. 3.190(c)(4). We affirm.
Appellees were charged with grand theft in violation of Section 812.014, Florida Statutes (1979). The basis for the charge was a purchase by law enforcement officers of one pound of white powder from a co-defendant. The officers believed they were purchasing cocaine based on the price and their understanding of the co-defendant’s representations. The powder was later found to be 100% lidocaine, a substance not controlled under Chapter 893, Fla.Stat. (1979). The State’s theory of prosecution was that there was a grand theft committed on a consumer fraud theory because the officers were led to believe they were buying cocaine but were sold lidocaine. The trial court specifically ruled that this theory of prosecution was not a valid charge.
Our review and our affirmance are limited to the facts in the motions and orders in this particular case. -The State withdrew its traverse to the motions. Therefore all facts in the motions, since not specifically denied by the State, are deemed admitted. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(d).
A review of the facts of each appellee’s motion leads to the conclusion that the facts do not state a prima facie case of consumer fraud under the grand theft statute.
The theft statute in this situation is meant to vindicate the reasonable expectations of the consumer. It is not reasonable to expect to receive contraband, even when that is what has been promised, and it is not reasonable to expect the criminal laws of the state to enforce quality control in illegal drug transactions. Where the buyer consents to part with his money on the assumption that he is to receive cocaine, the “contract” between buyer and seller is already voided by the illegal and unenforceable nature of the proposed transaction.
The buyer is clearly on notice that the person he is dealing with is necessarily a criminal if he delivers, a liar if he doesn’t, or both. “.. . [N]either law nor equity relieves against one’s own credulousness and inexcusable indifference to one’s own interest in a transaction where one has no legal right to rely upon the statements, representation and descriptions of another in the negotiation.” Smith v. Hollings-worth, 85 Fla. 431, 434, 96 So. 394, 395 (1923). See Ramel v. Chasebrook Construction Company, 135 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1961), and Morton v. Young, 311 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1975).
AFFIRMED.
ERVIN, SHIVERS and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur.
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State v. Bussey, 444 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)…e statute to be unconstitutional as an improper exercise of police power. The court found that the state had no proper purpose in enacting laws to enforce quality control in illegal drug transactions. The same rationale is stated in State v. Manucy, 417 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), where the First District held that the sale of an uncontrolled substance in lieu of a controlled substance could not be grand theft by fraud in violation of Section 812.014, Florida Statutes (1979). The court reasoned that the t…
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State v. Gordon, 920 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)…The state appeals a final order dismissing on the authority of State v. Manucy, 417 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), the charges of grand theft and conspiracy to commit grand theft with which Aaron S. Gordon, Appellee, had been charged by information. Because we conclude that the holding in Manucy is limited to cases of theft by fraud, we reve…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- Ramel v. Chasebrook Constr. Co., Inc., 135 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961)
- Smith v. Hollingsworth, 85 Fla. 431 (Fla. 1923)
- Emil Morton v. Young, 311 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)