MARTHA JEAN HEIST, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF FLOYD DOUGLAS HEIST, SR., APPELLANT,
v.
LOCK & GUNSMITH, INC. AND TRAVELERS' INSURANCE CO., APPELLEES
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Court affirmed dismissal of complaint against gun dealer for failure to allege sufficient facts that dealer knew or should have known the purchaser was mentally unsound or dangerous, despite allegations dealer knew the true buyer was someone other than the named purchaser.
A gun dealer's sale of a firearm states no cause of action for resulting injury where the complaint alleges only that the dealer should have noticed the true purchaser was different from the named purchaser, without sufficiently alleging facts showing the dealer knew the true purchaser was of unsound mind or otherwise dangerous.
[1] A complaint alleging a gun dealer sold a firearm to a straw purchaser states no cause of action for resulting injury unless it sufficiently alleges facts showing the deal…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA gun dealer sold a .38 caliber pistol to Bullard, though circumstances allegedly indicated Fitzpatrick was the true purchaser. Fitzpatrick used the g…
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ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., Chief Judge.
We affirm the trial court’s order dismissing appellant’s third amended complaint, with prejudice, for failure to state a cause of action arising out of the defendant gun dealer’s sale of a .38 caliber pistol to one Bullard in circumstances that are alleged to have placed the dealer on notice that the real purchaser was Bullard’s companion in the store, Fitzpatrick. Fitzpatrick used the gun 10 days later in a crime and, while doing so, shot plaintiff’s decedent. While the circumstances alleged in the complaint may well have put the dealer on notice that Fitzpatrick was the true buyer, so placing upon the dealer an obligation to require identity proof from Fitzpatrick under federal law, the chain of foreseeable circumstances ends there. The complaint insufficiently explicates its conclusory allegations that the circumstances put the gun dealer on notice that both Bullard and Fitzpatrick were persons of “unsound mind” to whom a gun sale is prohibited by section 790.17, Florida Statutes (1979), or that they were otherwise dangerous. Cf. Angell v. F. Avanzini Lumber Company, 363 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
It is not clear whether the trial court’s observations about the vagueness of the statutory term “unsound mind” amounted to a declaration that the statute is unconstitutionally vague; since we find it unnecessary to reach that question, we construe the trial court’s observations as observations only, equally unnecessary to and not a part of the decision. •
AFFIRMED.
ERVIN and SHAW, JJ., concur.