STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
JORGE LICOURT, APPELLEE
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Florida appealed the suppression of cocaine found during an inventory search of Jorge Licourt's impounded vehicle. The court reversed the suppression order, holding that the inventory search was properly conducted and did not exceed the scope of such searches, and rejecting arguments that the search violated Fourth Amendment protections.
The inventory search was proper and did not exceed its lawful scope. The court reversed the suppression order, holding that inventory searches are appropriate police procedures and that the removal of the checkered cloth to determine its contents was within the parameters of such searches.
[1] A defendant must demonstrate standing to challenge the legality of a search and suppress evidence.
[2] The doctrine of automatic standing for possession offenses is no longer viable.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“I knew that cars don't normally come with red and white checkered cloth stuffed in that area of the dashboard. So I reached underneath the dash and removed the cloth to see what it was, consisted of.”
Officer's testimony explaining the discovery of cocaine during the inventory search and establishing the basis for the removal of the cloth.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePolice stopped an automobile containing Licourt and two others based on two BOLOs. After the proper stop, the vehicle was blocking traffic and occupan…
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DOWNEY, Judge.
Proceeding upon authority of two BOLO’s the police stopped an automobile containing appellant and two others. After the undisputedly proper stop the automobile was blocking traffic and, since none of the occupants could speak English, the police decided to take the occupants to the police station nearby and to impound the automobile. Apparently the vehicle was old and the windows would not close, so an inventory search was conducted at the station. While inventorying the car, an officer noticed a “red and white piece of checkered cloth located in a housing which ran across the steering wheel underneath the dashboard.” The officer testified that “I knew that cars don’t normally come with red and white checkered cloth stuffed in that area of the dashboard. So I reached underneath the dash and removed the cloth to see what it was, consisted of.” Upon removing the cloth, he found what proved to be cocaine.
Appellee’s motion to suppress the contraband was granted and the State perfected this appeal, contending the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence because 1) appellee did not show he had standing; 2) the court recognized the inventory search was proper; 3) the cloth was in plain view; and 4) the search was incident to a lawful arrest. Appellee says the order of suppression is proper because 1) the inventory search became an exploratory search for evidence, and 2) he had standing because the crime charged involved possession of the very property illegally seized.
Appellee’s contention of automatic standing under the old Jones1 rule is no longer viable since the decision in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980). Thus, while appellee did fail to show he had standing to attack the illegality of the search, which showing is a requisite to a successful motion to suppress,2 we need not rely upon that oversight for reversal. Appellee conceded the stop in this case was proper and that the police had a right to take the appellant and the car to the police station. In fact, he does not argue that an inventory search was inappropriate under the circumstances; rather, he zeros in on the scope of the search as being the offending aspect of the police action. We reject this contention and hold that the inventory search was appropriate and that it did not exceed in scope the parameters and purposes of such police procedure.
We do not believe there is merit in the State’s contention that the search in this case can be upheld as a search incident to a lawful arrest under New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981). We concede that Belton liberal ized the circumstances under which a search incident to an arrest can be conducted so that the area to be searched is no longer restricted to the area within the arrestee’s immediate control as held in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), and Ulesky v. State, 379 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979). However, even Belton retains a time restriction regarding the search; it must be a “contemporaneous incident of that arrest.” Thus, a search conducted at a time and place far removed from the scene of the arrest would not appear to fulfill the requirements of a search incident to an arrest.
Accordingly, since the inventory search was propér, we reverse the order suppressing the evidence and remand the case for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED, with directions.
ANSTEAD and BERANEK, JJ., concur. . Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960).
. State v. Muzevsky, 388 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Rizzo v. State ex rel. City of Pompano Beach, 396 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Daley v. State, 398 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); and State v. Rivera, 400 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
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Citator
Cited By
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Meyers v. State, 432 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)…id not fall within the holding in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981) regarding searches incident to a lawful arrest. This search was not made “contemporaneously” with the appellant’s arrest. See State v. Licourt, 417 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964). Finally, the subsequent search cannot be justified on the grounds of an inventory ■ search. The vehicle had previously been so searched and Chief Fitz…
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State v. Marini, 488 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)…point of arrest that this Court finds it was not contemporaneous and incident to that. arrest. See Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 [84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777] (1964); Kuhn v. State, 439 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 3d DCA, 1983) and State v. Licourt, 417 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 4th DCA, 1982). The trial court was correct. In Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964), the Court observed that although the police have the unquestioned right to make a contemporaneous search of a defenda…1 / 2
Authorities Cited (11 total)
- Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (U.S. 1960)
- Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (U.S. 1969)
- New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (U.S. 1981)
- United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (U.S. 1980)
- Ulesky v. State, 379 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979)
- Anthony Rizzo & 1978 Sea Ray v. State, 396 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
- State v. Muzevsky, 388 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- Daley v. State, 398 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
- Barnes v. State, 400 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- State v. Rivera, 400 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)