APOLLO SHIRT CO.

v.

ENRO SHIRT CO., INC.

It would seem to be evident, from the argument of counsel for appellant that although appellant’s registered mark “Sport-master” is for use on “Men’s Dress, Work, and Under Shirts,” the prefix “Sport” in appellant’s trade-mark is merely descriptive of the goods upon which its mark is used, and that, therefore, the trademark “Sportmaster” on the goods upon which the mark is used, includes sport shirts, or that in the natural extension of its business, appellant contemplates the use of the trade-mark “Sportmaster” on sport shirts.

As hereinbefore noted, each of the tribunals of the Patent Office concluded that considering the marks in their entireties, and the goods upon which they were used, the marks were confusingly similar and that appellee would be injured by the use of appellant’s mark on its goods.

It is well known in the commerce of the United States, of which the court may take judicial notice, that so-called “sport shirts,” “undershirts,” “work shirts,” and “dress shirts” are sold in the same stores to the general public, so the question presented is whether, considering the goods of the parties and their respective marks, confusion in trade would be likely to occur by the concurrent use of the marks of the parties on their goods.

We are of opinion, as were the tribunals of the Patent Office, that the marks are confusingly similar and that appellee would likely be injured by the use of the registered mark “Sportmaster” on shirts possessing the same descriptive properties as those on which appellee uses its mark “Sportster.” It clearly appears that the last four letters of the marks end in the letters “Ster” and that the only difference is that appellant’s mark has the letters “Ma” which do not appear in appellee’s mark. It is true that neither of the parties is entitled to the exclusive use of the word “Sport” as a trade-mark, as it is merely descriptive of the goods upon which the mark is used by each of the parties.

We have given careful consideration to the arguments presented here by counsel for appellant,, and the cases cited upon which they rely, but are unable to hold that the trade-mark “Sportmaster” for use on appellant’s goods is not confusingly similar to the trade-mark “Sportster” as ■used by appellee on its goods, and that appellee would not likely be injured by the use of the trade-mark “Sportmaster.”

We have frequently held in opposition and cancellation proceedings that trademarks should be considered in their entire-ties, and that the public should not be required to dissect or analyze trade-marks in order to avoid confusion as to the origin of goods. It is unnecessary that we cite decisions in support of those statements.

After careful consideration we are of ■opinion that the tribunals of the Patent Office reached the right conclusion. Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner ■of Patents is affirmed.

Affirmed.

BLAND, Judge, sat during the argument of this case, but resigned before the opinion was prepared.