ARTHUR WAYNE MARSH, PETITIONER,
v.
LAUREL J. ISING MARSH, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court resolved a conflict among district courts regarding the standard for determining whether a spouse acquired a special equity in marital property held as tenants by the entireties. The court held that when intent must be determined from conflicting testimony, the trial court's credibility determinations are entitled to substantial deference and cannot be substituted by appellate courts.
When a grantor's intent to create a special equity is determined from conflicting testimony of the parties, the trial court's evaluation of the weight and credibility of that testimony is entitled to substantial deference. The appellate court may not substitute its judgment for the trial court's credibility determinations. The trial court properly found the husband's testimony that the transfer was a gift to be more credible than the wife's contradictory testimony.
[1] A special equity in property held as tenants by the entireties may be established by proof that all consideration for the property was supplied by one spouse from a sourc…
[2] The presumption of a gift when property is transferred to tenants by the entireties can be rebutted by evidence of the grantor's intent at the time of transfer.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In Ball we held that one way a special equity may be created is by an unrebutted showing that all of the consideration for the property held as tenants by the entireties was supplied by one spouse from a source clearly unconnected with the marital relationship. The special equity may be defeated, however, by "contradictory evidence that a gift was intended" at the time of the transfer.”
Establishes the legal test for creating and defeating a special equity in tenancies by the entireties
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceArthur and Laurel Marsh married on October 7, 1978. Two months later, Laurel transferred her home, which she owned solely before the marriage and on w…
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McDONALD, Justice.
This cause is before the Court on petition to review Marsh v. Marsh, 399 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), which conflicts with Ball v. Ball, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla.1976), and, Marti v. Marti, 377 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. dismissed, 383 So. 2d 1198 (Fla.1980). We have jurisdiction1 and quash the instant decision.
The petition concerns the final judgment of a dissolution of marriage, and the sole issue is whether the wife acquired a special equity in the marital home. The parties married on October 7, 1978. Two months later the wife issued a quit claim deed transferring her home from sole ownership to the two of them as tenants by the entire-ties. The wife owned the home prior to the marriage and paid all of the mortgage payments and property taxes. The petition for dissolution of marriage was filed on February 13, 1979, shortly after the transfer. No children were born of the marriage, and at trial the wife alleged that she made the transfer to provide a home for her children from a previous marriage, should anything happen to her. She also claimed that in the event of a divorce the property was to be transferred back to her. The husband claimed that the transfer was a gift.
As is usually the case in this type of proceeding, neither the deed nor any other contemporaneous document contained evidence of the intent behind the transfer. The trial judge, finding almost a direct conflict in the couple’s testimony, found for the husband and ordered a partition and sale of the home. The district court, interpreting Ball v. Ball, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla.1976), reversed the trial court, holding that no credible evidence supported the court’s ruling that the wife intended a gift.
In Ball we held that one way a special equity may be created is by an unrebutted showing that all of the consideration for the property held as tenants by the entireties was supplied by one spouse from a source clearly unconnected with the marital relationship. The special equity may be defeated, however, by “contradictory evidence that a gift was intended”2 at the time of the transfer. Conflict has arisen between the district courts of appeal concerning the application of what constitutes “contradictory evidence.”3 The issue involves the proof required by the grantee to establish the intent of the grantor. When the intent behind the transfer is included within the deed or other contemporaneous document the problem is not as severe as when the evidence of intent comes from the testimony of the litigants and their supporting witnesses. Under these circumstances, the testimony is subject to obvious bias and the witnesses’ credibility is naturally in question. The credibility of the witnesses and the weight given their testimony, however, is a question for the trial court. Mirras v. Mirras, 202 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967); Sharp v. Sharp, 185 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966). Findings of fact by a trial court are presumed to be correct and are entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict. Strawgate v. Turner, 339 So. 2d 1112 (Fla.1976).
When, as here, the grantor’s intent is to be determined from the conflicting testimony of the parties, it is the responsibility of the trial court to evaluate the weight and credibility of that testimony and to arrive at a determination. Our examination of the record convinces us that the trial court properly evaluated the evidence in reaching its decision. The district court improperly substituted its judgment for the trial court’s in reaching a contrary decision.
The decision of the district court is quashed and remanded with instructions to affirm the judgment of the trial court.
It is so ordered.
ALDERMAN, C. J., and ADKINS, OVERTON, SUNDBERG and EHRLICH, JJ., concur. BOYD, J., dissents.
. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla.Const. . 335 So. 2d at 7.
. See Marsh v. Marsh, 399 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (Cowart, J., dissenting).
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Citator
Cited By (61 total)
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Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)…a trial court’s findings remain the same. See Florida Bar v. Hooper, 509 So. 2d 289, 290-91 (Fla.1987). In this regard, “[findings of fact by a trial court are presumed correct and are entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict,” Marsh v. Marsh, 419 So. 2d 629, 630 (Fla.1982), and the record must be reviewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below. Carolina [*787] Lumber Co. v. Daniel, 97 So. 2d 156, 158 (Fla. 1st DCA 1957). Further, this court will defer to the trial court’s evaluation…
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Kennedy v. Kennedy, 622 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)…s of the alimony award, considered de novo. Sisson v. Sisson, 336 So. 2d 1129, 1130 (Fla.1976). In this regard, “[f]indings of fact by a trial court are presumed to be correct and are entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict.” Marsh v. Marsh, 419 So. 2d 629, 630 (Fla.1982) (in dissolution of marriage action, district court improperly substituted its judgment for trial court’s when district court vacated trial court’s finding in favor of husband). See also Kuvin v. Kuvin, 442 So. 2d 203 (Fla.1983) (reve…1 / 2
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Mondello v. Torres, 47 So. 3d 389 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)…re the evidence is conflicting as to whether one spouse intends to make a gift to the other, “it is the responsibility of the trial court to evaluate the weight and credibility of that testimony and to arrive at a determination.” See Marsh v. Marsh, 419 So. 2d 629, 630 (Fla.1982); accord Francavilla v. Francavilla, 969 So. 2d 522, 527 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). Here, the trial court determined all credibility issues in favor of Wife. Wife testified that she kept the Smith Barney account in her name because it was i…
Previewing 3 of 61 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Shannon v. State, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1976)
- Strawgate v. Dorothea Chase Turner, 339 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 1976)
- Mirras v. Mirras, 202 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)
- In re the Marriage of Laurel J. Ising Marsh v. Marsh, 399 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Sharp v. Sharp, 185 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)
- Marti v. Marti, 377 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)