PAVER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND AETNA INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
PATRICK MCDEVITT, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1982-09-29
No. AH-234
ERVIN and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.
419 So. 2d 1156 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1982) Caution
Cited by 12 cases

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Synopsis

In this workers' compensation appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed a 20 percent penalty assessed against the employer/carrier for late payment of workers' compensation benefits to the claimant McDevitt, rejecting arguments that payment was timely, that the order lacked sufficient findings, and that lack of intent to delay excused the penalty.


Holding

The court affirmed the 20 percent penalty, holding that payment must be made within 30 days to the claimant or his attorney (not to the E/C's own attorney), that the deputy commissioner's order was legally sufficient despite lacking detailed ultimate findings, and that lack of intent to delay payment does not excuse the assessment of a penalty, which is within the deputy commissioner's discretion.


Headnotes

[1] A penalty for late payment of workers' compensation benefits is properly assessed when payment is mailed to the employer's attorney rather than directly to the claimant o…

[2] The date of mailing for timely payment of workers' compensation benefits refers to the date the payment is sent to the claimant or their attorney, not the date it is sent…

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Key Quotes

“The "date of mailing" in that case refers to the date of mailing to claimant or his attorney, not the date of mailing to the E/C's attorney.”

Establishes that payment timing is measured from mailing to the claimant/attorney, not to the employer's own attorney

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Facts & Procedural History

The deputy commissioner ordered the employer/carrier (E/C) to pay compensation to claimant McDevitt on June 23, 1981. Aetna sent a check to the E/C's …

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Opinion of the Court
MILLS, Judge.

MILLS, Judge.

In this workers’ compensation appeal, we affirm the deputy commissioner’s assess ment of a 20 percent penalty against Paver Development and Aetna, employer/carrier (E/C), pursuant to Section 440.20(8), Florida Statutes (1981).

The following facts are pertinent:

23 June 1981 — The deputy commissioner ordered the E/C to pay compensation to McDevitt, the claimant herein.

15 July 1981 — Aetna sent the check for McDevitt to Robinson, the E/C’s attorney.

23 July 1981 — Robinson received the check in the mail.

27 July 1981 — Robinson sent McDevitt’s check to Lancaster, the claimant’s attorney.

29 July 1981 — Lancaster received the check in the mail.

The E/C first contend that payment was timely made on 15 July 1981 since that was the date the check was mailed. This contention is without merit. Clay Hyder Truck Lines v. Atherton, 400 So. 2d 1295 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), is inapplicable. The “date of mailing” in that case refers to the date of mailing to claimant or his attorney, not the date of mailing to the E/C’s attorney.

The E/C next contend that the deputy commissioner’s order is insufficient as a matter of law because it contains no ultimate findings of fact or conclusions. Four Quarters Habitat, Inc. v. Miller, 405 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Though the order might be more complete, it is legally sufficient. It states that “through error and omission or oversight, the draft was not forwarded by mail until after the 30th day.”

Finally, the E/C contend that because payment was not intentionally delayed, the deputy commissioner erred in assessing the penalty. In Crowell v. South Broward Hospital District, 378 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), this Court upheld the denial of a penalty where the judge found no intent on the part of the employer to delay payment to the claimant. However, the E/C’s interpretation of Crowell is incorrect. That case does not hold that penalties must be excused where there is no intent to delay. The assessment of a penalty is within the discretion of the deputy commissioner. We find no abuse of that discretion.

AFFIRMED.

ERVIN and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Steinbrecher v. Better Constr. Co., 587 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
    …the penalty provision of section 440.20(8) is mandatory, we are not unmindful that in Crowell v. South Broward Hospital District, 378 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), cert. denied, 392 So. 2d 1373 (Fla.1980), and Paver Development Corp. v. McDevitt, 419 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), the provision was treated as discretionary. However, the cited cases are factually distinguishable from the instant case, and provide no articulable basis for construing the language of section 440.-20(8) as discretionary. Acco…
  • Bell v. Univ. OF Fla. & Div. of Risk Mgmt., 652 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
    …e Sigg v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 594 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Steinbrecher v. Better Construction Co., 587 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); City of Miami v. Watkins, 579 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) with Paver Development Corp. v. McDevitt, 419 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Crowell v. South Broward Hospital District, 378 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), cert, denied mem., 392 So. 2d 1373 (Fla.1980). However, that does not resolve the pivotal question whether the JCC was required to apply the law in…
  • Dep't OF Transp. v. Montero, 568 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
    …as been no intent to effect any delay. See Crowell v. South Broward Hospital District, 378 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). The judge’s decision in this regard is sometimes described as a matter of discretion. See Paver Development Corp. v. McDevitt, 419 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). However, in addressing the issue of penalties the judge is obligated to recite the ultimate facts and conclusions supporting the decision. See Jupiter Marine v. Spoelstra, 528 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Stardust Motel v. S…

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